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The purpose of this dissertation is to contribute to Christian theological 
anthropology by bringing in the “interruption” of another religious tradition, Buddhism, 
in order to see how key Buddhist doctrines such as emptiness and practices of meditation 
may inform aspects of the Christian feminist discussions of kenosis in the spiritual life, 
and the search for a relational self. It also seeks to enhance Buddhist-Christian dialogue 
by bringing the “interruption” of feminist voices from both the Buddhist and Christian 
traditions into conversation with each other in order to see what they might offer, not 
only towards the search for “right relationship,” but also towards bringing about the re-
integration of doctrine and spiritual practices for more effective action in the world today. 
 In the first part of the dissertation, I lay out the background of these two concepts 
of kenosis and emptiness within their respective religious traditions including the 
Buddhist-Christian dialogues around these two concepts.  I then look at how Christian 
feminists (Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey) as well as Buddhist feminists (Anne Klein and 
Rita Gross) critique the traditional interpretations of these concepts and how they 
reconstruct such concepts in their articulation of a relational self and in their argument for 
the importance of practice and its relationship with doctrine. 
  
 In the second part of this dissertation, I focus on the comparison between these 
Buddhist and Christian feminists and how they can mutually learn from each other.  I 
argue that Buddhist feminist discussions on emptiness and meditation enhances and 
deepens the Christian feminist articulations of kenosis and how an empowered self can be 
found through a kenotic spirituality. I also demonstrate how such a dialogue can bring us 
back to the rich resources within the Christian tradition, such as the image of Mary and 
Marian devotions.  Furthermore, I show how this feminist comparison contributes back to 
Buddhist-Christian dialogue by including the voices of women and their concern for 
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Introduction 
I.  The importance of “interruption”  
 
The title of this dissertation, “Interruption the conversation” may seem 
disconcerting for the reader at first glance.  The notion of “interruption” is usually 
understood as something rude or inappropriate, or something that breaks a pattern or train 
of thought with negative connotations.  And yet “interruptions” can also be seen as 
having a positive value.  For example, they are necessary in order to move one out of 
patterns and habits that hamper growth and allow for new ones to emerge.  Furthermore, 
they enable us to see things from a new perspective or notice aspects previously 
unnoticed.  Henri Nouwen, writing on the spiritual life, says that interruptions are 
“invitations to give up old-fashioned and outmoded styles of living” that opens us to 
“new unexplored areas of experience.”1  They are important because they are part of the 
way that is constantly calling one to conversion, to a new way of seeing the world, to new 
realities and new possibilities.  One could also argue that interruptions are just as 
necessary within the life of the Church today for her “old-fashioned and outmoded styles 
of living” are being deemed as constantly irrelevant or distanced from the contemporary 
world we live in.  This, for example, is what Lieven Boeve observes as he looks at the 
situation of the Churches in Europe and concludes that “an ever-increasing gulf exists 
between contemporary culture and the Christian faith.”2 Given this gulf, he wonders “[t]o 
                                                
1 Henri Nouwen, Reaching Out: The Three Movements of the Spiritual Life (New York: Image 
Books/Doubleday, 1975) 53.   
2 Lieven Boeve, Interrupting Tradition: An Essay on Christian Faith in a Post Modern Context (Louvain: 
Peeters Press, 2003) 6. 
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what extent can the Christian faith still offer meaning to contemporary men and women 
and the communities to which they belong?”3 
For Boeve, the solution lies in recontextualizing the tradition itself and having a 
dialogue with the postmodern context.  For this to happen, however, the interruption of 
“the other”4 is necessary so that we do not just continue on as we did but that we allow 
ourselves to truly have an encounter, a real dialogue with the other.  This allows 
Christianity to say something meaningful to that context while allowing that context to 
say something relevant back to Christianity. Moreover, Boeve argues that the necessity 
for interruption and recontextualization is not only due to our current context; rather, 
interruption itself is a theological imperative.  
As a matter of fact, interruption is also capable of pointing the way in which God reveals 
Godself in history and the way in which Christians bear witness to this reality in 
narratives and practices. God’s interruption constitutes the theological foundation for a 
continuous and radical hermeneutic of the context and the tradition.  Just as (and because) 
every concrete encounter with the other/Other is a potential location for God to reveal 
Godself today, it is only in concrete narratives and practices that the interrupting God can 
be testified to in today’s context.5 
 
In other words, to be a Christian, to follow Christ and to believe in God is to allow 
oneself to be interrupted by the other, and through dialogue, find God in and through the 
other.  This theological foundation for interruption is developed in Boeve’s book, 
Interrupting Tradition where he depicts an “interrupting God” and Christ as “God’s 
                                                
3 Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 7. 
4 For Boeve, it is the interruption of the “religious other” that is necessary in today’s postmodern world.  
However, I take the notion of the “other” as those who have been “othered” and therefore marginalized and 
whose voices need to be brought back to the table of theological discussions.  Hence, in this dissertation, I 
not only focus on the voice of the “religious other” but also the voice of women who have been considered 
“other” and whose experiences have historically been excluded from Christian theology.  This will be 
discussed in the next section as I discuss the “double-interruption” of the voice of the religious other and of 
women.  Furthermore, this issue of “self” and “other” has been the focus of many philosophical 
discussions.  See footnote 42.   
5 Lieven Boeve, God Interrupts History: Theology in a Time of Upheaval (New York: Continuum, 2007) 
205. 
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interrupter.”  There, he argues that Christian discipleship involves following his work of 
interruption in order to allow for an open narrative in Christianity.6  Hence, “…just as 
(and because) the Christian narrative is interrupted by God, Christians are called to 
interrupt themselves and others when their own narratives and those of others close 
themselves off.”7  Such openness to the interruption of the other is found at the very heart 
of the Christian faith, and is what is necessary for Christianity in this postmodern context. 
 There are many different “contexts” within our current situation that warrant such 
interruption and dialogue with Christianity today.  As Boeve notes, for Johann Metz, who 
inspired his own work on interruption, “it is particularly the confrontation with suffering 
that forms the impetus behind his search for a ‘dangerous’ theology of interruption.”8  
One could argue that confrontation with suffering, especially the massive suffering that 
one finds in the world today (especially of the poor) has served as a huge source of 
interruption within Christian theology.   
Given the events of World War II, the Vietnam war, and the poverty of the two-
thirds world, many theologians began to look instead to this experience of suffering and 
oppression – not just of individuals but of peoples and nations -- as the common human 
experience that must become the new starting point for theology.  New questions then 
about what it means to be human in light of suffering and oppression arose: what is this 
human person that s/he is capable of so much good and yet apparently so much evil as 
well? How are we to understand suffering in the world and our responsibility and duty 
                                                
6 Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 115-146. 
7 Boeve, God Interrupts History, 205. 
8 Ibid. 
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toward it?  These questions led to the development of many liberation and political 
theologies (such as that of Metz) from both the “first” and the “third” worlds.  Hence, the 
voice of the poor and those who were suffering became the interrupting event that led 
many theologians to re-think their notion of God, Christ, humanity and salvation. 
The centrality of the experience of suffering, oppression, and marginalization was 
“interrupted” yet again by the voices of women.9  These women argued that much of 
theology and anthropology has been done by men, has focused on men and male 
experiences.  These theologies have not served to properly incorporate the experiences 
and voices of women so that the analysis of suffering and oppression has occluded the 
suffering and oppression of women. Such feminist critiques brought light to the fact that 
what was masked under what were seen as “universal” or “transcendental” experiences 
were really particular, white, male (usually European) experiences and did not take into 
account the particular experiences of women.  Thus a critique opened up concerning how 
much of Christian theology has been in the hands of men and has led to the interpretation 
of doctrines that have been harmful to women.  For example, looking at the history of the 
Christian tradition and the ‘fathers’ of the Church, many feminist theologians find that 
the understanding of Christian anthropology and cosmology rooted in the Greek 
philosophical tradition have led to notions of hierarchy and dualism: God-world, soul-
body, men-women, where women are identified with world and body, and thus secondary 
in the hierarchy and inferior to men.  These ideas influenced the interpretations of 
                                                
9 For example, Mary Ann Hinsdale argues that the voices of women can be understood as an “interruption 
of the Spirit.”  See “Women’s Struggle for Voice as Interruption of the Spirit” in Light Burdens, Heavy 
Blessings: Challenges of Church and Culture in the Post Vatican II Era, eds. Mary Heather MacKinnon, 
Moni McIntyre and Mary Ellen Sheehan (Quincy, IL: Franciscan Press, 2000) 97-113. 
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Augustine, Aquinas, Luther who saw women as inferior, as less than men, and not even 
in the image of God.  Hence, as they talked of human beings – they were really talking 
about male beings and not women.   
The interruption of women’s voices has led to the recontextualization of Christian 
theology as feminist theology.  One of its main strategies for theological interpretation 
has been critique of classical Christian doctrines such as creation-salvation and sin-grace 
in order to uncover their androcentric bias and how they are harmful to women.  It also 
includes the recovery of the voices of women within Christian history as well as the 
reconstruction and reinterpretation of doctrines that take into account women’s 
experience.   
 In addition to the context of suffering and the “interruption” of the voice of the 
poor and of women, another important context that Christianity is very concerned with is 
the plurality of religions.  This is Boeve’s primary focus in his two books on interruption.  
Thus, he asks “[i]n what way can the Christian narrative continue to hold its own in the 
midst of religious plurality?”10  For him, the answer lies in dialogue with the religious 
other in a way that allows for Christianity to keep an open narrative.  In this way, the 
religious other “interrupts” Christian theology and Christianity also “interrupts” the 
religious other and the current context.  In particular, he says,  
 [t]he confrontation with religious otherness alerts the Christian narrative specifically to 
the very particularity of its own truth claim and interrupts any pretence toward 
absoluteness….It is critically challenged to formulate its truth claims on two fronts: first, 
with respect to this irreducible narrativity and particularity, and second, as regards the 
truth claims of others.11  
                                                
10 Boeve, Interrupting Tradition, 164. 
11 Boeve, God Interrupts History, 43-4. 
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Rediscovering the particularity of the Christian narrative can be interruptive in a 
way that “not only critically engages with other narratives that have closed themselves 
off or harden themselves in a fundamentalist way, it also warns us of the erosion of the 
particularity and alterity in many current discourses that seemingly take a sympathetic 
view toward religion and other fundamental life options but often imply a post-Christian 
functionalization of religiosity, and relativization of its particularity.”12  Here then, we 
see Boeve’s concern for openness and engagement with other traditions so that 
Christianity is able to learn from the “other” without being reduced to mere similarities 
with the “other”.  The importance of the “interruption” of the other is that it can lead us to 
discover our own selves more deeply and learn to articulate our particularity in the midst 
of religious plurality.  It is from this stance of the rediscovered particularity (through 
dialogue) that Christianity is able to “interrupt” other traditions by eliminating the 
tendencies to reduce all religions to their least common denominator and judge them as 
all the same. Far from the fear of losing a distinctive Christian identity (the usual fear that 
arises when Christians deal with religious plurality), Boeve sees interruption and dialogue 
as necessary means for discovering Christianity’s particularity.  “Interruption” thus 
enables Christianity to hold its own amidst religious plurality in a way that neither 
isolates nor relatives it as one among many.  
 A concern for an engagement with religious plurality that is open, yet not 
reductionistic, and the belief that mutual interruption is necessary for Christian theology 
in light of religious plurality is also a chief concern for Francis Clooney. In our 
                                                
12 Boeve, God Interrupts History, 44. 
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increasingly plural world, Clooney argues, Christian theology needs to become 
interreligious, comparative, dialogical and confessional.13  First, like Boeve, Clooney 
takes religious plurality seriously and sees the need for Christian theology to open itself 
up and broaden theological discourse into an interreligious conversation.  Second, he is 
concerned with a real engagement with the other (as against more reductionistic 
approaches).  For theology to be comparative, similarities as well as differences must be 
taken into account. In this way, “intelligent and attentive scholars become able to 
theologize within their own traditions in a way that neither blocks thinking across 
religious boundaries nor interprets reductively the similarities that become obvious.”14  
Third, as a dialogical enterprise, theologians need to learn to “stop judging other religions 
from afar” and learn to “write in a way that speaks and responds to people in other 
traditions as well.”15 This then facilitates a real encounter with the religious other in their 
alterity, which involves finding a way to dialogue with them and formulate one’s truth 
claims in light of the truth claims of the other (as Boeve mentioned above).  However, 
attention to the particularity of the other does not have to lead to the loss of Christian 
identity.  Rather, as Clooney’s fourth characteristic makes clear, theology is confessional.  
This means that “theologians should be able to affirm the content of their faith as true, 
render it intelligible to those who believe it already, and venture to put persuasive 
arguments before outsiders in order to demonstrate the truth of the faith…”16  In other 
words, Christian theology should still be able to maintain its particularity and confront 
                                                
13 See Francis Clooney, SJ, Hindu God Christian God: How Reason Helps Break Down the Boundaries 
between Religions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 7-12. 
14 Clooney, Hindu God Christian God, 9. 
15 Clooney, Hindu God Christian God, 10. 
16 Clooney, Hindu God Christian God, 10-11. 
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others through this particularity.  However, such a stance is not a block for true learning 
from the other, since the discovery of one’s particularity is something that happens within 
the very dynamic of this dialogue/encounter with the other.   
 However, just like Christian theology in general, interreligious dialogue and 
comparative theology might also benefit from the “interruption” of women’s voices and 
vice versa. For example, in the new book The New Comparative Theology: Interreligious 
Insights from the Next Generation, Michelle Voss Roberts contends that “an alliance 
between feminist and comparative perspectives on theology awakens both to the types of 
power operative within them.”17 There she suggested that comparative theology could 
benefit from feminist theology by now using sources that included women’s voices and 
practices as against the use (though not deliberately) of sources that excluded women.  
On the other hand, feminist theology could benefit from comparative theology by 
learning to “emulate comparativists’ careful attention to the particularities within 
traditions and the long, difficult work of attaining competency in multiple religious 
traditions. Such practices inculcate a certain sensitivity to cultural essentializations that 
was absent in some earlier feminist work and can help feminists to welcome genuine 
religious differences even while searching for sites of convergence.”18  
Taking seriously the task of “interruption” as a theological enterprise, I will 
attempt a “double-interruption”; that is, of taking into account both the voices of women 
as well as the voice of the religious other in current discussions in Christian theology and 
                                                
17 Michelle Voss Roberts, “Gendering Comparative Theology” in The New Comparative Theology: 
Interreligious Insights from the Next Generation, ed. Francis X. Clooney, SJ (New York: T&T Clark, 
2010) 127. 
18 Ibid. 
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in interreligious dialogue and comparative theology. My objective is not to stop such 
discussions but rather to redirect them by bringing in the “interruption” of the voices of 
women and the religious other.  In so doing, I hope to highlight how such discussions 
have been too narrow or blind and may have even become harmful to the “other.” 
Highlighting these interruptions is intended to show how inclusion of the voice of “the 
other” can enrich the conversation and lead to new and more fruitful ways of thinking 
that address the issue of suffering and religious plurality in the world today.  
“Interruption” does not halt the conversation but redirects it by recognizing the “other” 
previously unnoticed.  In light of the new voices now at the table, voices that can offer a 
critical eye, a new approach or a broader perspective may be achieved – one that opens us 
to new unexplored areas of experience, as Nouwen mentioned. As Boeve says,  
…the category of interruption holds continuity and discontinuity together in an albeit 
tense relationship. Interruption is after all not to be identified with rupture, because what 
is interrupted does not cease to exist. On the other hand, it also implies that what is 
interrupted does not simply continue as though nothing had happened. Interruption 
signifies an intrusion that does not destroy the narrative but problematizes the advance 
thereof. It disturbs the anticipated sequence of sentences following one after the other, 
and disarms the security devices that protect against disruption. Interruption refers to that 
‘moment,’ that ‘instance,’ which cannot occur without the narrative, and yet cannot be 
captured by the narrative. It involves the intrusion of an otherness that only momentarily 
but nonetheless intensely halts the narrative sequence. They do not annihilate the 
narrative; rather they draw attention to its narrative character and force an opening 
toward the other within the narrative.19 
 
II. The Project:  A double-interruption of the voices of women and the religious 
other 
 
  In this dissertation, I will enter and “interrupt” two specific conversations.  The 
first would be the Christian feminist discussions that focus on the search for a relational 
self, and within these discussions to focus on attempts to re-interpret key Christian 
                                                
19 Boeve, God Interrupts History, 42. 
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doctrines and spiritual practice which empower the transformation of the self, society, 
and the church. One of the feminist critiques have focused on Western descriptions of 
selfhood which emphasize individuality and independence to the detriment of others 
(usually women), and relationality (which women value).  For example, Catherine Keller 
writes that “separation and sexism have functioned together as the most fundamental self-
shaping assumptions of our culture.  That any subject, human or non-human, is what it is 
only in clear division from everything else; and that men, by nature and by right, exercise 
the primary prerogatives of civilization: these two presuppositions collaborate like two 
eyes to sustain a single worldview.”20  Hence, the project of some feminists is to 
articulate a vision of selves as interconnected in a way that does not lead to the bondage 
of women, with her identity tied only to her relationships, but to a vision which stresses 
connections that are truly affirming of herself and her relationships.    
In this search for “right relationship,” many feminists have critiqued Christian 
doctrines which have proved to be detrimental to women. Beginning with Valerie 
Saivings’ critique of R. Niebuhr’s basic understanding of sin as pride and her rebuttal that 
for women, sin is selflessness, interpretations of Christian doctrines which focus on 
humility, vulnerability, dependence or self-sacrifice continue to be debated by feminist 
theologians who question whether such doctrines and their interpretations are still helpful 
or ultimately just damaging to women.21  One doctrine that has been particularly 
                                                
20 Catherine Keller, From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986) 2. 
21 Valerie Saiving, “The Human Condition: A Feminine View” in Womanspirit Rising: A Feminist Reader 
in Religion, eds. Carol Christ and Judith Plaskow, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979) 37-38. 
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troubling for some feminists is that of kenosis or self-emptying.22  As Sarah Coakley 
notes, this issue “cuts close to the heart of what separates Christian and post-Christian 
feminism.”  To illustrate, she points to Daphne Hampson for whom kenosis is “a Christic 
‘bone’” upon which she chokes.  For Hampson, the theme of self-emptying and self-
abnegation is far from helpful as a paradigm for women.23  In a more recent article, Jane 
Linahan cautions against interpretations of kenosis that may lead to distorted forms of 
relationship.  She notes how the image of Christ as slave, a model of Christ’s 
submissiveness has “continued to function, as a fundamental paradigm for Christian faith 
and life….It has fostered the notion that to be a good Christian, to be a good person, one 
must deny and efface the self.” 24  Such interpretations, for Linahan, lead either to 
“passive submissiveness to oppression or misguided self-sacrifice and ‘charity.”25  
Hence, she argues that “[s]ince the image of kenosis and its related ideals are so central 
and loom so large in the Christian ethos and imagination, it is absolutely essential to 
engage in a critical re-appropriation of them which can, if possible, transcend their 
potential for harm and mine their even deeper potential for good.”26 
                                                
22 When I speak of kenosis as a doctrine or the “doctrine of kenosis,” I do not mean this in any technical 
sense but more generally, as O’Collins describes it in A Concise Dictionary of Theology as “[t]he self-
abasement that the second person of the Trinity underwent in the incarnation.”  As he mentions, many 
theologians have adopted kenosis as a central theme in their Christologies.  I will focus on some of these 
theological interpretations in Chapter One, and how certain feminist theologians critique and re-interpret its 
meaning, particularly for theological anthropology in Chapter Two. 
23 Sarah Coakley, “Kenosis and Subversion:  On the Repression of ‘Vulnerability’ in Christian Feminist 
Writing” in Swallowing a Fishbone? Feminist Theologians Debate Christianity, ed. Daphne Hampson 
(London: SPCK, 1996) 82. 
24 Jane Linahan, “Kenosis: Metaphor of Relationship” in Theology and Conversation: Towards a 
Relational Theology, eds. J. Haers and P. de Mey (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003) 303-304. 
25 Ibid., 305. 
26 Ibid.  
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The critical appropriation of the doctrine of kenosis has already been the project 
of some feminist theologians.  The quest for a critical retrieval of the doctrine is based on 
establishing a new vision of self as self-in-relation to others and the world.  For these 
feminists, what is central is a search for the right understanding of relationship and within 
that relationship, the dynamics of “dependence” and “sacrifice” might still be held as 
central to Christian life.  Rosemary Ruether, for example, focuses on understanding the 
kenosis of Christ and its implications for human relationships.  She begins her book 
Sexism and God-talk with a “midrash” on the kenosis of the Father.27 Furthermore, in 
speaking about Jesus Christ and his maleness, she speaks of Jesus Christ as one who 
“manifests the kenosis of patriarchy, the announcement of the new humanity through a 
lifestyle that discards hierarchical caste privilege and speaks on behalf of the lowly.”28  In 
a similar vein, Sandra Schneiders speaks of the maleness of Jesus as a “free self-
emptying by which he participates in the oppressor class of humanity, thereby 
definitively undermining not only patriarchy but all the forms of oppression derived from 
it.”29   
Concerning God and the Trinity, feminists have also re-interpreted kenosis as the 
primary way of understanding God and God’s nature.  Elizabeth Johnson critiques 
Moltmann and other theologians’ discussions of kenosis by arguing that they continue to 
                                                
27 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1993) 1-11. 
28 Ibid., 137.  Rita Nakashima Brock critiques such an understanding of Jesus’ kenosis of patriarchy seeing 
it as a “unilateral, heroic model” which does not take the influence of community into account. Hence, 
using the story of the unclean woman, she argues for a re-interpretation of such a kenosis of patriarchy as 
involving Jesus’ community who challenges him and from whom he learns. Rita Nakashima Brock, 
Journeys by Heart: A Christology of Erotic Power (New York: Crossroad, 1988) 84. 
29 Sandra Schneiders, Women and the Word: The Gender of God in the New Testament and the Spirituality 
of Women (New York: Paulist Press, 1986) 68. 
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use almost exclusive male imagery and pronouns.  For her, there are more appropriate 
ways of describing such a kenotic, self-limiting God through the use of maternal 
metaphors and the feminist retrieval of the power of friendship.30  Linahan herself uses 
Moltmann to re-think the meaning of kenosis in light of the Trinity.  She argues that 
“kenosis is a key to the form of the dialogue between Jesus and the Father, helping to 
underscore the mutuality and reciprocity of their relationship…”31  Kenosis then, she 
argues, is the metaphor for relationship:  of the Father, Son, and Spirit, and of God with 
the world.32 
Finally, a number of feminist theologians have focused on how we are to 
understand kenosis within women’s search for self and “right relationships.” Two British 
theologians, Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey focus on contemplation as key in the re-
interpretation of kenosis and the articulation of a relational anthropology.  I hope to 
contribute to this specific re-interpretation of kenosis and the more general attempt at a 
relational anthropology by bringing these Christian feminist theologians in conversation 
with Buddhist feminists who have some of the same concerns in searching for the 
“relational self” and who critique, but also reinterpret, key Buddhist doctrines such as 
emptiness and (śūnyatā) and dependent origination (pratītya samutpāda), connecting 
their understanding and interpretation of these doctrines to meditation practice.  In this 
way, I hope to bring in the interruption of the voice of the “religious other” in order to 
enrich the Christian feminist discussions of kenosis and theological anthropology.    
                                                
30 Elizabeth Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York, 
Crossroad, 1992) 234-235. 
31 Linahan, 307.   
32 Ibid., 308. 
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 The second conversation I wish to “interrupt” is that of the Buddhist-Christian 
dialogues. Within these dialogues, there seem to be two main currents of conversation: 
one is the focus of the dialogue on key doctrines and the other on spiritual practices – 
particularly comparisons in contemplation and meditation.33  However, feminist voices as 
well as attempts to bring about dialogue on doctrine and spiritual practice have been 
primarily lacking in these interreligious dialogues. For example, Jay McDaniel has 
observed that “the emergence of feminist theology within Christianity and that of a 
Christian dialogue with Buddhism have proceeded for the most part independently.”34  
Furthermore, Christian feminist theologian Catherine Keller has critiqued the Buddhist-
Christian dialogue spearheaded by the Kyoto School which has focused on the Christian 
doctrine of kenosis and the Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine of śūnyatā (emptiness).  In a 
response to Masao Abe,35 Keller points out that this dialogue “neglects the most obvious 
common denominator of these two world religions: their patriarchalism!”36  However, 
this does not suggest that she finds the dialogue futile.  Rather, she sees promise in the 
interchange and in the “interruption” by a feminist perspective: how Buddhist emptiness 
                                                
33 See for example the annotated bibliography that came out in 1993 which lists the works done within 
Buddhist-Christian dialogue. Harry Wells, chairperson,  Resources for Buddhist-Christian Encounter:  An 
Annotated Bibliography (Wofford Heights, CA: Multifaith Resources, 1993) 17-24. 
34 Jay McDaniel, “Self-Affirmation and Ego Transcendence: The Encounter of Christianity with Feminism 
and Buddhism” Buddhist-Christian Studies 7 (1987): 230. 
35 Masao Abe is a Japanese philosopher who was highly involved in Buddhist-Christian dialogues with 
Christian theologians and philosophers.  He is part of the Kyoto School that focused on the dialogue around 
kenosis and śūnyatā.  This will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
36 Catherine Keller, “Scoop up the Water and the Moon is in your Hands: On Feminist Theology and 
Dynamic Self-Emptying” in The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation, eds. John 
Cobb and Christopher Ives (NY: Orbis Books, 1990) 102. 
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can support a feminist revision of kenosis and also how the dialogue itself can help 
articulate “authentic and novel forms of spirituality grounded in global responsibility.”37  
In the end, I hope to contribute to Christian theological anthropology by bringing 
in the “interruption” of another religious tradition, Buddhism in order to see how key 
Buddhist doctrines and practices may inform aspects of Christian feminism and theology.  
I also hope to enhance Buddhist-Christian dialogue by bringing the “interruption” of 
feminist voices from both the Buddhist and Christian traditions into conversation with 
each other in order to see what they might offer, not only towards the search for “right 
relationship,” but also towards bringing about the re-integration of doctrine and spiritual 
practices for more effective action in the world today.38   
 Methodology. The retrieval of the notion of kenosis and the construction of a 
relational anthropology will be done by employing both a feminist as well as comparative 
methodology.39 Given the focus on kenosis and śūnyatā within Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue, the feminist methodology will begin with the “interruption” of the feminist 
voices that establish the lack of consideration for the experience of women in these 
dialogues and show the problematic ways in which discussion of these doctrines continue 
to propagate interpretations that lead to notions of ‘self-sacrifice” and “self-negation” that 
are harmful to women.   
                                                
37 Ibid., 104-105.  Also in a later essay, Keller speaks of how kenosis might be used as a “basis for an 
uninhibited spirituality of embodiment…” Keller, “More on Feminism, Self-Sacrifice, and Time; Or Too 
Many Words for Emptiness” Buddhist-Christian Studies 13(1993): 215-216. 
38 In his dissertation, Thomas Cattoi has also spoken of the disjunction between spirituality and theology.  
See Thomas Cattoi, “Redeeming the Particular: Maximos the Confessor’s critique of Origenism and the 
Tibetan Debates on Practices” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 2006) 4-13.  
39 The comparative methodology will involve looking at the similarities and differences in the use of 
kenosis and śūnyatā within their respective traditions, then in conversation with each other. This method 
will be further explicated in Chapter Four. 
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However, as mentioned, this project does not seek to abort the Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue that has already occurred.  Rather, it will use this dialogue and the comparative 
method in order to undertake a feminist reconstruction of kenosis and theological 
anthropology.  With a feminist and comparative lens, the critique and re-interpretation of 
kenosis will be compared to the critique and re-interpretation of śūnyatā in the Mahāyāna 
Buddhist tradition especially in light of Buddhist feminist retrieval of this doctrine and its 
link with compassion as well as with meditation practice. After establishing the Christian 
feminist discussion, a Buddhist feminist discussion on śūnyatā will follow.  Then 
comparison will proceed by looking at the similarities behind the reconstruction of both 
traditions followed by a discussion on what their differences are and the challenges they 
continue to constitute.  In light of this comparison, I will begin to analyze how the 
Buddhist feminist reconstruction of śūnyatā can contribute to the Christian feminist 
reconstruction of kenosis and a relational anthropology.  In this way, I hope to follow 
Boeve’s description of “interruption” as holding both continuity and discontinuity, in this 
case, continuing the dialogue with Buddhism but with the goal of redirecting and 
broadening (and in this sense discontinuing previous discussions) the dialogue to address 
the specific concerns of feminists in search for the relational self. 
A good example of the kind of comparison that I envision in this project is the 
work by Paula Cooey on emptiness and the otherness of God.  In this article, she begins 
with the feminist problem of identity and otherness and looks to the doctrine of emptiness 
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and the otherness of God in order to articulate a selfhood that remains related to others.40  
However, I will not primarily be basing my comparison on ancient or sacred texts of 
either tradition or their philosophical underpinnings.  Rather, though considering the 
historical and philosophical interpretations, my comparison will focus more on how 
feminist theologians from both traditions are using these texts and re-interpreting or 
retrieving meanings from key doctrines in these texts in their search for a relational self 
that resonates with their experience as women. In a sense then, my comparative “texts” 
will be the works of these feminist theologians.  I will compare how kenosis and śūnyatā 
function in women’s search for the relational self, and the place of doctrine within the 
spiritual life.   
Scope and Limitations.    
 Feminist theology and comparative theology are two fields that are relatively new 
but are experiencing great interest among many theologians.41 However, as previously 
mentioned, the dialogue itself between feminist theology and comparative theology has 
occurred less frequently. More often than not, feminist critiques and reconstructions have 
focused only within particular religious traditions.  Yet, as many comparative theologians 
                                                
40 Paula Cooey, “Emptiness, Otherness, and Identity: A Feminist Perspective” Journal of Feminist Studies 
in Religion 6 (Fall 1990): 7-23. 
41 I am aware of the pluralism within “feminist theology.” The very history of feminism and feminist 
theology shows how there is no one feminist “theology” and to speak as such can be highly suspicious 
since this usually implies the dominance of Anglo-European feminist voices to the detriment of the rich 
theologies coming out of places such as Asia, Africa, etc. Yet, I agree with Anne Clifford who argues that, 
“although each feminist theology is unique, feminist theologies share in common the commitment to bring 
faith in God revealed in Jesus Christ from the perspective of women’s experience to understanding” and 
that “[a]ll Christian feminist theologies share a distinguishing principle: patriarchy and androcentrism in 
their many forms conflict with faith in a God whom Christian revelation proclaims to be love itself.”  See 
Anne Clifford, Introducing Feminist Theology (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001) 30. It is from this 
perspective that I am using a feminist methodology and use the expression “feminist theology” in my 
dissertation. 
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such as Francis Clooney, John Keenan, John Cobb, and others have demonstrated, there 
is much to be gained from the dialogue with other religious traditions.  Concepts within 
one’s own tradition may sometimes be clarified, deepened, thought of in a different way, 
and challenged by the encounter with another tradition.  From this encounter, feminist 
theologians can only stand to benefit.  They may find many resonances with how 
feminists from other traditions have uncovered and problematized the patriarchal roots of 
their traditions.  Even more, in their dissonances, in their different approaches and 
symbols, feminists may actually find resources from these traditions that can further 
critique areas of one’s tradition that have not been thought of, or retrieve strands of their 
own tradition that have been forgotten.  Moreover, these concepts and symbols may 
become resources for a reconstruction that may not have been possible simply with the 
resources of one’s own tradition.  Hence, the main purpose of this dissertation is to 
provide a feminist reconstruction of theological anthropology through an encounter with 
Buddhist feminists, and to redirect Buddhist-Christian dialogue by means of the  
“interruption” of the feminist critique. The “double-interruption” that I will employ 
allows me to contribute both to feminist thinking and to dialogue among religions, 
particularly in terms of how Buddhist doctrines and practices might illumine aspects of 
Christian theology. 
Given the broad fields of theological anthropology and Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue, one of the limits of this project will be the focus on kenosis and śūnyatā, 
particularly in how these two doctrines are helpful in the articulation of a new 
anthropology.  Hence, in terms of the discussion of kenosis, my focus will not be on 
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interpretations of the kenosis of God/Trinity or Jesus Christ but more on kenosis and the 
individual/self.  Furthermore, though there have been some philosophical works on 
kenosis and the problem of self and “other” such as those of Kierkegaard, Levinas, and 
Ricoeur, these are beyond the scope of this project.42  The project will focus primarily on 
feminist retrievals of kenosis, particularly the works of two British theologians, Sarah 
Coakley and Mary Grey.  Neither will an extensive exegesis of Philippians 2:6-11 be 
undertaken, although an overview of the various interpretations of the hymn will be 
undertaken as a background for the general feminist arguments against certain 
interpretations of kenosis as well as for the theological interpretations of Sarah Coakley 
and Mary Grey. 
In terms of the discussions of śūnyatā, unlike the dialogue with Masao Abe and 
the Kyoto school which has primarily focused on Zen Buddhism, I will involve Indo-
Tibetan theory and practice.  The two major Buddhist feminists, Rita Gross and Anne 
Klein, both come from the Indo-Tibetan tradition (the Nyingma and Kargyu Dzogchen 
traditions) so their discussion of śūnyatā will come primarily from this tradition.  I also 
                                                
42 Levinas and Ricoeur have primarily been interested in the relationship of the self and other in light of 
suffering.  Levinas saw the problem of ‘totality’; that is, of the totalizing systems that sought to understand 
and reduce everything in light of the self.  In controlling the other, one does violence to that other. His 
solution then is the notion of “infinity,” of how the other is stranger whose depths cannot be known, of 
someone who overflows my thought of them and hence cannot be reduced or controlled by me.  See his 
work, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1994).  
Ricoeur builds on Levinas and adds the need for self-esteem, which he argues, is necessary for self-
effacement.  Self-esteem grounds one’s solicitude for the other. Hence, the demand of the Other is met by 
the solicitude of the self for the other, grounded upon one’s own self-esteem. In his system, we find the 
importance of recognition; that is, of recognizing oneself as an other and the other as one’s self which leads 
to solicitude and from solicitude to justice.  See his work, Oneself as Another (Chicago, IL: Chicago 
University Press, 1992).   
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relied primarily on their re-interpretations of the doctrine of emptiness instead of going to 
primary sources such as the Prajñāparamitā sutras. 
In some ways, one could say that the dialogue is “one-sided” since I am a 
Christian and my goal is a reconstruction of the Christian doctrine of kenosis and 
theological anthropology. Hence, though I offer some points for deeper reflection on 
Buddhist feminist understanding of śūnyatā (from my own Christian (particularly 
Catholic) perspective, my focus will be on how Buddhist feminists are re-interpreting key 
doctrines and practices and from that, seeing how one can gain a new perspective within 
the Christian feminist attempts at reconstructing kenosis and its grounding in spiritual 
practices.  Finally, the critiques and reconstruction of kenosis as well as śūnyatā will 
primarily be based on the experiences and dialogues of feminist theologians in North 
America and Europe.  However, my hope is that this conversation among North 
American/European women can also help illumine the way for an Asian articulation of 
relationality and become a springboard for conversations between Buddhist and Christian 
women in Asia.  
Chapter Outline 
 Chapter One:  In this chapter, I will give an overview of the two concepts of 
kenosis and śūnyatā, including the historical development of the traditional 
interpretations of these concepts within their respective traditions.  Then I will present 
some background on the Buddhist-Christian dialogues that have taken place concerning 
these two concepts, particularly the Kyoto School dialogues.  I will end with the various 
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critiques of this dialogue in order to set up the comparison that will follow in the next 
chapters and demonstrate the relevance of my project.  
 Chapter Two:  In this chapter, I will focus on the Christian feminist critique and 
retrieval of the doctrine of kenosis in the articulation of a relational self.  In particular, I 
will discuss the work of two British feminist theologians, Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey, 
whose reconstructions of kenosis are grounded in the practice of contemplation.  Both 
argue that in contemplation, one understands “right” kenosis and women are able to 
experience the relational self that is required for the transformation of the self, society 
and the church.     
Chapter Three:  In this chapter, I will focus on the analogous work of two 
Buddhist feminists, Anne Klein and Rita Gross, in their critique and retrieval of the 
doctrine of śūnyatā in their articulation of an interconnected self.  I will focus on how 
they use śūnyatā and its corollary pratītya samutpāda (dependent arising or the 
interdependence of all things).  I will also examine how they discuss the relationship 
between wisdom and compassion, and how understanding the relationship of the two can 
guard against notions of self-sacrifice and selflessness that are detrimental to women.  In 
the end, I will endeavor to bring out the relationship between the doctrine of emptiness 
and its implications for the feminist search for the relational self, the relationship between 
the doctrine of emptiness and the practice of meditation, and finally the relationship 
between the doctrine of emptiness and the practice of compassion. 
Chapter Four:  This chapter will be comparative in its approach. Having 
discussed in the previous chapters how the doctrines of kenosis and śūnyatā function in 
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their respective feminist reconstructions, I will begin with a brief description of the 
comparative method that I will be using.  This will be followed by a discussion of how 
the Christian feminist interpretations of kenosis for the ethical and spiritual life can be 
deepened and challenged by the Buddhist feminist discussions on emptiness and 
dependent origination.  It will include a reflection on the story and significance of Mary 
as influenced by the Buddhist feminist discussions on the Great Bliss Queen.  In the last 
section, I will discuss a Christian response to the discussions of Anne Klein and Rita 
Gross to show possible ways of a Christian contribution to the Buddhist feminist 
discussions on emptiness and the search for a relational self. 
 Conclusion:  In this chapter, I will summarize the work that has been done in the 
previous chapters that highlights how the interruption of the voice of the religious other 
contributes to Christian feminist theology.  I will also discuss how the interruption of 
these feminist voices has something to contribute back to Buddhist-Christian dialogue.  
Here, implications of the feminist reconstruction of kenosis and śūnyatā for Buddhist-
Christian dialogue will be discussed as well as suggestions for the continued dialogue and 
how my work responds to the critique leveled at previous dialogues.  
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Chapter One:  Background on Kenosis, Emptiness and the  
Buddhist-Christian Dialogues on these two doctrines 
 
I.  Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I will focus on the development and interpretation of the concepts 
of kenosis and śūnyatā within the greater context of their respective traditions.  For 
kenosis, this will entail an overview of the biblical and theological interpretations of the 
Philippians hymn in terms of theological statements regarding God and Christ as well as 
understanding Christian discipleship.  Particular attention will be paid to the development 
of the interpretation of kenosis as it originated as part of a liturgical pre-Pauline hymn in 
the life of the early Church that moved into metaphysical and dogmatic discussions on 
the nature of Christ and God.  Finally, I will trace the implication of these discussions for 
the understanding of human nature and its relationship with God as well as for the ethical 
and spiritual life of Christians.  
In terms of śūnyatā, I will trace the development of this doctrine back to early 
Buddhism with the discussion of the Four Noble Truths and the earlier understanding of 
other doctrines such as “no-self” (anātman) and dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda).  
I will then move toward the richness and complexity of its meanings among the various 
Mahāyāna schools ranging from understanding it as an epistemological tool against 
attachment to false views to articulations of Buddha nature and visions of dependent 
arising as the mode of being of persons.  I will also focus on the Bodhisattva path of 
wisdom and compassion, and how these doctrines express the Buddhist understanding of 
human nature and the human condition.  In the last section, I will include an example of 
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how these doctrines are expressed within Buddhist practices and how meditation 
practices are used to help one realize the teachings for one’s spiritual enlightenment.   
Finally, I will present the background on the Buddhist-Christian dialogues that 
have taken place concerning these two concepts. I will end with the responses and 
critiques to this dialogue, particularly the call to expand the horizon of the interpretation 
of both doctrines and to take into consideration the feminist critique of this dialogue. 
II.  Background on the doctrine of kenosis 
 
Biblical Basis:  Philippians 2:5-11 
 
 The doctrine of kenosis has been a central teaching with regard to understanding 
the doctrine of God, Christology, and the Christian life.  The locus classicus for this 
doctrine can be found in Phil. 2:5-11 which states: 
 Let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of 
God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, 
taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness, And being found in human 
form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death – even death on a 
cross. Therefore God also highly exalted him and gave him the name that is above every 
name, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and 
under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of 
God (NRSV). 
 
This text has been widely understood to be a pre-Pauline hymn, probably used in 
a liturgical setting (Eucharist or baptism) by the early Church.  One of the main debates 
which relates to Christology and the doctrine of God centered on the question of who 
“emptied himself.” There were primarily two trends in these debates: those who focused 
on the human Jesus and his life on earth as the model for human behavior and those who 
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saw Christ as a kind of the archetypal Urmensch or “original Man”, and the author of the 
hymn as influenced by pre-Christian Gnostic circles.43  
For example, Ernst Lohmeyer posited that the text was speaking only primarily of 
the human Jesus, and interpreted “did not regard equality with God as something to be 
exploited” (or grasped) as an allusion to the experience of temptation, a “resisting of the 
evil one, which is relocated to the beginning of days.”44  He then explicates that it is this 
path of humiliation and obedience within Jesus’ earthly ministry that led to his exaltation.  
This view is supported by Hans Werner Bartsch who re-iterated that this text was only 
about the historical Jesus and there was no assumption of pre-existence at all.  Rather, it 
is in his earthly life, in constantly choosing solidarity with the slaves, that he gradually 
becomes son of God.  Other arguments, such as that of Oscar Cullman, juxtapose the 
image of Adam with Jesus as the suffering servant.  Just as Adam “grasped equality with 
God” in reaching for the Tree of knowledge and hence bringing sin and disobedience, 
Jesus is the one who refused to grasp such equality, choosing instead a life of humility 
and obedience to God that brings him to death on a cross.  However, while Adam’s 
“grasping” brought death, Jesus’ refusal to grasp leads to his exaltation and glory. For 
this group of scholars, the emphasis is on correlating the emptying with Jesus’ earthly life 
that culminated with the death on the cross.  
The interpretation above has been highly questioned by other exegetes who focus 
on the verse stating that he was “in the form of God.” For these scholars, the verse “form 
                                                
43 Coakley, “Kenosis and Subversion,” 85-6. 
44 Rinse Reeling Brouwer, “Kenosis in Philippians 2:5-11 and in the History of Christian Doctrine” in 
Letting Go: Rethinking Kenosis, ed. Onno Zijlstra (Bern: Peter Lang, 2002) 73. 
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of God” and the “emptying” refers to some kind of Gnostic redeemer myth, and Christ 
“in the form of God” as some kind of divine or (quasi) divine entity who descended upon 
the earth to impart gnosis upon a select few.  For example, Ernst Käsemann argues that 
the author of the Philippians hymn’s understanding of the ‘form of God” probably 
incorporates and modifies some kind of a “Gnostic redeemer myth, which views the 
redeeming Christ as a cosmocrator and inaugurator of a new eon.”45  For him, the 
emptying then does truly entail a change of the divine “mode of being” in the divine’s 
“descent” or “emptying” into humanity.  In either case, there is an agreement among most 
modern New Testament scholars that this text does not refer to any kind of metaphysical 
discussion about the nature of Christ, nor to the Incarnation, but emphasized more 
Christ’s earthly life and the focus on his obedience to God that led to the cross.  As 
Käsemann puts it, “Philippians 2 tells us what Christ did, not what he was.”46 
However, theological debates regarding this hymn and kenosis have not reflected 
this same emphasis only on Jesus’ earthly life but focused more on what he was. In 
particular the understanding of God and the formulation of the two natures of Christ 
shifted the focus of the discussions into the nature of God and Christ.  Discussions 
focusing only on the human Jesus and his life became inadequate to truly understand who 
Christ is.  For example, if one accepts the interpretation that it was the human Jesus who 
emptied himself, what does that mean for a Christology that not only holds that Jesus 
Christ is both human and divine, but holds central the action of the divine becoming 
                                                
45 David Hadley Jensen, “The Emptying Christ: A Christological Approach to Interfaith Dialogue” Studies 
in Interreligious Dialogue 11 (2001): 11. 
46 Ernst Käsemann, Exegetische Versuch und Besinnung: erste Band (Gottingen, Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1960) 70, quoted in Coakley, “Kenosis and Subversion,” 85. 
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human?  On the one hand, such an interpretation would appeal to those who wish to de-
mythologize Jesus and turn him into a model of exemplary human behavior who is meant 
to be emulated, a kind of superman or deified man.  On the other hand, if it was instead 
the “preexistent Son”, then there are still further questions about “what” was emptied and 
how this affects the understanding of Chalcedonian understanding of Christ, as well as 
the doctrine of God and the Trinity.  In this case, the debates center around the 
understanding of the verb “kenoo” (to empty, render void, or be of no effect) and what 
Christ was emptied of.  The appearance of this verb in this passage is very interesting 
since the verb “kenoo” does not appear often in the New Testament, and in particular, 
only appears in this hymn as “self-emptying.”  As mentioned, if one understood this 
“self-emptying” of the human Jesus, then it relegates this action into his humility and 
obedience, and his ministry of self-giving love on earth.  This is not adequate for a 
Christology that links kenosis with the Incarnation, as the “form of God” who emptied 
Godself and was “born in human likeness.” On the other hand, if one holds to the 
preexistence of the Son, there is still the further question of “what” the Son was emptied 
of, the answer to which affects our understanding of the doctrine of God and the Trinity.  
This has been the subject of debate from the early Church onwards to which we now turn. 
Kenosis and the Divine:  Theological Debates on the nature of Christ and of 
God47 
                                                
47 A summary of the various possibilities in the interpretation of kenosis will be discussed later in Chapter 
Two where Sarah Coakley systematizes such interpretations in her critique of other feminists and in her re-
interpretation of the doctrine.  
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Many Christological discussions regarding this passage assume the pre-existent 
Son as the subject of the hymn, and that it alludes to the Incarnation, especially in the 
context of other New Testament texts such as John, Hebrews, etc. However, the question 
of “what” the Son was emptied of became a predominant challenge given certain 
formulations of the understanding of Christ and of God. 
For example, for the early Church who held that God was immutable, omniscient 
and omnipresent, it was inconceivable to think of Christ being emptied of divine 
attributes. As Friedrich Loofs argues, “no theologian of any standing in the early Church 
ever adopted such a theory of kenosis of the Logos as would involve an actual 
supersession of His divine form of existence by the human…”48  Many emphasized that 
God could not change but explained the emptying as “taking on the flesh” instead of 
“becoming flesh”.  Assumption of the flesh, they insisted, involved no change in the 
Godhead but merely an extension, a transference of divine energy into the human, 
without any loss or change in God. In these discussions, the main concern was to protect 
God’s immutability, for any change or loss in God was seen to undermine God’s divinity.  
Hence, there was greater focus on what human nature gained in the process of emptying 
than any loss in God. For example, Cyril is quick to point to God’s continued superiority 
despite God’s “assumption” of the flesh.  He states: 
What sort of emptying is this? To assume the flesh, even in the form of a slave, a likeness 
to ourselves while not being like us in his own nature but superior to the whole creation.49 
                                                
48 Friedrich Loofs, art. ‘Kenosis’ in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914) 
VII, 680b-87b, quoted in Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake?” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: 
The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 250. 
49 Cyril, “On the Unity of Christ” cited and translated in Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture  VIII, 
Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, ed. Mark J. Edwards (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1999) 
243, quoted in Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake?,” 251. 
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Others such as Gregory of Nyssa interpreted kenosis not as a loss but as the realization or 
demonstration of God’s ultimate power, of being able to do the impossible.  He writes 
that “His descent to humility of man is a kind of superabundant exercise of power.”50  
Furthermore, he also focused on what the human gained in this assumption of flesh: a 
transfusion of divinity into humanity without any loss of or gain on the divine.  He 
explains it saying: 
…but human  nature in Christ, undergoes change towards the better, being altered from 
corruption to incorruption, from the perishable to the imperishable, from the short-lived 
to the eternal, from the bodily and the formed to what is without either body or form.51   
 
During the time of the Reformation, other debates regarding kenosis came about 
as Lutherans centered on the notion of the communicatio idiomatum: that is, the exchange 
of qualities between Christ’s human and divine natures.  This was an important theme for 
Luther whose Christology focused on Christ’s humanity, in his vulnerability, particularly 
his anxiety and weakness in the face of death.  How then to explain such vulnerability 
and weakness in Christ, his cry of anguish and despair, in light of his divinity?  This point 
continued to be debated among 17th century Lutherans, particularly the Tübingen and the 
Giessen schools.  The Tübingen School insisted on the hiddenness of the divine 
characteristics (of omnipotence, omniscience, etc.) from humanity so that one couldn’t 
tell from Jesus’ words and action that he was using them.52  The Giessen school, on the 
other hand, argued for a kenosis, a partial renunciation of Christ’s human nature; that is, a 
                                                
50 Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio catechetica (385 or later), Chapter 24 first half, in A select library of Nicene 
and post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, vol. V, trans. William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson 
(Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1994) 494, quoted in Brouwer, 88. 
51 Gregory of Nyssa, in “‘Heavenly Man’ and ‘Eternal Christ’: Apollinarius and Gregory of Nyssa on the 
Personal Identity of the Savior, trans. by Brian E. Daley, SJ, Journal of Early Christian Studies 10 (2002): 
469-88, at 480-1, quoted in Coakley, “Does Kenosis Rest on a Mistake?,” 259. 
52 Brouwer, 93. 
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“kenosis operative on his human side […] ‘empty’ of the possession of such divine 
attributes as omnipresence and omnipotence during the incarnation” while the divine 
nature retained its powers.53  Brouwer describes this as a “kenosis of use” so that Christ 
retained the divine attributes but gave up their use as Christ became human.54            
By the 19th century, with the development of New Testament scholarship and the 
quest for the historical Jesus, questions regarding Jesus’ self-consciousness, his 
psychological development, etc., became a crucial issue.  In contrast to the position of the 
early Church that there could be no change in God (and that this entailed a weakening or 
diminishment of God), it is at this time that we find a reversal of that position, that the 
kenosis of Christ truly meant some degree of modification, change, or an “emptying” of 
the divine attributes in the person of Christ.  This became the position of scholars such as 
Gottfried Thomasius as well as British kenoticists who focused their work on ascertaining 
what attributes of divinity were actually renounced while still trying to both honor the 
Chalcedonian doctrine and answer questions regarding Jesus’ humanity.  They developed 
a notion of the idea of a self-limitation of the divine realm, and of God being a “‘self-
limited God’ and wants to be that way.”55 For example Thomasius explicates his notion 
of divine self-limitation saying that what God gives up are relative divine attributes, not 
essential to being divine.  In particular, he points to divine glory which includes 
omnipotence, omniscience, as those characteristics that the divine can give up, and still 
not become any less divine.  He writes: 
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Omnipotence is no ‘more’ of the absolute power, omniscience is no enhancement of the 
immanent divine knowledge, omnipresence is no enhancement of the divine life (#11 and 
12). Thus if the Son as man has given up these attributes, he lacks nothing which is 
essential for God to be God.56 
 
Charles Gore, a British kenoticist, on the other hand, talks about this act of self-
limitation, as an act of empathy, the “power of sympathy as a power of self-
abandonment, or self-effacement, or self-sacrifice.’”57 In this case, God’s self-limitation 
does not involve any change in God, since such empathy is God’s nature. It is rather the 
realization or actualization of God’s nature, for “God can limit Himself by the conditions 
of manhood, because the Godhead contains in itself eternally the prototype of human 
self-sacrifice and self-limitation, for God is love.”58  This claim moves even farther from 
the early Church’s position of seeing the “emptying” as a loss and diminishment of God 
to now understanding “emptying” as the very nature of God.  For example, such an 
interpretation was echoed by other theologians such as John Macquarrie who argued that 
Jesus Christ did not only reveal the “depth of a true humanity” but also the “final reality 
as likewise self-emptying, self-giving and self-limiting.”59 That God is self-emptying 
love and is the prototype for humanity will have implications for the use of kenosis 
beyond arguing God’s nature to discussions about human nature. This will be discussed 
in the next section.   
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 Finally, these discussions of kenosis as the very nature of God also extended to 
new articulations of the Trinity asserting that kenosis is not only the activity of the Son 
but of all three persons of the Trinity.  Furthermore, theologians such as Hans Urs von 
Balthasar assert that such activity is not only turned toward humanity, but is the very 
activity or disposition within the Trinity itself.  For him, “…the idea of kenotic self-
surrender is too pervasive and important a characteristic to divine love to circumscribe its 
significance alone; it is eternally true of the perichoretic and reciprocal interrelations of 
the person of the Trinity…”60  Other theologians who broaden kenotic activity to the 
whole Trinity include Jürgen Moltmann, who in his work The Crucified God, writes how 
it is not only God the Son who suffers and dies on the cross but also God the Father 
suffers with the son. There he questions the notion of a God who is unmoved, unchanged 
by the suffering of the Son.  Again, notice the shift away from the early Church’s notion 
of God being “weakened” by being changed.  Here, what is argued is that a God who is 
not moved or changed by the suffering of the Son (and of the world) is not truly God.    
Finally, Thomas Altizer moves such interpretations further and talks about the 
radical kenosis, the total self-giving of God, the “death of God” and the absence of God 
that is experienced in the modern world.  It is such interpretations of kenosis that will be 
of particular interest to the Kyoto school which will be discussed later.  In the end, 
Coakley summarizes the complexity of the developments in the interpretation of kenosis 
and Philippians 2:5-11 saying:  
the christological uses of the language of kenosis in the history of Christian tradition 
shifted from its original hymnic celebration of Christ’s exaltation through humility […] 
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via its narrative application to the pre-existent Word who miraculously ‘took flesh’, and 
then on into the increasingly complex debates about the metaphysics of the relations of 
the ‘natures’, which became more problematic, not less, with the imposition of ‘modern’ 
notions of the subject on the classical category of hypostasis.  It is a convoluted story…61 
 
Kenosis and the Human: Following the “self-emptying” of Christ 
Debates regarding the doctrine of God and of Jesus Christ inevitably have 
implications in the understanding of humanity.  As Karl Rahner once famously stated, 
“theology is anthropology” and the debates around kenosis with regard to the nature of 
Christ inevitably lead to questions regarding human nature and the human’s relationship 
with God.  For example, the juxtaposition of Christ’s kenosis with the actions of Adam 
implies the understanding of the human condition as one of sin.  As discussed above, sin 
was understood as pride, choosing to be like God, “grasping the form of God”, in his act 
of disobeying God’s command.  Through this act, sin and death entered the world.  This 
contrasts with Christ’s whole life of kenosis, of “not grasping the form of God” in his life 
of humility, and his obedience unto death.  Such is the model of a new Adam, of true 
humanity without the stain of original sin.   
However, the discussion of sin and the human condition is only half of the story 
because the story of salvation also involves grace.  Sin is not something that we can 
escape out of our own action or will.  Rather, it is only through the grace of God, the act 
of God entering into human chaos, that salvation is possible.  For example, in 
Augustine’s discussion of human nature and the human condition, he understood human 
nature as primarily disordered because of sin.  For him, original sin was due to our first 
parents having ‘free will’ (that is, the freedom of choice) and they chose themselves 
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instead of choosing God.  This choice has disordered the will, so that it can no longer 
choose God or the good (which is what real freedom is about).  This disorder has been 
passed down to all human beings; original sin is our inherited sin.  So the human 
condition is one of universal corruption in need of redemption. Though we are free to 
make choices, our wills are in bondage, our desires are disordered.  Such bondage and 
disorder means that though we have free choice, the choices that we make are ultimately 
not the good, and our own efforts cannot lead to the liberation of our will and the proper 
ordering of our desire. 
Given this understanding of sin, grace then, for Augustine, is the liberation of the 
will, of a proper ordering of the will toward the good which is God. Given his anti-
Pelagian stance, Augustine understands grace as absolutely gratuitous; that human beings 
cannot do anything to earn it – since without grace we cannot choose the good. He holds 
that grace is operative (that is what God does without us), while holding on to free will, 
he still contends that grace is also cooperative (that God cooperates with us).   
Grace then is understood in the context of sin.  Because of sin (which has led to 
our disordered desire and the imprisonment of our will) grace is necessary (as that which 
reorders or reorients our desire back toward God).  The human condition is one of 
corruption (due to sin) and the human person is one whose will is disordered, unable to 
choose the good that s/he wants.  Grace “corrects” and reorients us back to God, and this 
is our salvation. This grace took form in the person of Jesus Christ, who entered the 
world through the act of kenosis. His whole life was a continuing of that kenosis which 
culminated on the cross, the salvation of humanity.   
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Furthermore, this unique union of the human-divine in Christ which has been the 
central question in discussions regarding kenosis, also begs the question of the 
relationship of the human to God.  For example, God being “emptied” into humanity 
leads to discussions about how such emptying empowers and ultimately transforms and 
divinizes the human, the question of salvation.  Moreover, in the “assumption of the 
flesh”, there is the further question of whether anything is retained in the human or 
whether the human is completely dissolved into the divine. It is unavoidable then to 
speak about kenosis without a discussion of the understanding of sin and grace, of 
salvation and how the act of God’s self-emptying and entering the world is an act of 
grace that leads to salvation.  However, such discussions also lead to questions about 
humanity and humanity’s role in this act of salvation.  For if due to sin only God can save 
humanity, if it is grace that brings about salvation, then where is the role of human 
agency, as well as human freedom and free will?  These are the questions that have 
divided Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians throughout history.   This is why, 
according to Sarah Coakley, “this theme of kenosis has profound importance for how we 
perceive the humanum – how we think of the nature of human freedom and of the willed 
and (graced) response to God.”62        
Finally, these discussions about human agency and salvation lead to the issue of 
discipleship, of how Christians are to live in the world.  The Philippians’ hymn is seen to 
teach Christ’s kenosis as the model for Christian behavior.  Furthermore, kenoticists like 
Charles Gore, also argue that such is the behavior to be imitated because it mimics the 
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very nature of God as love.  These later theological interpretations shifted from the more 
metaphysical preoccupations about the nature of the “self-emptying of God” to the ethical 
preoccupation of the exhortation to “have the mind of Christ” understood as following 
the way of self-emptying and self-giving, and mirroring God’s agape, God’s 
unconditional and self-sacrificial love.  The example of such love is not only Christ’s 
kenosis through the Incarnation, but also his kenosis in his life of humility and obedience 
unto death (his passion/cross).  This latter development, the emphasis on obedience, 
humility, and self-sacrifice, of kenosis being equated with agape becomes problematic 
from a feminist perspective which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
Kenosis in Christian Spirituality 
Finally, discussions on kenosis are not limited only to the nature of Christ, nor to the 
understanding of a moral example or the ethical individual path to follow, but include the 
spiritual life of the Church.  They also include an exhortation to enter the sacramental life 
of the community.  As mentioned above, the hymn was part of either a Eucharistic or 
baptismal celebration, so it was used as part of the ritual of the early Christian 
community.  As Sarah Coakley reminds us, the “hymn of Philippians 2 was, from the 
start, an invitation to enter into Christ’s extended life in the church, not just to speculate 
on his nature.”63  It is not a surprise then, that the doctrine of kenosis has also played a 
very big role in many spiritual writings, understanding the way of kenosis as to enter into 
a life of contemplation or meditation, an entry into the very life/heart of God.  
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Within the spiritual life, kenosis  involves an understanding of “self-emptying” in 
the process of prayer, of a letting go or surrender of one’s will or one’s desire to the will 
of God.  It involves self-denial, a renunciation or loss of the self that is a condition for the 
mystical life.  In prayer, one “empties” oneself to be infused and filled up by God.  In 
some ways this is reminiscent of the discussions of the Incarnation, of how the divine 
“descends” and transfers divine energy so that the human is purified and transformed in 
the process. In this case though, instead of the focus on the divine emptying, kenosis is 
seen as the human activity/ receptivity that allows for the person to be filled by God.  Just 
like the discussions above, once again, there are questions regarding human agency and 
asking what is retained in the human.  Is the human dissolved into the divine in the 
experience of union with God?  The centrality of kenosis in the spiritual life, for example, 
can be found in the classic Carmelite tradition of both John of the Cross and Teresa of 
Avila.  
However, just as the emphasis on humility, obedience and self-sacrifice in the 
ethical Christian life is critiqued by feminists, so too is the notion of kenosis in the 
spiritual life and its perceived rhetoric of “letting go” and “surrender” that seems to 
promote a passivity, a dissolution (even destruction) of self and escape from the world 
that is problematic for many feminists.  These objections will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
III.  Background on the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) 
 Early Buddhism  
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Emptiness is understood as one of the key Mahāyāna doctrines.  This doctrine is a 
further development of the early Buddhist teaching of impermanence (anityā) and the 
doctrine of “no-self” (anātman) found in the teachings regarding the Four Noble Truths.  
The Four Noble Truths, which are part of the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism, give a 
description or analysis of the human condition and of the human person.  The 1st Noble 
Truth states that: 
The Noble Truth of Suffering (dukkha) is this: Birth is suffering; ageing is suffering; 
sickness is suffering; death is suffering; sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair 
are suffering; dissociation with the pleasant is suffering; not to get what one wants is 
suffering; in brief, the five aggregates of attachments are suffering.64 
 
Here one finds a description of the whole of the human condition as one of suffering – 
that is that sickness, death, ageing, etc. are suffering.  These experiences within human 
experience is suffering, but even more that, in a sense, the human person is “suffering” – 
as the last part of the first noble truth says – “the five aggregates (skandhas) are 
suffering.”  These five aggregates are said to be the basic constituents of the human 
personality which is mistaken for the “self” which leads to attachment and ultimately to 
suffering.   
In a further explication of the doctrine, it states that:  
And what, friends, are the five aggregates affected by clinging that, in short, are 
suffering? They are: the material form aggregate affected by clinging, the feeling 
aggregate affected by clinging, the perception aggregate affected by clinging, the 
[mental] formations aggregate affected by clinging, and the consciousness aggregate 
affected by clinging.  These are the five aggregates affected by clinging that, in short, are 
suffering.65     
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 The five aggregates mentioned are primarily related to the Buddhist doctrine of 
no-Self - that is, that there is no permanent, substantial Self.  Rather the human 
personality is comprised of the 5 aggregates listed above – that is form, bare sensory 
awareness or consciousness, feeling tones, recognitions or perceptions and thought 
formations.  These five aggregates are understood as the composite nature of personality 
or as constantly changing processes of mind-body that is usually experienced as one 
instantaneous event that brings about this sense of a permanent, unchanging, substantial 
Self, the sense of an “I”.  As Peter Harvey says, “The Buddha focused much critical 
attention on views concerning ‘self’….Such views can take many forms, but the Buddha 
felt that all of them locate a substantial self somewhere in the five khandhas…”66   
Attachment or clinging (as the quote mentions) to such a “substantial self” is 
rooted in the very nature of these five aggregates.  They, in a sense “cause” it.  For 
contact with the world through the senses leads to feeling tones particularly of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness or neutrality which then bring about 
desire/attachment/clinging to that which is pleasant while trying to avoid the unpleasant.  
This brings about chains of thought and reaction that rule our actions. We are led by such 
chains of thought and reaction, ultimately controlled by our thoughts, emotions and 
actions and become unconsciously reactive to the world around us.  We are caught in this 
endless cycle of reaction, constantly craving, thirsting, led by emotions – leading to 
anxiety, unsatisfaction, struggle – which is dukkha.  This is the cycle of samsara. 
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 One example typically used to demonstrate this doctrine and how the aggregates 
work together is the image of the chariot which is primarily just made up of different 
parts.  The word “chariot” is used to “denote a collection of items in functional 
relationship, but not a special part of a chariot….”67 There is no “chariot” in itself, but 
rather different parts coming together in order to make that chariot.  In the same way, the 
“self” that is experienced as a unitary “self” is really the five aggregates which are of a 
composite nature.  
Furthermore, these five aggregates and the doctrine of “no-self” are also closely 
related to another key Buddhist doctrine, dependent origination (pratītya samutpāda) 
which states that “…all things, mental and physical, arise and exist due to the presence of 
certain conditions, and cease once their conditions are removed: nothing (except 
Nibbāna) is independent.”68   Such doctrine strengthens the doctrine of no-self, 
reaffirming the teaching that there is no independent, unchanging “self”, but rather, it is 
conditions coming together, dependent upon each other for their arising or their 
existence. Hence as Peter Harvey states,  
The doctrine [of conditioned arising] thus complements the teaching that no permanent, 
independent self can be found.  The main concrete application of the abstract principle is 
in the form of a series of conditioned and conditioning links (nidānas) culminating in the 
arising of dukkha.69   
 
 In particular, Abhidharma literature has used the description of the links of 
dependent origination70 to analyze the origin of suffering.  Basically, in trying to 
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understand the mechanics of rebirth into samsara (which is dukkha), the Abhidharmists 
argued that the origin of rebirth was volitional action (unskillful ones marked by greed, 
hatred or delusion), being fueled by one’s grasping, clinging or attachment, itself rooted 
in one’s ignorance.  These three – action, clinging and ignorance – are the fundamental 
causes of suffering, the second Noble Truth.  It is all of these conditions coming together 
that lead to suffering.  In this analysis, Harvey contends that this analysis bolsters the 
doctrine of no-self for it does not invoke a permanent self. “No substantial self can be 
found which underlies the nidānas, owning and operating them: they simply occur 
according to conditions.”71   
What we find then in these early Abhidharma analyses of the nature of the person 
is that the notion of ‘no-self’ and dependent arising demonstrates our ignorance or mis-
knowing (avidyā) of our fundamental nature.  The doctrine of ‘no-self’ points to how 
there is no permanent, substantial, autonomous Self.  Rather, that sense of Self is the 
product of the five aggregates that construct this illusory Self which leads to attachment.  
In reality, the ‘Self’ is really conditioned (as we saw in the analysis of the links of 
dependent origination); it relies on other conditions for its arising.  Hence, it is wrong to 
think of the Self as autonomous, permanent, or substantial.    What we find from this 
analysis is that the five aggregates are essentially defiled – they lead to our ignorance, 
clinging and attachment and hence to suffering and samsara.   
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In the end, the doctrine of “no-self” is the antidote to the attachment one feels to a 
sense of “I-ness” or “self” and a corrective to one’s ignorance about the true nature of the 
self, which can then lead to liberation.  This teaching reminds us that the sense of self that 
we usually experience as permanent, unchanging, stable, individual/autonomous does not 
exist!  This is not the “self” at all, it is only as we experience it in our ignorant, 
unattentive, unexamined ways.  Rather, “self” is to be found in the moment by moment 
construction of thought processes, dynamic, continually changing processes.  We are a 
changing process, not a fixed being that becomes the source of attachment.  As Harvey 
states, 
The not-self teaching is …primarily a practical teaching aimed at the overcoming of 
attachment.  It urges that all phenomena that we identify with as ‘self’, should be 
carefully observed and examined to see that they cannot be taken as such. In doing this, a 
person finally comes to see everything, all dhammas, as not-self, thereby destroying all 
attachment and attaining Nibbāna.72 
 
Nirvana then was understood as the cessation and escape from this suffering.  
Coming from the root “nirv” which means to “blow out or extinguish”, nirvana was 
understood as the ‘blowing out or extinguishing’ of the flames/fires of desire or 
attachment.  Cutting out such desires then frees one from samsara, and one attains 
nirvana.  If the root of suffering is ignorance about one’s fundamental nature, then by 
understanding our true nature as conditioned and understanding the causality of 
conditioning, one can break such a conditioning and the cycle of samsara can be ended.  
In early Buddhism then, we find the human situation one of suffering, caught in samsara, 
and nirvana was seen as an escape from samsara, the two mutually exclusive. 
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Furthermore, the nature of the person is impermanent and conditioned, the five 
aggregates defiled.   
Mahāyāna developments in the doctrine of emptiness 
With the development of the Mahāyāna tradition beginning around the 1st CE, the 
understanding of the nature of the person and of samsara and nirvana changed.  One of 
the key developments in Mahāyāna is the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) developed from 
meditative practices which brought about insight into the “empty nature” of things.  The 
development of wisdom (prajñā) opens one up to see the “empty nature” of things – their 
lack of inherent existence.  The doctrine of emptiness extended the notion of 
impermanence and “no-self” to “emptiness” or lack of inherent existence.  In other 
words, the Mahāyāna view emphasized “not only that no permanent, substantial Self can 
be found to exist, but that the changing mental and physical processes – dharmas – that 
make up the world and persons are devoid of any inherent nature or separate existence.”73  
Here, we see the move of Mahayanists away from the Abhidharmists who believed that 
these dharmas still existed as substantial and not empty.  The concern of these 
Mahayanists was the continued attachment that belief in the substantial nature of the 
dharmas may bring.  For example, Paul Williams contends that in the Perfection of 
Wisdom (Prajñāpāramitā) sutras, considered to be the earliest Mahāyāna sutras, 
attachment to dharmas was considered attachment nonetheless, and that the goal of 
arhatship was unattainable “without understanding the absence of Self in dharmas.”74 
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The greatest systematizer of the teachings on emptiness was probably Nagarjuna, 
of the Madhyamaka school.  Streng characterizes Nagarjuna’s basic work, the 
Mulamadhyamakakarikas as showing the influence of both the Abhidharmic concern 
with analysis and clarification as well as the Prajñāpāramitā concern with the practice of 
spiritual realization.75  In particular, Nagarjuna mirrors the concern about attachment to 
dharmas and the insistence on their empty nature.  As Ornatowski contends, “Nagarjuna 
was attempting to overturn the substantialist views of the Abhidharmists, who tried to 
give a substantive positive reality to the dharmas and other concepts that Nagarjuna 
argued were not there.”76 Furthermore, in his Stanzas on the Middle Path, Nagarjuna 
developed emptiness as a logical tool to be used to break down the monks’ attachment to 
false views. 77  He was not trying to give a description of the Ultimate or unconditioned, 
or the nature of existence, but instead was using emptiness as a tool to against attachment 
to anything, even to the doctrine of emptiness itself which is a “poison.”78  
Furthermore, Nagarjuna also moves away from the Abhidharmists by re-
interpreting the understanding of dependent origination and identifying it with emptiness.  
As Ornatowski says, “[t]he main achievement of Nagarjuna was not simply his insistence 
upon the importance of ‘emptiness’ but also his identification of emptiness with 
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dependent co-origination (pratītya-samutpāda) which he considered the basic teaching of 
the Buddha.”79  For the Mahayanists, the understanding of dharmas being empty meant 
that, in their very nature, they lack inherent existence and are therefore mutually 
dependent on others for their arising.  This is how things really are. For Nagarjuna, 
“emptiness became the best verbal expression for ‘originating dependently.’ It avoided 
the illusion of self existence most completely and omitted the necessity for a law of 
causation which related entities that were presupposed in a ‘svabhava’ [own/inherent-
existence] perspective.”80  In this case, the notion of emptiness should not be seen as 
equivalent to nothingness or nihilism, but to relative existence; meaning they [the 
dharmas] are dependent on other causes and conditions for their arising.81   What they are 
opposed to is the imputation of inherent existence.  This is the false view that leads to 
attachment and greater suffering.  According to Streng,  
…the religious significance of ‘emptiness’ is comparable to that of anatma [no-self], for 
both are expressions of dependent co-origination. They delineate the existential situation 
in which man attains release.82  
 
In contrast to the Mādhyamaka teaching on emptiness and its use as a logical tool 
against attachment to views, the Yogācāra school developed, deeply rooted in the practice 
of meditative trance (dhyānas), which focused on consciousness and how the ordinary 
experience of the world is made of conceptual constructions.  As Harvey states,  
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The Mādhyamikas had an analytical, dialectic approach to reality, emphasizing prajñā 
(wisdom); the Yogācārins emphasized samādhi (meditative concentration) and the 
withdrawal of the mind from sensory phenomena.  Just as the early Buddhists sought to 
transcend limiting attachment by seeing phenomena as imoerant, unsatisfactory and not-
self, the Mādhyamikas sought this by seeing them as ‘empty’, and the Yogācārins sought 
it by seeing perceived phenomena as mental constructions.83 
 
Yogācārins emphasized the role of consciousness or mind (hence its other name 
as the Cittamātra or mind/thought-only school) as that which interprets experience and 
thus constructs the world.  A central concept among Yogācārins is that of the three 
“natures” or “aspects’ (trisvabhava) to explain one’s experience of reality, and to move 
from the ordinary experience of reality to the ultimate truth.  The first aspect, the 
parikalpitasvabhava (mentally constructed or imagined), is one’s ordinary, 
unenlightened, dualistic experience of the world. “It is how the world appears to us, the 
realm of subject-object duality. These things do not actually exist at all (Trimśikā v. 20), 
things are not really like that.”84  The second aspect is the paratantrasvabhava (the other-
dependent) which sees both subject and object as a flow of perceptions, seeing them as 
impermanent and arising dependently of each other.  However, this is not the highest 
level for it is this flow of perception which forms the basis of the mistaken construction 
into subject and object in the first aspect.  The third aspect, the parinispannasvabhava 
(absolutely accomplished or perfected) is one that is totally devoid of subject-object 
duality and where the empty nature of the first two aspects/natures is realized.  This 
aspect is “knowledge of the very empty ‘nature’ of all phenomena: emptiness.  This 
‘nature’ is also known as thusness, the inconceivable as-it-is-ness of reality.”85 This is the 
view of the Buddhas who are able to glimpse the ‘empty nature’ of all things, and in so 
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doing, see things in their thusness/suchness (tathatā); that is, to see things as they are, 
prior to conceptual construction and reification.  This thusness, the way things truly are is 
the ultimate truth.  It is ineffable and unchangeable.  It is through meditation that one 
learns to glimpse into this ultimate truth. 
In such discussions, the Yogācārins shifted the emphasis from expressing 
emptiness as a mere negation or as lack of inherent existence to emptiness as the 
affirmation of the intrinsic and positive nature and purity of things, and the affirmation of 
the mind as a nondual flow of perceptions.  As Harvey argues,  
While the Mādhyamikas see ‘emptiness’ as simply indicating the absence of inherent 
existence in phenomena, the Yogācārins see it as itself positively existing – in the form of 
the non-dual nature of ‘construction of the unreal’.  Reality, understood according to the 
true Middle Way, is empty of duality but not empty of existence.86 
 
Of course, there were debates about the nature of this mind, for how can a pure 
mind lead to impure illusory constructions.  Ultimately, they came to agree that the mind 
is inherently pure and its defilements are merely adventitious, and not part of its very 
nature. Mind is seen as impure only from the view of conventional or phenomenal truth 
but from the stance of ultimate reality – glimpsed in meditation – the mind is pure. As 
Harvey says,  
Its purity is intrinsic to it: ‘As is pure gold, water free from dirt, the sky without a cloud, 
so it is pure when detached from imagination’ (Lanka 1.31). Emptiness is seen as 
undefiled due to its very nature, the brightly shining state of the transcendental citta, but 
this purity is hidden by arriving defilements (Mv. Ch. 1, v. 23, cf, p. 56).87 
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Another school of thought which emphasized a more positive discussion on 
emptiness is the tathāgatagarbha.88  Its main contribution is the discussion of the 
tathāgatagarbha (TTG) and its relation with Buddha nature.  Garbha means womb, 
embryo or container while tathāgata usually alludes to the Buddha, the perfect one.  
Hence, TTG usually refers to the “embryonic perfect one” alluding to the seed/potential 
within all sentient beings to become Buddhas, no matter how deluded or defiled one is.  
One of the key texts for this doctrine is that of Queen Śrimala which explains that this 
TTG is really the dharmakāya which is obscured in unenlightened persons.  The 
dharmakāya is:  
beginningless, uncreate, unborn, undying, free from death; permanent, steadfast, calm, 
eternal; intrinsically pure, free from all the defilement-store; and accompanied by Buddha 
natures more numerous than the sands of the  Ganges, which are nondiscrete, knowing as 
liberated, and inconceivable. This Dharmakāya of the Tathāgata when not free from the 
store of defilement is referred to as the Tathāgatagarbha.89 
 
 Furthermore, beyond the earlier understanding of no-self and even of emptiness as 
negation, TTG discussions continue to affirm the intrinsic and positive nature and purity 
of things as we saw among Yogācārins.  As Harvey states,  
 [i]t is an emptiness which is itself full of possibilities; it is resplendent with the qualities 
of Buddhahood, beginningless, unchanging and permanent (Rv. Vv. 51, 84). It is beyond 
duality, having the nature of thought and the intrinsic purity of a jewel, space or water 
(Rv. vv. 28, 30, 49). It is brightly shining with lucid clarity (Rv. v. 170) and is ‘by nature 
brightly shining and pure’ (Lanka.77).90    
 
Hence, in a reversal of earlier views of the “self” (and skandhas) as defiled, this further 
development shows that the person is inherently pure, and has the capacity for goodness 
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and love and all the qualities of enlightenment (the qualities of a Buddha such as 
discernment, creative responsiveness, skillful means, etc.) except that it is concealed.  
Such a development in doctrine still upholds the prior notion of ‘no-self’ understood as a 
wrong understanding of self as “samsaric egoism.”  However, the true nature of self lies 
beyond the notion of impermanence, and is glimpsed from the view of emptiness.  This 
true self is the ultimate truth: that the fundamental nature of persons is one of purity and 
goodness – the nature of the Buddhas as stated above.   
 Correlated to the Yogācāra stance that the mind is pure yet has adventitious 
defilements, the TTG developed the stance that Buddha nature is pure and undefiled, only 
it is hidden by habits of clinging and attachment.  Some of the metaphors to illustrate the 
relationship of the pure TTG and its defilements are a Buddha-image wrapped in rags, or 
a gold ore that has to be refined in order to bring out the intrinsic purity of the gold.91  In 
the metaphor of the Buddha-image wrapped in rags, one finds a strong model of Buddha 
nature where one can argue that only from conventional reality, that is, from the state of 
ignorance and unenlightenment is our nature seen as tainted.  Hence if our very nature is 
already that of the Buddhas, then there is nothing that we need to do except to 
discover/uncover this truth or in this case, take off the rags and uncover the Buddha 
hidden within.  In the second metaphor, one finds a weaker model of Buddha nature, as 
the capacity for awakening that needs cultivation – just as the gold ore has to be purified 
and refined.    
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The discussions on these key Buddhist doctrines of “no-self’, “emptiness” and 
“dependent origination” has implications on the understanding on the mode of existence 
of persons.  The doctrine of ‘no-self’ – that there is no permanent, substantial self - 
already implies the doctrine of dependent arising, that the self is dependent on other 
causes and conditions.  Moreover, the Mahāyāna emphasis on emptiness as dependent 
origination emphasizes further how the very nature of persons (indeed of all phenomena) 
is interdependence.  Since all is empty, and everything depends on everything else for its 
existence, then fundamentally everything is interconnected and interdependent.  As 
Ingram says,  
Applied to human beings, for example, non-self means that we are not embodiments of 
an unchanging self-entity that remains self-identical through time. All Buddhist teachings 
are firm in their rejection of permanent selfhood.  What we “are” is a system of 
interdependent relationships – physical, psychological, historical, sociological, cultural, 
spiritual – that, in interdependence with everything else undergoing change and becoming 
in the universe, continuously create “who” we are from moment to moment in our 
lifetimes. We are not permanent selves that have these interdependent relationship; we 
are these interdependent relationships we undergo.  Since these relationships are not 
permanent, neither we nor anything else in the universe is permanent.92 
 
Furthermore, the doctrine of emptiness also implies that ultimately, “self” and 
“other” are beyond duality. Conventionally, there is the appearance and experience of 
duality since “self” and “other” are interdependently co-constructed in relation to each 
other.  Through realizing emptiness, there is a recognition of the other as oneself, as 
sharing this fundamental ‘empty nature’ but also constitutive of the other since we are all 
mutually interdependent.  With the further development of the doctrine of Buddha nature 
– then the recognition of other as oneself – extends beyond the recognition of sharing an 
                                                
92 Paul O. Ingram, The Process of Buddhist-Christian Dialogue (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2009) 48. 
  51 
‘empty nature’ but ultimately realizing that “self” and “other” are one nature, thusness 
beyond duality, having the nature of the Buddhas. As Burton Watson says, 
…because of its underlying unity, all things in it interpenetrate with one another and 
share one another’s identity…all beings partake of the Buddha nature and have the 
potential to attain Buddhahood.93  
 
This is primarily what is found in many meditation practices, that part of the 
wisdom of emptiness is cutting through our delusion of seeing ourselves as separate and 
different from others in order to see the fundamental nature that is shared by all, the 
nature of the Buddhas.  Just as our suffering can be shown as not being different from 
another person and we can see them as ourselves, we can also see this Buddha nature in 
others and sense our deep connection with them, and commune with them.  A wonderful 
image of such a mode of interdependence was developed in the Hua-Yen tradition in 
China.  In the Flower Garland sutra is the image of Indra’s net and Tower of Vairocana, 
the latter seen as the vision of Bodhisattvas and Buddhas who see ultimate reality – the 
emptiness and hence interpenetration of all beings.  In the image of Indra’s net, each knot 
that forms the net has a jewel and in each jewel is reflected all the other jewels that make 
up the net. Each jewel then is constituted by all the other jewels – an image of 
“emptiness” (lack of inherent existence) and dependent origination.  And the Tower of 
Vairocana gives us the vision of how all reality is contained within every single entity, a 
vision of ultimate reality which is the perfect interpenetration of all things.  
From this vision of emptiness comes compassion – that is the wish to help others 
and free them from their suffering. Aside from seeing that everyone shares the same 
fundamental conditioning and nature, our interdependence means that one cannot wish 
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for one’s liberation without wishing the same for others.  One cannot be liberated unless 
all are liberated.  This becomes the beginning of the bodhicitta (the awakened or 
awakening mind) which is the entrance to the Bodhisattva path.  This is the path of one 
who chooses to attain enlightenment, not just for themselves, but for the sake of all 
sentient beings who are ultimately undivided from oneself. This focus on compassion and 
the liberation of all beings is one of the key characteristics of the Mahāyāna.  According 
to Williams,  
What characterizes the Mahayana is not the teaching of absence of Self in dharmas but, 
according to the great Tibetan scholar Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the extensive deeds and 
compassion of the Bodhisattva who is treading the path to perfect Buddhahood for the 
benefit of all.94 
 
 In a famous passage in the Bodhicaryāvatāra (The Way of the Bodhisattva), this 
aspiration is expressed as such: 
For all those ailing in the world, 
Until their every sickness has been healed, 
May I myself become for them 
The doctor, nurse, the medicine itself.95  
 
Just as the buddhas of the past 
Embraced the awakened attitude of mind, 
And in the precepts of the bodhisattvas 
Step by step abode and trained, 
 
Just so, and for the benefit of beings, 
I will also have this attitude of mind, 
And in those precepts, step by step, 
I will abide and train myself.96  
 
In these verses, this aspiration to heal every sickness coupled with embracing the 
awakened attitude of mind shows the Bodhisattva path as both the path of wisdom 
(awakened attitude of mind) and compassion (healing every sickness, benefiting sentient 
                                                
94 Paul Williams, 47-8. 
95 Shantideva, The Way of the Bodhisattva: A Translation of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, trans. Padmakara 
Translation Group (Boston: Shambhala, 2003) 3:7. 
96 Shantideva, 3:23-24.  
  53 
beings).  They are usually expressed as the two wings that enable one to fly or as the two 
eyes that enable one to see deeply or clearly.   On the one hand, wisdom (realizing 
emptiness), as Harvey says, ensures that compassionate action is “appropriate, effective, 
and not covertly self-seeking.”97  This is so because in realizing emptiness, one sees that 
“I” is not ultimately different from “another” since both are “empty” and one’s action 
will not stem out of pride or condescension, but instead comes from seeking liberation for 
them, in the same way that one seeks liberation for oneself.  Furthermore, wisdom cannot 
be seen as fully realized unless it bears fruit in compassionate action.  For if one realizes 
the emptiness of both self and other, then one can only act to save not just oneself, but all 
sentient beings.  Hence, the universality of the vow of a Bodhisattva never to stop until 
all beings are set free or as quoted above, until every sickness has been healed.  On the 
other hand, compassion helps us to realize the wisdom of emptiness by undercutting our 
self-centeredness, lessening the attachment to self in light of our consideration of the 
other.  Furthermore, great compassion does not allow us to “immerse ourselves in any 
sort of quietistic trance, or accept any sort of illogical escapism from relativity, but 
imperatively compels us to act selflessly, as if already enlightened, even when we do not 
yet feel enlightened.”98 Here, we see how wisdom and compassion help in the cultivation 
of each other on the path. 
The interdependence of wisdom and compassion can be found in the very popular 
and much loved story of Vimalakīrti, a bodhisattva who appears as a sick man in order to 
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teach others the view of emptiness which will lead them to liberation.  In his discussions, 
he challenges wrong understandings of emptiness, and insists on its nonduality with 
compassion.  He makes it clear that “the sole function of wisdom, gnosis or any state of 
liberation is its function as a necessary complement to the indispensable great 
compassion that has no object (anupalambha) and is not a sentimentally conceived 
emotion (ananūnayad.r.st.imahākarunā).99 For example, in Vimalakīrti’s discourse on 
his sickness, he speaks about using his own sickness to empower empathy for all living 
beings and hence work for their welfare.100  Moreover, he speaks about how wisdom and 
compassion have to work together, for without the integration of the two, one does not 
find liberation but only bondage.  He says, 
Wisdom not integrated with liberative technique is bondage, but wisdom integrated with liberative 
technique is liberation. Liberative technique not integrated with wisdom is bondage, but liberative 
technique integrated with wisdom is liberation.101  
 
Here as the translator notes, “liberative technique” is the expression of compassion.102  
On the one hand, wisdom without compassion is still bondage because one cannot truly 
have realized wisdom, if one chooses only to work for one’s own liberation and not that 
of others.  This would show one has not truly realized both the sameness and the 
interdependence of all sentient beings.  In other words, one still continues to have a subtle 
attachment to oneself.  At the same time, compassion without wisdom is also bondage, 
because it leads to what he calls “sentimental compassion.”  This kind of compassion is 
problematic because it is still attached to the emotions and passions that lead to suffering.  
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As Vimalakīrti said, one is still “living in the grip of dogmatic convictions, passions, 
attachments, resentments and their subconscious instincts.”103  One is not acting from 
detachment, or from the view of the equality of all beings, but continues to act out of 
wrong notions of “I” and “other”, out of feelings of “desire” or “anger”, not free from 
such passions and attachments.  In his view, such “sentimental compassion” only 
exhausts the bodhisattva.  They are unable to free others because they themselves are not 
yet free.  Thus it is only with wisdom that compassion can be liberating because then it is 
a compassion that is truly without attachment, truly universally encompassing, and 
without any desire of merit on the part of the bodhisattva.  This is why wisdom and 
compassion are seen as two wings due to the synergy in the practice of both.  Each 
further empowers the other as the path of the bodhisattva unfolds.  The practice of 
compassion helps to undercut one’s attachment to oneself and one’s self-centeredness 
thereby supporting the development of wisdom.  On the other hand, wisdom ensures that 
one’s practice of compassion over time becomes wider until it encompasses all sentient 
beings, and is no longer motivated by one’s emotions especially attachment or hatred. 
 Doctrine of emptiness and meditation practice 
 In order to realize such wisdom of emptiness, one must ultimately engage in the 
practice of meditation.  As previously mentioned, the very development of this doctrine 
came as the result of intense meditative practices.  In the same way, the realization of 
emptiness, the direct perception of the absence of self and the empty nature of all 
phenomena, is only possible through mental cultivation, that is mind-training and 
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meditation.  The Bodhicaryāvatāra, is one popular example of such meditation and mind-
training that is focused on the cultivation of both wisdom and compassion.  It was written 
by Śāntideva (c. 695-743), another influential Madhyamika writer, on the topic of the 
bodhisattva path. The whole of the Bodhicaryāvatāra is “geared toward wisdom, the 
direct realization of emptiness, absolute bodhicitta, without which the true practice of 
compassion is impossible.”104  Furthermore, it is famous for its chapter on wisdom 
showing how such is central to the spiritual life, and not just a topic for philosophical 
discussions. “Shāntideva demonstrates that, far from being a matter of rarified 
metaphysics or academic discussion, removed from the concerns of practical existence, 
Mādhyamika is fundamentally a vision and a way of life. It is the ultimate heart and soul 
of the Buddha’s teaching.”105 
 In the chapter on wisdom, Śāntideva contends that only the realization of 
emptiness can bring enlightenment and hence the task of one who seeks it must be the 
meditation on this topic.  He writes: 
Afflictive passion and the veils of ignorance --   
The cure for these is emptiness. 
Therefore, how could they not meditate upon it 
Who wish swiftly to attain omniscience?106  
 
 What follows in that chapter is a very profound and complex meditation on 
emptiness, teaching the reader to ponder what one usually experiences and to see the 
“empty” nature of all of that.  In particular, he is keen to examine the usual notion of the 
“self” as a unitary “body”, of analyzing the five aggregates (the skandhas) mentioned 
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above, to show that none of them is the “I”, nor do they have inherent existence.  For 
example, he writes: 
The flesh and skin are not the “I,” 
And neither are the body’s warmth and breath. 
The cavities within the frame are not the “I,” 
And “I” is not accounted for within the six perceptions.107  
 
Instead, what appears as “I” or having inherent existence, only arises through the coming 
together of certain causes and conditions.  Here, we see him following the Mādhyamaka 
train of equating emptiness with dependent arising.  For example, he writes: 
As long as the conditions are assembled, 
A body will appear and seem to be a man. 
As long as all parts are likewise present, 
It’s there that we will see a body.108  
 
What arises through the meeting of conditions 
And ceases to exist when these are lacking, 
Is artificial like the mirror image; 
How can true existence be ascribed to it.109  
 
May beings like myself discern and grasp 
That all things have the character of space110  
 
He states that suffering, all sorrow and pain can be attributed to this wrong view, the 
ignorance regarding emptiness.  In order to counteract such tendencies, he goes into these 
deep examinations of phenomena and encourages his readers, as quoted above, to see 
things as “artificial”, as having the character of space, or even seeing them as illusions or 
mirages.  Such can help lessen one’s attachment to seeing phenomena as solid, permanent 
and unitary.  Such exercises are done in meditation and are ultimately what lead to the 
direct realization of emptiness.  
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 However, as previously mentioned, the realization of emptiness is impossible 
without the practice of compassion and vice versa.  In this text, one also sees how the two 
work together, and how Śāntideva balances the training on emptiness with the practice of 
compassion.  In his discussions, one sees how compassion comes through the realization 
of the “emptiness” of “self” and “other” and hence their interdependence, and how one’s 
own liberation can only come through the liberation of others.  For example, he writes: 
And catching sight of others, think 
That it will be through them 
That you will come to buddhahood. 
So look on them with open, loving hearts.111  
 
Furthermore, his meditation on chapter eight, verses 90-98 is a classic example of 
a meditation that leads to compassion undergirded by an understanding of emptiness 
articulated as seeing the nonduality between “I” and “other”, and seeing their equality.  
This practice becomes the basis of then being able to exchange oneself for the other, 
ultimately allowing one to take on the suffering of the other as one’s own suffering, and 
powering the great compassion.  As Khenchen Kunzang Palden writes, in his 
commentary on these verses, “first meditate strenuously on equality of self and other; for 
without it, a perfectly pure altruistic attitude cannot arise.”112  For Sāntideva, the way to 
achieve this is to meditate on how all beings are the same, in wanting happiness and 
wanting to be free from suffering.  He writes, 
Strive at first to meditate 
Upon the sameness of yourself and others. 
In joy and sorrow all are equal. 
Thus be a guardian of all, as of yourself.113  
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The hand and other limbs are many and distinct, 
But all are one – one body to be kept and guarded. 
Likewise, different beings in their joys and sorrows, 
Are, like me, all one in wanting happiness.114  
 
Meditating in this way, Khenchen Palden contends, one begins to realize the 
nondualism of self and other, to see “I” and “other” as totally unreal and illusory.  One 
begins to realize the “spacelike quality of egolessness” and “it is no longer possible to 
make a separation between ‘I’ and ‘other’, and there arises an attitude of wanting to 
protect others as oneself, to protect all that belongs to them with the same care as if it 
were one’s own.”115  It is precisely this attitude and realization that empowers the 
bodhisattva’s activity in the world, wishing to liberate all beings from suffering, realizing 
not only their equality but also their interdependence.  As mentioned, such meditation 
becomes the basis for the practice of exchanging oneself for the other, a practice in 
compassion, but also a constant reminder of how “I” and “other” are not ultimately 
different.  This allows for compassion to be pure and universal, not tainted by the 
passions and attachments rooted in the wrong view of “self” and “other.”  Such insights 
into wisdom and compassion, as demonstrated by Śāntideva, can only happen within 
meditation.  Hence, it is a vital component in order to truly have a direct realization of 
emptiness. Its main goal, as mentioned, is not any kind of discursive or academic 
understanding of the doctrine, but ultimately its realization so that one can experience 
liberation in the fullest sense, a liberation that reaches out to all others as one’s greater 
self.    
IV.  Buddhist Christian dialogues on kenosis and śūnyatā  
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Comparison and dialogue between Christians and Buddhists have proven to be 
fruitful for both religions.116  In these comparisons, there has been a focus on śūnyatā as 
one of the key Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines even as Christian theologians reflected upon 
the nature of God, on Christology, and on theological anthropology and selfhood.  
Furthermore, there have also been exchanges between some of these Christian 
theologians and their Buddhist counterparts.  These exchanges which occurred between 
the 1980s and the 1990s focused on the Buddhist doctrine of śūnyatā and the Christian 
doctrine of kenosis. In Lai and von Brück’s assessment, academic exchange has primarily 
concentrated on this dialogue between the Kyoto school and most prominently American 
process philosophy.117   Masao Abe of the Kyoto School together with John Cobb started 
a group of Buddhist and Christian scholars conversing on various issues over a five-year 
period.  Such conversations over the years have resulted in books such as The Emptying 
God, Buddhist Emptiness and Christian Trinity and Divine Emptiness and Historical 
Fullness.118   
Such prolific dialogue between these Buddhist and Christian scholars may have 
come about because they share many parallels.  Process philosophy, started by Alfred 
Whitehead, moves away from the Aristotelian notion of being and substance toward a 
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more dynamic process of becoming, both of God as well as beings.  As such, “it takes 
positions that are similar to certain assertions of Buddhism, without being historically 
dependent on Buddhism.”119  In particular, it comes close to the Buddhist understanding 
of impermanence, no-self, as well as “emptiness” and dependent origination.  As Lai and 
von Brück note, this was not immediately apparent in the early days of Buddhist- 
Christian dialogue where emptiness was understood in the sense of radical negation 
rather than as complete interdependence.  However, as interest in the Hua-Yen school, 
with its more positive image of emptiness as mutual dependence, and its vision of the 
interdependence of all things, increased, there came a corresponding increase in interest 
from process philosophers and theologians.  One of the first fruits of this encounter is the 
work of John Cobb, a process theologian who started the conversation with Masao 
Abe.120 
 John Cobb and Beyond Dialogue: Toward a Mutual Transformation of 
Christianity and Buddhism 
 
In his book, Beyond Dialogue, John Cobb reflects upon aspects of the Christian 
tradition by way of understanding Buddhist doctrines, particularly the doctrine of 
emptiness.  As is evident from his title, he believes that the encounter between the two, 
and his method of “passing over” to Buddhism and “coming back” to Christianity, moves 
“beyond dialogue” to a new and enriched understanding of both traditions that can lead to 
their mutual transformation and fructification. In particular, as Paul Ingram points out, 
Cobb believes that dialogue with Buddhism can help Christians understand “how 
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inadequately theology has reflected on the nonsubstantial character of God and human 
selfhood.  To make this point, he incorporates the Mahayana Buddhist doctrines of 
“emptying” (Sanskrit śūñyatā) and “non-self” (Sanskrit anātman) into his doctrine of 
God.”121   
For example, in reflecting upon the Christian understanding of selfhood and 
whether that can be understood in light of the Buddhist notion of “no-self”, Cobb reflects 
upon “no-self” as the reminder of how we are not permanent, unchanging selves.  This 
counters views that keep us locked in the illusion that change is not possible, and 
ultimately close us to new possibilities.  Within the Christian framework, this could be 
understood as closing ourselves to the possibility of deeper openness to the call of God 
because we are too firmly entrenched in our “past” and the “self” understood in that past.  
He writes: 
The strong personal self which characterizes us is also the sinner who refuses to respond, moment 
by moment, to the call of Christ. The dominance of our past purposes restricts our openness to the 
new possibilities that are given in Christ …. The Christian goal, therefore, is not the dissolution of 
the personal self but its continual transcending of the past through conformation to the ever new 
purposes of God.122 
 
Furthermore, Cobb also re-thinks the Great Commandment of loving the other as 
oneself in light of his understanding of emptiness as dependent origination.  He writes 
about the difficulty to love others in the same way that we love ourselves; that in the 
Christian imagination, there is the strong sense of one’s individual self over that of 
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others, and a sense that a choice for the other is a choice for the “refusal to favor oneself.”  
He contends then that, in the Christian tradition,  
the call to love others as we love ourselves is experienced either as remote and hardly relevant 
ideal, a burdensome and guilt-producing law, or as a supernatural gift. Relations to other persons 
are so different from relations to oneself that an equality of love is virtually inconceivable.123   
 
However, taking into consideration the Buddhist notion of dependent origination 
(and this could be where we see the influence of the Hua-yen tradition of the 
interdependence of all things), there need not be a dualism between self and other, for the 
other is experienced as oneself.  He rejects the substantialist understanding of selfhood, 
and contends that with the understanding of emptiness as dependent origination, “the 
barrier between persons, the mutual externality, disappears. Each participates in the other 
as in itself. The Christian commandment to love the neighbor as the self is transformed in 
the enlightened ones into a description of the actual relationship to others.”124  However, 
he clarifies that such a movement, is not meant to lead to a dissolution nor annihilation of 
a personal structure of existence (which may be a particular Christian and Western 
concern or a misunderstanding of Buddhist notion of “no-self”), but rather is a movement 
toward transcendence.  It is a move away from the past self that is locked in one’s 
individuality and one’s concern and crosses over to the concerns of the other, 
transcending such a past in a way that allows for the “development of relations to others 
that are increasingly able to inherit from them…”125  
In accordance with his own process theology and the doctrine of emptiness and 
dependent origination, he also posits a new understanding of God that goes beyond the 
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Greek philosophical understanding of God as an unchanging substantial essence, and 
corresponds better, he argues, to the biblical notion of God.  He writes,  
God must be conceived as wholly lacking substantiality. God cannot be an agent or 
distinct from the divine activity or a patient distinguished from the divine receptivity. 
God must be the complete, unqualified, everlasting actualization of pratitya-samutpada, 
dependent origination. It is precisely by being perfectly empty that God, like a Buddha, is 
perfectly full. That is, God must be totally open to all that is and constituted by its 
reception. … might resonate better to the revelation in Jesus than does the identification 
of God as being or Supreme Being.126 
 
  In the end, Paul Ingram expresses his understanding of Cobb’s project and its 
contribution to Christian theology stating that: 
…dialogue with Buddhism, meditated through Whiteheadian process philosophy, brings 
theological reflection into closer alignment with biblical tradition, given the fact that 
traditional Christian teaching of God as an unchanging substantial essence, as well as the 
doctrine of an immortal soul, are in harmony neither with biblical tradition nor the 
‘structure’ of Christian experience.127 
 
 This description of God, as wholly lacking substantiality, and his statement that 
only by “being perfectly empty is God perfectly full, or even perfectly God,” comes close 
to the conversations with Masao Abe who re-thinks Christ’s kenosis in light of his 
understanding of emptiness, concluding that God can only be truly the Son of God in his 
full emptying of his divine nature in the Incarnation.  It is to this discussion that we now 
turn our attention.  
 The Kyoto School and Masao Abe’s “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata” 
Masao Abe comes from the Kyoto school of Japanese Buddhism that has a history 
of studying Western Continental philosophy, particularly Kantian idealism.128 The Kyoto 
School is characterized by formation/education in European/Western thought.  This 
                                                
126 Cobb, Beyond Dialogue, 113. 
127 Ingram, 36. 
128 Ibid., 49. 
  65 
school, according to Steve Odin, started a new period of kenoticism, particularly, 
“Japanese kenoticism” with the Japanese effort to reformulate the Christian notion of 
kenosis in light of the metaphysics of sunyata.129   These dialogues were begun by 
Nishida Kitaro (1879-1945), the founder of the Kyoto School, when he first introduced 
the kenosis/śūnyatā motif in his search for a transcultural or comparative philosophy of 
religion. In his analysis, he stated that “A God who is simply self-sufficient is not the true 
God.”130  He argued that the nature of God is that God is self-emptying or “kenotic,” and 
hence the perfection of God rests, not on God’s self-sufficiency, but on the kenosis of 
God. 
His disciple, Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990), followed in his footsteps and also 
focused on the problem of a transcultural philosophy of religion.  In his book Religion 
and Nothingness, Nishitani followed upon the logic of Nishida and continued to develop 
the notion of kenosis.  He linked it to another Christian concept, agape, arriving at a re-
interpretation of Christ.  For him, kenosis is grounded in agape or disinterested love. The 
self-emptying of Christ out of agape reveals the very perfection of God.  This is the 
characteristic of the divine, and the self-emptying of Christ can only be understood within 
the original kenosis of God.   The perfection of God is God’s self-emptying nature.  This 
is typified in Christ’s ekkenosis (the activity of self-emptying) and our self-emptying 
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today is the practice of that divine perfection.131  This interpretation of the Christian 
theological notion of kenosis is done from the standpoint of some key Mahayana 
Buddhist categories as emptiness, non-ego, and compassion.132  
Most prominently, Masao Abe continued this dialogue around kenosis and 
śūnyatā, and as mentioned above, started a group of Buddhist and Christian scholars 
conversing on various issues.  He studied at Union Theological Seminary under Paul 
Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr.  Furthermore, as James Fredericks also notes, “Abe 
Masao, more than any other member of the Kyoto school, has made interreligious 
dialogue his specialization.”133  
Abe’s article entitled Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata sparked much 
conversation with many Christian as well as Jewish theologians which resulted in the 
three books mentioned above.  First, he contextualizes not only the need for mutual 
understanding but also mutual transformation of both Buddhism and Christianity in light 
of anti-religious tendencies, particularly scientism and nihilism, in the modern world.  He 
states that “[t]he most crucial task of any religion in our time is to respond to these anti-
religious forces by elucidating the authentic meaning of religious faith.”134 Specifically, 
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of Buddhist-Christian dialogue he writes that, only when “it is pursued with an 
appreciation of the wider context of the contemporary confrontation of religion and 
irreligion will it be able to open up a deeper religious dimension in which Buddhist and 
Christian truth can be fully realized in a new paradigm beyond the religion-negating 
principles of scientism, Marxism, traditional Freudian psychoanalytic thought, and 
nihilism in the Nietzchean sense.”135  This reflection then on kenosis/śūnyatā, on a kind 
of “kenotic Buddhology” of “Buddhist Christology” is his proposal for how Buddhism 
and Christianity can overcome scientism and nihilism as well as open up that deeper 
religious dimension in both traditions. 
Before one can understand his interpretation of Christ’s kenosis, one must look at 
how Abe uses the doctrine of emptiness upon which kenosis is re-interpreted, and how 
his understanding of kenosis or “self-emptying” influences his articulation of emptiness. 
He gives Buddhist philosophy a new Christian terminology, using śūnyatā verbally in a 
way that was not traditionally used or understood in Indian Buddhist philosophy.  For 
example, Abe begins his interpretation of śūnyatā and his comparison with kenosis, by 
stating that “[t]he ultimate reality for Buddhism is neither Being nor God, but Sunyata. 
Sunyata, literally means, ‘emptiness’ or ‘voidness’ and can imply ‘absolute 
nothingness.’”136  Here, Abe grounds his understanding of śūnyatā on Mādhyamikan 
interpretation of Nagarjuna and the traditional Buddhist understanding of emptiness.  Yet, 
at the same time, he articulates Nagarjuna’s discussion of emptiness using the Christian 
notion of “emptying” when he cautions that even emptiness itself must be emptied and 
                                                
135 Abe, 4. 
136 Ibid., 27. 
  68 
not clung to.  This “self-emptying” of emptiness, this “pure activity of absolute self-
emptying” is true Sunyata.”137 This articulation of “emptying emptiness” as caution lest it 
become another form of attachment is closer to the Christian articulation of kenosis as 
self-emptying and Christ’s kenosis where he emptied himself and did not cling to the 
form of man.   For Indian Buddhist philosophy, emptiness, like everything else, does not 
need to be “emptied” of anything since it is already empty of inherent existence.  In his 
discussion of emptiness then, one sees how Abe is trying to accommodate the Christian 
understanding of kenosis as well.   
Furthermore, using the Heart sutra which states that “form is emptiness, and 
emptiness is form”, he also argues against a kind of nihilistic understanding of śūnyatā 
and proposes a dynamic understanding instead.  He reminds the readers of the more 
positive meanings of emptiness while at the same time, again articulating it in light of 
Christian “self-emptying.”  For example, in speaking of the positive meanings of śūnyatā, 
he mentions that it can also be equated with suchness (tathatā), or with boundless 
openness, with naturalness.  Śūnyatā can be understood as the interdependence and 
interpenetration of all things (pratītyasamutpāda) and contains the characteristics of 
wisdom and compassion.  All these possible meanings are reasons he uses to argue for 
understanding śūnyatā, not “in its noun form but in its verbal form, for it is a dynamic 
and creative function of emptying everything and making alive everything.”138  This 
interpretation of a dynamic śūnyatā as both one that is totally self-emptying, that it 
empties even itself, and yet as one full of positive meaning correlates to his interpretation 
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of the kenosis of Christ and of God, as a complete self-emptying, as an absolute 
nothingness which is at the same time a fullness, an absolute being.  Ingram comments 
that in the process, Abe, 
…transformed Nagarjuna’s epistemological use of Emptying into a metaphysical 
absolute ultimate reality which is the ground of all religious experience, but which is 
manifested most clearly in Buddhist, particularly Zen, teachings and practices.139 
 
Masao Abe begins his interpretation of Christ’s kenosis by looking at Philippians 
2:5-8 and, similar to many of the Christian theologians discussed above, takes it to refer 
to the Incarnation, the act of God becoming human.  Based on this passage, he argues for 
a complete and total abnegation of Christ as the Son of God, understood as a 
transformation not only in appearance but in substance.  He writes that, “in Paul’s 
understanding the Son of God abandoned his divine substance and took on human 
substance to the extreme point of becoming a servant crucified on the cross.  
Accordingly, Christ’s kenosis signifies a transformation not only in appearance but in 
substance, and implies a radical and total self-negation of the Son of God,” and he 
concludes that the activity of the Son of God, his ekkenosis reveals that he is “true person 
and true God at one and the same time in his dynamic work and activity of self-
emptying.” 140  From this, he reformulates the doctrine of Christ’s kenosis (the 
Incarnation) as: 
The Son of God is not the Son of God (for he is essentially and fundamentally self-
emptying): precisely because he is not the Son of God he is truly Son of God (for he 
originally and always works as Christ, the Messiah, in his salvational function of self-
emptying).141   
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In other words, Abe argues that the very nature of Christ, as Son of God is self-
emptying; that is, emptying himself of his divine nature to the point of becoming the 
humblest of human beings, a servant.  Moreover, it requires a radical kenosis of fully 
giving up divine transcendence, a total renunciation of divinity.  It is this total self-
emptying, not clinging in any way to any form of God that makes him truly the Son of 
God.  Such a radical kenosis where Christ is true person and true God at the same time 
challenges the Christian understanding of the preexistence of the logos which Abe 
believes requires a new interpretation.  In particular, he wants to argue that any 
discussion regarding preexistence cannot be separated from discussion about humanity.  
Hence, he says that “[t]he “preexisting” Son of God must be realized right here, right 
now, at the depth of our present existence, as the self-emptying Son of God.”142 In other 
words, he wants to focus and prioritize discussions about Christ to his self-emptying 
nature rather than to discussion of his pre-existence.  This, he argues, is necessary given 
the context in the modern world where such a view (of preexistence) would be deemed 
incompatible with “critical rationality and autonomous reason” and where it would be 
“challenged by contemporary existentialistic atheism and active nihilism, which proclaim 
the death of God.”143 
Instead, the discussion regarding Christ, as stated above, must focus on how we 
can realize and find in the depth of our own experience, this self-emptying of Christ. 
Ultimately, this radical kenosis, the act of Incarnation, must be related to discussions 
about our salvation.  This is why his formulation above talks of Christ as the Messiah and 
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of self-emptying as salvational.  For Abe, any discussion regarding Christ is meaningless 
if it does not address our own human existence, and our own existential problems of self, 
and ultimately address the issue of our salvation.  In particular, he says that “[t]he notion 
of Christ’s kenosis or his self-emptying can be properly understood only through the 
realization of our own sinfulness and our own existential self-denying.”144  And in the 
same way that Christ’s kenosis was total and complete, so too must our own self-denial 
and the death of our ego self be complete.  Hence, he concludes that the statement 
regarding Christ’s kenosis can also be reformulated for the kind of radical kenosis that we 
are called to enact. Only in this complete “emptying” of the “old person” or the “ego-
self” can the new person (the one who lives in Christ) be realized. The formulation states: 
Self is not self (for the old self must be crucified with Christ); precisely because it is not, 
self is truly self (for the new self resurrects with Christ).145 
 
In the end, Christ’s kenosis, begun in the Incarnation finds fulfillment and fullness 
in the death of the Son, the full self-emptying into God that leads to our salvation. The 
complete abnegation of Christ as the Son of God ultimately shows Christ’s self-sacrificial 
love for disobedient humankind.  Furthermore, he argues that such self-sacrificial love is 
revelatory of the very nature of the God the Father.  He writes, “[t]he unfathomable depth 
of God’s love is clearly realized when we come to know and believe that Christ as the 
Son of God emptied himself and became obedient to the point of death on the cross.”146 
Moreover, James Fredericks says,  
…the self-negation through self-emptying is complete only in the cross, where the self-
emptying God becomes fully human by dying into God. Thus not only is Christ’s kenosis 
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the self-negation of God, it is also God’s radical self-realization as the saving love that 
has triumphed over death. Therefore, the emptiness of the true God does not reveal the 
universe as meaningless and godless. Only in being empty is God revealed as love.147 
 
Here one sees that the kenosis of Christ cannot be understood apart from the 
kenosis of God, or as Abe says, the problem of the kenosis of Christ leads to the question 
of the kenosis of God.  In particular, Abe argues that the kenosis of the Son of God is 
rooted in the kenosis of God, the Father. He writes that “[w]ithout the self-emptying of 
God, “the Father,” the self-emptying of the Son of God is inconceivable.”148  He contends 
that the kenosis of the Son has its basis on the will and love of God while the kenosis of 
the Father is implied in the very nature of God, which is love.149  With his predecessors, 
he holds that the essential nature of God is kenosis and he roots Christ’s own kenosis in 
the kenosis of the Father.  Just as the kenosis of the Son cannot be partial but must be 
radical and total, so too is the kenosis of God the Father.  
While the self-emptying of Christ can be seen in the act of Incarnation, the total 
and complete kenosis of the Father can be seen in God’s identification with creation 
where God is “each and everything thing […] Only through this total kenosis and God’s 
self-sacrificial identification with everything in the world is God truly God.”150  The total 
self-emptying of God leads to God being emptied into all, in the very act of creation.  
This leads to his second formulation that:  
                                                
147 Fredericks, 93. 
148 Abe, 14. 
149 Here we find echoes of Nishitani’s works where kenosis is grounded in agape.   
150 Abe, 16.  Abe himself acknowledges that there may be two objections to this statement.  First, that God 
being “each and everything” smacks of pantheism and second, that Christ’s incarnation no longer seems 
unique since everything is an incarnation of God. For his answer to these objections, see pp. 17-9. 
  73 
God is not God (for God is love and completely self-emptying); precisely because God is 
not a self-affirmative God, God is truly a God of love (for through complete self-
abnegation God is totally identical with everything including sinful humans).151 
 
Here, just as Abe’s interpretation of the kenosis of Christ (in the Incarnation) led 
to his conclusion that the very nature of Christ is self-emptying, so too, does the kenosis 
of God (in creation) lead to the conclusion that the very nature of God is self-emptying.  
This self-emptying God however, Abe relates to Absolute Nothingness which he states is, 
at the same time, Absolute Being.  He writes that “God’s total kenosis is not God’s self-
sacrifice for something else or God’s self-negation for nihilistic nothingness, but God’s 
self sacrifice for absolutely ‘nothing’ other than God’s own fulfillment.”152 In both of 
these statements about Christ and God, he applies the paradoxical logic of Nagarjuna, 
mentioned above, that “emptiness that is not completely empty is a false view of 
emptiness.  In the same paradoxical way, the God that clings to an eternal transcendence, 
removed from creation, is not the true God.”153  
At the same time, holding on to the Heart sutra’s formulation that “form is 
emptiness and emptiness is form”, he also asserts that kenosis is also a plerosis, the 
fullness of the expression of God’s divinity, and not a limitation of God’s divinity.  Here 
he follows the Christian theologians of the 20th century mentioned above who saw the 
kenosis of God, not as a self-limitation but as the very expression of the essence of God, 
of understanding divinity as self-emptying love.  God finds God’s being, God’s 
fulfillment in God’s “nothingness”, in God’s love that fully empties itself into creation.  
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In this sense, this radical kenosis is no longer just an “attribute” of God but is the very 
“being”/nature of God, for fullness is emptiness.  Hence as Odin summarizes, 
Abe’s articulation of śūnyatā in positive terms as dynamic function of self-emptying out 
of egoless compassion itself facilitates an equally positive understanding of kenosis  …as 
the fullest expression of that divine glory through a real ‘self-emptying’ out of agapic 
compassion….It is in this coincidence between Emptiness and Fullness wherein the 
Christian kenosis and Buddhist śūnyatā traditions have at last encountered each other in 
their ultimate depths.154 
 
Given this, Abe states that:  
…the notion of the kenotic God opens up for Christianity a common ground with Buddhism by 
overcoming Christianity’s monotheistic character, the absolute oneness of God, and by sharing 
with Buddhism the realization of absolute nothingness as the essential basis for the ultimate.155  
 
He concludes his article by stating that “when we clearly realize the notion of the 
kenotic God in Christianity and the notion of the dynamic Sunyata in Buddhism – then 
without eliminating the distinctiveness of each religion but rather by deepening their 
respective unique characters – we find significant common basis at a deeper dimension.  
In this way, I believe, Christianity and Buddhism can enter into a much more profound 
and creative dialogue and overcome antireligious ideologies prevailing in our 
contemporary society.”156 
Responses to Abe’s “Kenotic God and Dynamic Sunyata” 
Responses to Abe’s interpretation of the Philippians hymn in correlation to the 
Buddhist emptiness has indeed resulted in the kind of “profound and creative dialogue” 
that he was hoping for.  His work was engaged by a variety of Jewish and Christian 
theologians in a back and forth that has resulted in many conferences and books.  Many 
of the challenges from the Christian theologians question whether his re-interpretation of 
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kenosis is truly adequate for a Christian understanding of Christology or the Trinity.  For 
example, some have criticized his work as too narrowly interpreting kenosis only in light 
of his own Buddhist understanding of emptiness without taking into consideration the 
Christian understanding and context of kenosis.  Such a method then limits his “Buddhist 
Christology” and leads to inadequate or wrong understandings of the doctrine of God.  
For example, Schubert Ogden responds to his work saying,  
…it is obvious that the conclusion he draws is controlled less by a historical-critical 
exegesis of this passage than by his own Buddhist beliefs concerning the nature of 
ultimate reality.157 
 
In so doing, according to Ogden, his description of God places God as “simply one 
individual among others faced with the same fundamental option between inauthentic 
self-affirmation and ignorance of emptiness, on the one hand, and authentic realization of 
emptiness and self-denial on the other.”158  This, for Ogden, may be acceptable to Abe 
who believes that anything divine is  just like any other natural or human thing but is not 
acceptable for Christians who see God as the ultimate ground of all reality and cannot be 
conceived as just one particular individual among others.  Such a kenotic God as Abe 
proposes, for Ogden, “could not really be God at all but only an idol in whom faith could 
believe only by ceasing to be itself.”159 
 Similarly, Hans Küng also criticizes Abe’s description of God, calling it 
unbiblical. In his case, he points to Abe’s conclusion that the kenosis of Christ is the 
“emptying of God Himself, completely and radically, which accords in a non-dualist 
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sense with the renunciation of ourselves in the unity of non-duality.”160  This, for Küng, 
is not supported by the New Testament texts which insist on the distinction between God 
the Son and God the Father.  In this way, it is only the Son who undergoes such 
renunciation, and it is only the Son who undergoes death on the cross, but not God 
himself.161  In the end, Küng argues that such an error is most critically seen in the 
resurrection, for if God is dead, then who is supposed to have resurrected the dead God 
back to life.  He concludes then saying:  
This is the significant fallow in Masao Abe’s interpretation: he indeed makes reference to 
the resurrection, but practically speaking neglects it – has to neglect it. Why? In order to 
be able to abide by his interpretation: the renunciation of God Himself in Buddhist 
shunyata.162 
 
Other scholars have also commented on Abe’s uncontextual/unbiblical use of 
kenosis which could have opened up the heavily philosophical discussions on kenosis and 
śūnyatā.  For example, Steve Odin, citing theologians such as Hans Urs von Balthasar, 
Teilhard de Chardin and Thomas Merton, also argues that Abe’s interpretation does not 
place kenosis in its proper context within Christianity, particularly its essential connection 
with the Eucharist (where Christ’s self-emptying continues) and with the eschatological 
dimension of Christianity (the culmination of Christ’s kenosis which ends in plerosis).  
Hence, in the end, he argues that “the Christian experience of kenosis or self-emptying 
cannot be simply reduced to the realization of muga or selflessness in Zen Buddhism.”163 
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 Another scholar, E.D. Cabanne argues that, if one were to look at the biblical 
interpretations of kenosis, one would see that the discussions were focused on a broader 
issue of “mind”, of having the “mind of Christ” which is the concern of the Christian 
spiritual life.  Given this greater context, Cabanne argues that the kenosis/śūnyatā 
dialogues could be shifted to this broader issue of mind, moving the Buddhist discussion 
from śūnyatā towards bodhicitta, the beginning of the spiritual path to Enlightenment.  
Such consideration of this broader context then can lead to a shift from the more 
philosophical discourse that the Kyoto school has started into a more spiritual discourse, 
which is the proper context for understanding these two doctrines.  As Cabanne contends, 
The previous discussion of ‘kenosis’[by the Kyoto School] should be considered, 
therefore, as a preliminary effort to pave the way, laying an aesthetically conducive 
groundwork (albeit admittedly prosaic) for dialogue.  The door to a spiritually concerned 
dialogue is not opened by the keys or combinations of erudition. Such an “intelligent” 
approach is not the wisest.  There must come into play a quality of consciousness, mind, 
heart, spirit, soul, that is confessedly weary of talking ‘about’ spirituality but that rather 
yearns with all its heart to settle down and begin to feel out, contemplate and 
interpenetrate into the reality of it.164 
 
 This suggestion of considering the broader context of the doctrines and moving 
toward a more spiritual comparison is also supported by looking at the broader context of 
the doctrine of emptiness.  Though the Kyoto school asserts that they are influenced by 
Nagarjuna and the Mādhyamaka school, their notion of “absolute nothingness” does not 
correspond to Nagarjuna’s notion of emptiness.  As Ornatowski points out, for 
Nagarjuna, emptiness “was not a new Absolute Reality itself but a means or method 
‘used to shift the mode of apprehending ‘existence’ and ‘ultimate reality’ so as to allow 
the Absolute reality to be apprehended.”165  Instead, the Kyoto school’s understanding of 
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emptiness, particularly as they discuss it as fullness or potentiality (as they asserted from 
the Heart Sutra that emptiness is not nihilism) is closer to the Yogācāra or Zen schools 
than the Mādhyamikans.   
 Given this critique of Abe’s use of emptiness, Ornatowski echoes the suggestion 
above, stating that participants in the dialogue must become more aware of the historical 
and cultural contexts and specific meanings of emptiness, and in so doing, be able to 
broaden the dialogue so as to take into account other possible meanings of emptiness.166  
He gives as an example the shift back to the Mādhyamikan “negative” notion of 
emptiness as a tool for enlightenment.  Nagarjuna’s concern was more soteriological than 
philosophical.  Reminded by this specific meaning, the dialogue around kenosis and 
emptiness could then shift from an overly heavy ‘theologizing’ and ‘philosophizing’ 
towards the similar apophatic meditative tradition that exists in both Buddhism and part 
of the Christian tradition of spirituality.”167 
One work that has addressed these concerns, particularly in terms of broadening 
the discussion to include spirituality is Donald Mitchell’s Spirituality and Emptiness.  
Here, he tries to address David Tracy’s challenge to Masao Abe to “give new attention to 
spirituality and its relation to theology.”168 In an attempt to answer Tracy’s challenge, 
Donald Mitchell wrote a book which he saw as broadening the “Christian response to the 
Kyoto school by speaking from the field of spirituality.”169   However, while he speaks of 
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the spirituality of Teresa of Avila and of Chiara Lubich, he himself does not directly 
address the problem of kenosis for women and whether kenotic spirituality, which he 
develops through comparison with the Buddhist notion of emptiness, addresses the 
particular issues concerning women and feminist spirituality.  This is another crucial 
critique of these dialogues. 
Catherine Keller, as mentioned in the introduction, pointed out the patriarchalism 
in both Christianity and Buddhism. She reminded Abe and his other interlocutors that the 
concept of kenosis and the Philippians hymn has long been the source of much of the 
problem for feminists in the Christian tradition who have argued that such rhetoric of 
self-sacrifice, service, and obedience have often been used to keep women in a 
subordinate place.  Hence, she legitimately questioned whether such a dialogue based on 
a concept that has been seen as problematic by feminists would then offer the worst of 
both worlds to women.  She asks, “How can the two patriarchies, with their common 
problem of the inflationary male ego and their common solution of selflessness, fail to 
redouble the oppressive irrelevance of the ‘world religions’ for the liberation of 
women?”170  However, she does not suggest that the dialogue is futile.  Rather, she sees 
promise in how Buddhist discussions can support Christian feminist discussions on 
kenosis and how the dialogue itself can be broadened to include spirituality and a sense of 
global responsibility. 
                                                                                                                                            
Christian dialogue that has focused on contemplation and meditation.  For example, see Speaking of 
Silence: Christians and Buddhists on the Contemplative Way, ed. Susan Walker (New York: Paulist Press, 
1987) and The Gethsemani Encounter: A Dialogue on the Spiritual Life by Buddhist and Christian 
Monastics, eds. Donald Mitchell and James Wiseman, OSB (New York: Continuum, 1998).  However, 
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 Given this feminist critique, as well as the critique above to be more aware of the 
specific background and broader contexts of kenosis that refocuses the dialogue on 
spirituality, I will endeavor, in the next chapters, to bring the “interruption” of both 
Christian and Buddhist feminist voices and perspectives into this dialogue. I will attempt 
to answer the challenge of how both traditions offer something to the liberation of 
women, particularly in light of women’s search for self and right relationships.  In 
particular, they will look at how Buddhist philosophy in Buddhist feminist thought can 
inform aspects of Christian feminism and theology, particularly on the issues of kenosis 
and theological anthropology.  Furthermore, the “interruption” of both Buddhist and 
Christian feminist understandings, in informing each other, can contribute new 
interpretations and understanding of the doctrines that help nuance and deepen Buddhist-
Christian dialogue and learning. Furthermore, a focus on spirituality and its links to the 
teachings will also be discussed, in order to answer the challenge above of discussing 
such doctrines within their proper context of spiritual practice/life.  Such a discussion can 
then offer a response to David Tracy’s challenge of relating theology and spirituality. 
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Chapter Two:  Christian Feminists on Kenosis: 
The Example of Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey 
 
I.  Introduction  
 
Chapter One focused on the traditional interpretations of kenosis and śūnyatā, and 
the Buddhist-Christian dialogue that revolved around them.  Furthermore, it was also 
noted how women’s voices and experiences were not taken into account in such 
discussions and interpretations.  As mentioned, Catherine Keller critiqued how the 
dialogue did not address the issues of women and the patriarchalism in both traditions.  
This chapter will focus on the feminist critique of kenosis but more importantly on its 
reconstruction or retrieval in light of women’s search for a relational self.   
 As Aristotle Papanikolaou has observed, “[t]he Christian notion of kenosis or 
‘self-emptying’ has an ambiguous history.”171  In the previous, we saw the complexity 
and richness of the development of the interpretation of kenosis that focused on God and 
Christ’s nature, ultimately becoming understood as the unconditional love of God and the 
sacrifice of Jesus on the cross, out of love for humanity.  However, as kenosis became 
understood as an ethical imperative, as “self-sacrificial love” following the example of 
Jesus who died on the cross for others, feminists began to question whether this was a 
positive virtue for women whose sin, as mentioned above, is that of “selflessness”.  For 
example, Daphne Hampson has questioned whether kenosis is in line with feminism and 
feminist values.  She writes that “[i]t may well be a model which men need to appropriate 
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and which may helpfully be built into the male understanding of God. But … for women, 
the theme of self-emptying and self-abnegation is far from helpful as a paradigm.”172 
Furthermore, this development of equating kenosis with agape, seeing God’s 
“self-emptying” (kenosis) as paradigmatic of “God’s love” (agape) and the command to 
follow that same example (Charles Gore’s argument in the previous chapter) is 
problematic for feminist ethics. For example, Brita Gill-Austern, in an article entitled 
“Love Understood as Self-Sacrifice and Self-Denial:  What does it do to women?” begins 
with this statement:  “The equation of love with self-sacrifice, self-denial, and self-
abnegation in Christian theology is dangerous to women’s psychological, spiritual, and 
physical health, and it is contrary to the real aim of Christian love.”173 In her article, she 
proceeds to show the negative effects of self-sacrifice and self-denial on women.  She 
outlines seven negative effects including the loss of the voice and identity of the woman 
because she has focused so much on others.  In the end, this situation can even 
“contribute to exploitation and domination of relationships by the more powerful 
party”.174  Even Barbara Andolsen argues that this notion of self-sacrifice is problematic.  
She begins by talking of how self-sacrifice is often understood in the context of agape or 
of “other-regard”175 and proceeds to show how agape is problematic when taken together 
with the female experience.  She too points to Valerie Saiving’s contention about the 
female sin being selflessness and that “women have a tendency to give themselves over 
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to others to such an extent that they lose themselves”.176  Moreover, Andolsen quotes 
Mary Daly who problematizes this virtue even more, saying: 
There has been a theoretical one-sided emphasis upon charity, meekness, obedience, 
humility, self-abnegation, sacrifice, service.  Part of the problem with this moral ideology 
is that it became accepted not by men, but by women, who hardly have been helped by an 
ethic which reinforces the abject female situation.177   
 
It is for the same reason that many feminists also argue against the notion of 
kenosis in Christian spiritual practice.  The language of “submission” and “surrender”, of 
the dissolution of one’s self, or being “nothing” and the sometimes violent imagery of 
God “battering one’s heart” or the “destruction of the self” can only seem to heighten the 
problem of women’s sense of a loss of self as well as promote passivity especially in the 
face of suffering and the abuse of women, seeing this as part of the path of kenosis.  
Furthermore, the (mis)understanding of Christian spiritual practice as an interior practice 
and as moving away from the world brings about the objections that such practices do not 
adequately give women the resources to fight the sources of oppression and abuse in this 
world.  Rather, it allows them only to “escape” into an interior life where they may 
continue to just experience their own sense of “nothingness” or to offer up such 
sufferings in prayer, equating them to the redemptive suffering of Christ and hence 
passively accepting such suffering.   
Despite these objections, I noted in the Introduction that many feminist 
theologians have undertaken the critical appropriation of the doctrine of kenosis.  In this 
chapter, I hope to contribute to that work by articulating a new interpretation of kenosis 
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for theological anthropology that answers the question of how we are to understand 
kenosis in ways that are empowering for women and their relationships.  The quest for a 
critical retrieval of the doctrine is based on establishing a new vision of self as self-in-
relation to others and the world.  What is central is a search for the right understanding of 
relationship and within that relationship, the dynamics of “dependence” and “sacrifice” 
might still be held as central to Christian life.  Furthermore, this will be done through a 
re-interpretation of the understanding of God and God’s kenosis and how such empowers 
the ethical and spiritual dimension of Christian kenosis.      
To do this, I will focus on the work of two British feminist theologians, Sarah 
Coakley and Mary Grey, who not only focus on a reinterpretation of kenosis but do this 
within the context of contemplation.  David Ford writes that “[p]erhaps the most obvious 
feature of British women’s theology is its commitment to spirituality.”178 This is 
definitely true of Coakley and Grey who both argue that in contemplation, one can 
understand and experience “right” kenosis.  Furthermore, spiritual practice is the place 
where one can begin to transform the self and realize new ways of “right” relationality 
and be empowered to act within society. 179  This is important since both theologians are 
not just interested in a reinterpretation of doctrine and showing its deep ties with 
spirituality, but ultimately in social change and the transformation and empowerment of 
women in society.  These two women have been characterized as theologians who are 
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“actively engaged in feminism as a means of social change.”180 In their projects, we see 
the formation of a “wholistic” theology that shows the relationship between 
doctrine/theology, moral theology/ethics and spirituality that grounds women’s search for 
self and right relationships.   
II.  Sarah Coakley 
 Introduction  
 
 Sarah Coakley is a British theologian who came to Harvard Divinity School in 
1993 and taught there for many years.  Since 2005, she has gone back to England to 
become the Norris Hulse Chair of Divinity at Cambridge University.181  Apart from being 
a scholar, she is also a priest in the Anglican tradition who used to celebrate a weekly 
ecumenical Eucharist at Harvard as well as serve as chaplain in a Boston jail for one 
semester.  Being a priest-scholar, as Mark Oppenheimer describes her, her “theological 
investigations have a pastoral component, one that introduces her to more actual 
Christians than many theologians get to meet.”182 
  In her work, what one finds is the intersection of feminism/gender studies and 
systematic theology, or rather systematic theology from a feminist perspective, and the 
importance of prayer/contemplation within systematic theology.183   Oppenheimer has 
noted that there are two general themes in Coakley’s major writings, “[t]he first is that 
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feminist theory is a powerful tool not always well used. The second is that prayer needs 
to be a central category of theology.”184  Confirming this observation, Coakley writes 
about the future of systematic theology and how it needs to take into account gender 
studies, as well as insights from political and liberation theology.  She writes: 
My claim will be that only systematic theology (of a particular sort) can adequately and 
effectively respond to the rightful critiques that gender studies and political and liberation 
theology have laid at its door. And only gender studies, inversely, and its accompanying 
political insights, can thus properly re-animate systematic theology for the future.185   
 
 Furthermore, she also argues that only a systematic theology that is rooted in 
prayer can provide an answer to the critiques of systematic theology today.  This kind of 
systematic theology, which she sees as her own project, she calls a contemplative 
théologie totale.186 She describes it thus: 
That “particular sort” of systematic theology I propose, then, (and here is the major 
novum I lay before you), must involve the purgative contemplative practice of silence as 
its undergirding point of reference – an ascetic activity which is peculiarly equipped to 
search and transform, over the long haul, the arena of sexual (and indeed all other) 
desires. It thus involves an understanding of theology in progressive transformation (in 
via, as we might say), and one founded not in any secular rationality or theory of 
selfhood, but in a spiritual practice of attention that mysteriously challenges and expands 
the range of rationality, and simultaneously darkens and breaks one’s hold on previous 
certainties.187 
 
 This contemplative théologie totale, for her, is the answer to the current 
challenges to systematic theology that come from the philosophical, moral/political, and 
feminist critiques.   The philosophical critique focuses on how systematic theology turns 
God into an object of knowledge and therefore an idol, forgetting about the absolute 
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mystery of God. She argues that, with contemplation as the ground for one’s theology, 
this can be overcome for “it is the actual practice of contemplation that is the condition of 
a new knowing-in-unknowing.”188  Furthermore, “contemplation is the unique and wholly 
sui generis, task of seeking to know, and speak of God unknowingly; as Christian 
contemplation, it is also necessarily bodily practice of dispossession, humility and 
effacement….”189  Hence, it is only within this posture of dispossession and humility, of 
being reminded of the mystery and unknowability of God, that any kind of utterance 
about God can be made without God being turned into an object that can simply be fully 
known or captured in language. 
 The moral/political critique focuses on the “totalizing” tendency of systematic 
theology that does not hear the voices or perspectives of those who are marginalized. 
Again, for Coakley, grounding theology within contemplation can serve as a solution, for 
contemplation allows one to heed the voice of the other, to go outside of oneself towards 
the other.  As she writes, “the ascetic practices of contemplation are themselves 
indispensable means of a true attentiveness to the despised or marginalized other …its 
practiced self-emptying inculcates an attentiveness that is beyond merely good political 
intentions. Its practice is more discomforting, more destabilizing to settled presumptions, 
than a simple intentional design on empathy.”190 
 Finally, there is the critique, particularly from French feminists who write how 
systematic theology is ordered according to the “male mode of thinking which seeks to 
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clarify, control, and master.  It is thereby repressive of creative materials culturally 
associated with femininity and the female body which are characteristically pushed into 
the unconscious.”191  Again, she argues that such issues can be addressed by a théologie 
totale that is grounded upon contemplation; contemplation as the action that delves into 
the unconscious, welcomes the arts and the imagination in a way that “dryly intellectual 
theology often misses.”192  Furthermore, she writes that such feminist critiques are right 
to show how “gender and bodily difference cannot be irrelevant to systematics.”193  
However, unlike those feminists who have chosen to be dismissive of systematic 
theology, she argues that there can be a response other than rejection.  This, I believe, has 
been the main topic of many of her writings within systematic and feminist theology.   
An example of such a response, an example of her contemplative théologie totale 
can already be found in her earlier works where she explored the doctrine of kenosis, 
choosing to re-interpret it in light of prayer, understanding contemplation itself as a kind 
of kenosis and how such can bring a new understanding of the Trinity, Christology, and 
anthropology.  Hence, in the next few sections, I will focus on how she reinterprets 
kenosis within prayer/contemplation, and how this kind of kenosis is what is needed for 
women’s stronger sense of self and relationality, as against interpretations of kenosis that 
may lead to passivity in the face of suffering or further abuse for women. Ultimately, 
“[s]he sees the Christian spiritual tradition as an offering to the vexed antinomy in 
feminist theory between autonomy and relationality. The way to have strengths of both is 
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the self-outpouring that invites in the presence of an Other.”194  This will be the focus of 
the discussion on Coakley’s interpretation of kenosis and re-interpreting it in light of 
prayer.   
Coakley’s reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Kenosis195 
 
Sarah Coakley agrees that kenosis has been a “contentious theme in feminist 
theology in recent decades: to call to ‘self-effacement’ or ‘self-sacrifice’  - whether in 
God or in the human – has the inevitable ring of ‘feminine’ abasement, which feminist 
theology from its outset has been concerned to expose and criticize.”196  However, unlike 
those theologians who have chosen to reject or avoid discussions of kenosis, Coakley 
argues that to do so would be dangerous for Christian feminists, for it would be the 
rejection or avoidance of central teachings within Christianity as well.  For example, 
interpretations of kenosis would ultimately bring about discussions on dependence and 
vulnerability, which some feminists find worrying.  However, to avoid such discussions 
would mean abandoning discussions regarding creaturehood, a fundamental 
understanding of our unique relationship with God and what it means to be human.197  
She writes,  
The undeniable danger of using the appeal to ‘kenotic’ self-sacrifice as a means of 
subordinating, or even abusing, Christian women should not be confused with the attempt 
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to reconsider the status of kenosis as a legitimate spiritual goal for both men and 
women…The danger lies in refusing to face what the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ lays 
before us for consideration: it does not therefore follow that all attempts to rethink the 
value of moral kenosis, or of ‘sacrificial’ love, founder on the shoals of gender 
essentialism … the repression of questions of kenotic ‘vulnerability’  is a worrying trend 
if what it disallows is an admission of creaturely dependence in women as well as men 198 
 
Furthermore, she argues that such hesitation to speak of dependence or 
vulnerability, the “failure to confront issues of fragility, suffering, or ‘self-emptying’ 
except in terms of victimology is …ultimately the failure to embrace a feminist 
reconceptualizing of the power of the cross and resurrection.”199  Hence, like Linahan 
who saw the importance of kenosis for Christian discipleship, Coakley sees the need to 
reconceptualize our understanding of kenosis, in terms of re-interpreting our 
understanding not only of “dependence” or “vulnerability” but also of “power”, 
particularly “divine power” as opposed to worldly (male) power. 
First, Coakley critiques the usual feminist criticisms surrounding kenosis.  
Primarily, in response to Hampson’s rejection of the doctrine, Coakley argues that 
Hampson has fallen into the gender stereotypes that only men have power and women 
suffer from lack of it.  This is why, for Hampson, kenosis can only be helpful for men as 
a compensatory balance for their dominating tendencies.  She writes,  
 [F]or her [Hampson], ‘males’ (all males, including ‘workmen’ and ‘slaves’?) need to 
compensate for their tendency to ‘dominate’ by means of an act of self-emptying; 
whereas ‘women’ (all women, including university professors?) do not….Has she not 
assumed, that is, that ‘vulnerability’ or ‘self-effacement’ are prescriptively ‘female’ 
(though regrettably so), and thus only ‘helpful’ as a secondary or compensatory addition 
to ‘male’ power and dominance…But why should we continue with these outworn 
gender presumptions in the first place?200   
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From this quote, we can see how Coakley argues that Hampson seems to just reify gender 
assumptions about men’s power and women’s powerlessness.  Coakley insists that what 
must be done instead is to acknowledge that everyone lives between some sort of power 
and vulnerability/dependence, as her example about male slaves and female university 
professors demonstrate.  At the same time, the dynamic of power and vulnerability within 
the divine-human encounter also needs to be reinterpreted in ways that address the 
feminist critiques on these issues. On the one hand, discussions about dependence cannot 
be avoided, for everyone is called to live out some kind of dependence, which is at the 
“heart of true human creatureliness.”201  At the same time, discussions about power 
cannot be avoided either for power is usually assumed to be the purview of men.  Rather, 
Coakley says that we all wield power in some areas.  The challenge is how to understand 
“power”, not in worldly (male/dominant) fashion, but a different kind of gentle, non-
dominating power, that is divine power.  As she says, “If ‘abusive’ human power is thus 
always potentially within our grasp, how can we best approach the healing resources of 
non-abusive divine power? How can we hope to invite and channel it, if not by a patient 
opening of the self to its transformation?”202 This then, is her project with regard to 
kenosis: to reform the understanding of divine power as non-abusive and non-dominating, 
as that which sustains and empowers. It is, furthermore, on the human side, a refusal of 
the kind of worldly (male/bullying) forms of power which destroy or annihilate.  As she 
says, “[i]s there not, we might ask, a more creative theological way through our dilemma 
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via a reformulation of the very notion of divine ‘power’ and its relation to the human?”203   
At the same time, she also seeks to reform the understanding of vulnerability or 
dependence as the posture that opens one up to such divine power and therefore leads to 
the transformation and empowerment of the human in God.  It is not a submission that 
leads to destruction or annihilation, nor an emptying that leads to emptiness, but rather a 
fullness and empowerment from the divine.  As she argues,  
 [w]e need to get beyond these alternatives, and to re-embrace alternative readings of 
kenosis that take the communicatio tradition seriously, along with its understanding of the 
radical difference of status of the ‘divine’ and the ‘human’. Such a view need not think of 
human ‘freedom’ as involving divine ‘self-restraint’ at all, I suggest, but rather as being 
enabled precisely by the sustaining and continuing matrix of divine creative power.204 
 
In order to do this, she goes back to the history of kenosis, from its New Testament roots 
in Philippians 2 and goes to the interpretations from New Testament connotations to the 
patristic era up to the 20th century British kenoticists.205  From this survey, which was 
discussed in Chapter One, she observes that there are a whole range of possible 
interpretations of the relationship of divine power to the human.  She summarizes them 
as:  
 (1) temporarily relinquishing divine powers which are Christ’s by right (as cosmic 
redeemer); (2) pretending to relinquish divine powers whilst actually retaining them (as 
gnostic redeemer); (3) choosing never to have certain (false and worldly forms of power 
– forms sometimes wrongly construed as ‘divine’; (4) revealing ‘divine power’ to be 
intrinsically ‘humble’ rather than ‘grasping’206; (5) the divine Logos’ taking on of human 
flesh in the Incarnation, but without loss, impairment, or restriction of divine powers207; 
(6) a temporary retracting (or withdrawing into ‘potency’) of certain characteristics of 
divinity during the incarnate life.208 
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From this survey, she argues that the interpretation of kenosis that feminists 
critique can be traced only to such modern interpretations of the British kenoticists, as 
mentioned in Chapter One, who offered an interpretation of “emptying” as a kind of 
“empathy” articulated as a “superior” coming down to the level of someone inferior, an 
“empathetic identification with the circumstances of an ‘inferior’: the child, the 
uneducated, or the ‘savage.’”209 As she writes, “Hampson’s critique scores only against 
relatively modern forms of kenosis, and in particular those where the ‘emptying’ is 
regarded as a compensating for an existing set of gender presumptions that might be 
called ‘masculinist.’”210  Furthermore, she argues that in these debates about kenosis and 
its implications on gender, no model considers the possibility “of a ‘strength made perfect 
in (human) weakness’ (2 Cor. 12.9), of the normative concurrence in Christ of non-
bullying divine ‘power’ with ‘self-effaced’ humanity.”211 
 Hence, from other strands of the tradition, Coakley reinterprets kenosis as a 
special kind of “power-in-vulnerability” a special kind of dependence upon God, and 
divine power which is not a worldly kind of power that empowers and transforms the 
human.  To do this, she brings the third possibility above offered by New Testament 
scholars with the interpretation by the Giessen School in which Christological kenosis is 
applied to the human nature of Christ. Instead of choosing interpretations of kenosis that 
focused on the actual or “pretended” relinquishment of divine power, Coakley is most 
convinced by the interpretation where Christ “chooses never to have certain (false and 
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worldly) forms of power – forms sometimes wrongly construed as ‘divine.’212   
Furthermore, she argues that a variant of this interpretation can be found later in the 
Giessen school, which again argued for a “kenosis operative on his [Christ’s] human 
nature, whilst his divine nature retained its powers.”213  These two interpretations 
together raise the possibility of a vision of Christological kenosis uniting human 
‘vulnerability’ with authentic divine power (as opposed to worldly or patriarchal visions 
of power), and uniting them such that “the human was wholly translucent to the 
divine…”214  As Papanikolaou summarizes such kenosis, it is “not a powerlessness in 
opposition to powerfulness, but a non-grasping at worldly forms of power in order to 
make oneself available to the true empowerment that comes from the presence of divine 
power. It is not a sign of weakness, but a strength made perfect in weakness (2 Cor. 
12:9).”215  In this interpretation of kenosis, we see the focus on Christ’s action of “non-
grasping” to certain kinds of power, in order to be open to empowerment from the divine. 
   In another article, Coakley focused more on the patristic interpretations of 
kenosis, and there demonstrated more fully how divine power transforms and empowers 
the human using Gregory of Nyssa’s alternative interpretation of Philippians 2:5-11.  As 
she states:  
…what Gregory proposes is a real, but gradual transformation of divinity into the human, 
until, as he memorably puts it, the humanity is ‘absorbed’ by the omnipotent divinity like 
a drop of vinegar mingled in the boundless sea…the divine characteristics are 
progressively absorbed by the human, but not without every dimension of authentic 
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humanity being held up to transformative interaction, until, in the resurrection, the 
process is found complete.216 
 
Furthermore, she writes,  
 
Not – says Gregory – that the characteristics of divinity and humanity are compatible; but 
nor are they meant to be: one (the divine) is infusing the other (the human) until it is fully 
restored to its proper perfection in the resurrection.217 
 
 From this example of Gregory of Nyssa’s alternative interpretation of Philippians 
2, one gets a glimpse of the possibility of a divine power that does not dominate nor 
destroy the human.  Rather, in this description, “every dimension of authentic humanity” 
is held up and transformed.  It is not just absorbed (in the same way that vinegar cannot 
just be “absorbed” nor “mixed” into water) into the divine, but rather the divine 
transforms and empowers the human, without annihilating it.     
 This alternative interpretation of Christological kenosis where one sees how the 
human is not annihilated, nor ‘absorbed’ into the other, where divine power is not seen as 
a dominating force but rather one that sustains and empowers the human, and where 
vulnerability is seen as empowering and transformative, is important and can serve as 
foundation for a new understanding of kenosis for theological anthropology.  This is the 
kind of interpretation of kenosis that can empower women’s search for a strong yet 
relational self; of an understanding of kenosis that does not lead to abuse but to a 
transformation and expansion of the self.  Furthermore, it offers a model of relationship 
where one is not subsumed or consumed by the other, but is empowered precisely by 
such a relationship.    
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For Coakley, this special “power-in-vulnerability” does not just happen in any 
kind of context or any kind of relationship.  Rather, this special vulnerability, this 
“paradox of power and vulnerability” is “uniquely focused in this act of silent waiting on 
the divine in prayer.”218  As she argues, it is in silent prayer, an “activity characterized by 
a rather special form of ‘vulnerability’ or ‘self-effacement’, that ‘right’ kenosis can be 
found.  Furthermore, she demonstrates how “wordless prayer can enable one, 
paradoxically, to hold vulnerability and personal empowerment together, precisely by 
creating the ‘space’ in which non-coercive divine power manifests itself.”219  It is in such 
prayer that one’s self is empowered and transformed, helping to “find themselves in 
losing themselves” and to find the prophetic voice to speak in society and discern the 
relationships that are most empowering.   
The doctrine of kenosis and contemplation  
Sarah Coakley understands the danger of starting with prayer, and its connotations 
of “vulnerability” and “dependence” which may lead to abuse. For example, she writes 
that “an ‘absolute dependence’ is at the heart of true human creatureliness and the 
contemplative quest. But such right dependence is an elusive goal: the entanglements 
with themes of power, hierarchy, sexuality and death are probably inevitable but also best 
brought to consciousness: they are an appropriate reminder that our prayer is 
enfleshed.”220  However, just like her discussion on kenosis¸ the answer, for her, does not 
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lie in avoiding the topic, but in trying to understand the “right” kind of dependence, the 
“right” understanding of prayer.  Prayer, where one enacts the special kind of power-in-
vulnerability, can be the place of the transformation and expansion of the self, and one’s 
relationship and commitment to others.   
What is prayer?   Coakley clarifies what she means by prayer and is adamant that 
prayer or contemplation is not an “elitist” pursuit that only spiritual masters can achieve.   
Rather, she describes the contemplative as one who “regularly spends even a very short 
time in a quiet waiting upon God”221 or one who engages in any such “regular and 
repeated ‘waiting on the divine.’”222 This, for example, can take the form of Quaker 
attentiveness or charismatic expression.  Furthermore, it is in prayer, where the “right” 
kind of kenosis can be practiced.  As she says,  
 [T]he ‘spiritual’ extension of Christic kenosis, then (…the avoidance of all ‘snatching’ 
from the outset)…involves an ascetical commitment of some subtlety, a regular and 
willed practice of ceding and responding to the divine…in prayer (especially the 
defenceless prayer of silent waiting on God) it is ‘internalized’ over time in a peculiarly 
demanding and transformative fashion.223  
 
Just as Coakley favored the interpretation of kenosis as the giving up, or choosing 
never to have certain kinds of worldly power, she also understands contemplation as a 
kind of kenosis where one “gives up power” by relinquishing control or ceasing to make 
the agenda within this space of prayer.  This is why she describes it as “quiet waiting” or 
a “ceding and responding” to the divine, making space for God to be God.  However, this 
posture cannot simply be understood as one of passivity, for, as Coakley writes, it is a 
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“peculiarly active form of passivity”224, a “willed practice” as she describes above.  This 
demonstrates how prayer cannot simply be seen as a passive moment but one that the 
believer actively engages in which requires much discipline and effort, for as Coakley 
contends, it is an activity that is demanding, painful, and must be repeated and 
‘internalized’ over time.  In other words, it is not just a kind of pastime activity, but a 
practice that involves great “personal commitment and great personal risk.”225  It is in this 
demanding and painful space that a deeper and more profound knowledge and ultimately 
love of oneself and other, can happen.  
As Coakley describes: 
The very act of contemplation – repeated, lived, embodied, suffered – is an act that, by 
grace, and over time, precisely inculcates mental patterns of un-mastery, welcomes the 
dark realm of the unconscious, opens up a radical attention to the other, and instigates an 
acute awareness of the messy entanglements of sexual desires and desire for God. The 
vertiginous free-fall of contemplation, then, is not only the means by which a disciplined 
form of unknowing makes way for a new and deeper knowledge-beyond-knowledge; it is 
also the necessary accompanying practice of a theology committed to ascetic 
transformation.226 
 
 Coakley used this description of contemplation to argue for its necessity in 
systematic theology today. However, in this description, there are three results of 
contemplation that can aid in understanding how such practices can contribute to 
women’s search for an empowered and relational self.  First, such practice results in a 
kind of knowing through “unknowing” as she describes “mental patterns of unmastery” 
or becoming open to a “knowledge-beyond- knowledge”.  Such is helpful for women in 
order to help them question their usual assumptions of self and God (including gender 
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assumptions), and bring them towards a more balanced sense of self and of God.  The 
same holds true for the second result of contemplation, the opening to the dark realm of 
the unconscious including the messy issues of sexual desire vs. desire for God, as well as 
the desire for a wholistic sense of self that goes beyond the binaries of “active/passive” 
and “body/soul.”  Third, contemplation, instead of keeping the person isolated, opens one 
up to the world, becoming more conscious of the other.  Hence, it is through the practice 
of contemplation that women can experience a transformation of the self which also leads 
to a transformation in their relationship with others.  The next sections will clarify how 
these three aspects in contemplation lead to this transformed relational self.    
Prayer and the love of self.  Silence and the posture of openness and vulnerability 
– the practices within prayer – are the practices necessary for self-knowledge and 
transformation.  It is only within silence, in sitting with oneself, that one can truly hear 
one’s own voice and begin to know oneself.  Furthermore, only within the practice of 
contemplation can one begin to develop those patterns of unmastery or un-knowing, 
mentioned above, which are necessary for self-knowledge and the knowledge of God.  As 
a “bodily practice of dispossession, humility and effacement…”227, contemplation 
develops the necessary disposition so that one can look closely at one’s knowledge of 
self, other, and God and begin to question them.  It is a practice then of “non-grasping” to 
what we think we know, to allow for patterns of unmastery and unknowing that can lead 
to transformation. 
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However, this practice of prayer can also be very painful and rigorous.  Just as the 
path to self-knowledge and acceptance can indeed be an arduous path, so too is the path 
toward conversion, moving away from the old self and transforming into a new self.  This 
is why for Coakley, the silence and vulnerability within contemplation are not seen 
negatively, but are understood as the qualities needed in order to truly know and 
transform oneself.  She writes,           
…if traditions of Christian ‘contemplation’ are to be trusted, this rather special form of 
‘vulnerability’ is not an invitation to be battered, nor is its silence a silencing (If anything, 
it builds one in the courage to give prophetic voice)…Thus the vulnerability that is its 
human condition is not about asking for unnecessary suffering (though increased self-
knowledge can indeed be painful); nor is it self-abnegation. On the contrary, this special 
‘self-emptying’ is not a negation of the self, but the place of the self’s transformation and 
expansion into God.228 
 
 In prayer, this silent waiting for the divine, one experiences vulnerability, for as 
Coakley describes, “we come to prayer empty handed, aware of weakness, inarticulacy 
and even of a certain hollow ‘fear and trembling.’”229  Furthermore, in this silent time, we 
encounter ourselves in what could be a very dangerous moment, the moment of truly 
hearing our own voice including encountering ourselves in our weakness, in those dark 
moments we would rather not face.  For example, Coakley describes having to endure our 
“inner ‘noise,’ and inner obsessions, fantasies and feelings” within prayer.230  This is part 
of the result of the practice of silence, not a silencing, but actually beginning to hear and 
acknowledge our own voice which may be painful and uncomfortable when we are not 
used to truly confronting ourselves and our thoughts and feelings, but rather masking 
them in the “din” of a myriad of voices in the midst of a “busy life.” Moreover, in this 
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space, we might also experience the “dark night of the soul,” the experience of a God 
who “appears sometimes for long periods, to desert us; or worse still … to press upon us 
with apparent negative pressure, causing disturbance, deep uneasiness, the highlighting of 
sin and even the fear of insanity.  Such are the death throes of the domineering ego.”231  
Yet, as Coakley contends, such pain, suffering and one’s disposition of 
vulnerability are part of the journey towards the transformation and expansion of the self.  
It is in this seemingly powerless and painful moment that true empowerment occurs, 
where the false self gives way to the true self, and where one enacts and participates in 
the very cross of suffering that leads to resurrection and glorification. As Coakley writes,  
While risky, this practice is profoundly transformative, ‘empowering’ in a mysterious 
“Christic” sense; for it is a feature of the special “self-effacement” of this gentle space-
making – this yielding to divine power which is no worldly power – that it marks one’s 
willed engagement in the pattern of the cross and resurrection, one’s deeper rooting and 
grafting into the “body of Christ”.232  
 
How then does the silence and vulnerability that leads to pain and suffering, the 
“yielding to divine power” lead to the transformation and expansion of the self, and the 
sense of the true empowered self? First, by “nongrasping,” the space created through the 
quiet waiting for God is filled by God, and the experience of prayer which may seem 
very isolating and desolate, over time becomes experienced almost as an expansion of 
oneself as one realizes that through prayer, one participates in the very life of God.  As 
Coakley explains,  
Usually it dawns bit by bit on the person praying that this activity, which at first seems all 
one’s doing, is actually the activity of another. It is the experience of being ‘prayed in,’ 
the discovery that ‘we do not know how to pray as we ought (Romans 8:26), but are 
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graciously caught up in a divine conversation, passing back and forth in and through the 
one who prays, ‘the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit’ (Romans 8:16).233 
 
In this case then, the fear of our inarticulacy, our weakness, begins to lessen with 
this experience of being “prayed in” and of realizing that we do not need to control what 
is going on.  There is an empowering feeling of letting go and resting in God and in the 
experience of being caught up in this divine dialogue. This experience can lead to greater 
courage to face ourselves and to give ourselves into this process of prayer. 
Second, the experience of God that we encounter in prayer is not only the 
experience of the absence of God or the “dark night” as mentioned above.  Rather, 
Coakley says that “[b]y choosing to ‘make space’ in this way, one ‘practises’ the 
‘presence of God’ – the subtle but enabling presence of a  God who neither shouts nor 
forces, let alone ‘obliterates’”.234 For apart from encountering ourselves at our most 
vulnerable moment, it is also in this space that we encounter a gentle and tender God.  
This God does not will our death or destruction nor will we be abused in that vulnerable 
space. Rather God wills our flourishment and empowers us to be more fully human, fully 
alive. This encounter with a God whose message on the cross is what Coakley labels, 
“power-in-vulnerability” becomes a powerful critique of the experience of human 
abusive power.  It gives women an experience of power that does not force itself upon a 
person, but rather is invited in and empowers the person.  It is an experience of 
vulnerability that leads to empowerment and not destruction.  As Coakley argues, such 
“power-in-vulnerability, a willed effacement to a gentle omnipotence, far from 
                                                
233 Coakley, “God as Trinity,” 108. 
234 Ibid., “Kenosis and Subversion,” 108. 
  103 
complementing masculinism, acts as its undoing.”235 Hence, this encounter is not about 
being battered or undergoing unnecessary suffering.  Rather, it is in the face of this gentle 
divine power, which is neither coercive nor abusive, that we are able to face our own 
inner turmoil and weakness.  We are empowered toward an acceptance and love of 
ourselves, having seen ourselves through the eyes of a God who knows us better than we 
know ourselves.   As Coakley puts it “For God is no rapist, but the very source of my 
being: God is closer than kissing (I am happy to put it thus, metaphorically); indeed God, 
being God, is closer to me even than I am to myself…..”236  Hence, this encounter with 
God begins a true encounter and discovery of the self and with that comes the destruction 
of our idols, of the wrong notions of self that we had.  This is why for Coakley,  
Kenosis, waiting for our wordless entry into the triune conversation that is prayer, is 
actually a putting off of our false and sinful self to await our true self, as we are in the 
presence of God.237 
 
In this encounter with God, one can begin to see glimpses of our true, most 
authentic selves as seen from the eyes of God.  We are forced to truly look at ourselves 
for the first time, to confront parts of ourselves we would rather hide, and to begin to 
confront our brokenness.  One part of it is looking at our own self-conception and our 
relationships and see to what degree we have been “abusive” to ourselves – too harsh, too 
critical – and to what degree we’ve allowed others to be abusive to us. This confrontation 
becomes part of shedding our false and sinful self, a confrontation that cannot happen 
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without making space to listen to our own voice, and to make space for God.  However, 
such an image does not have to lead us to despair, for in the presence of God, we 
experience our own truest self, and the glory of that true self.   
Furthermore, it is an experience of a God who “wants us whole, conscious and 
unconscious, soul and body.”238 As Coakley writes, “[i]t is truly an effect of this prayer 
that we are gradually forced to accept and integrate those dark and repressed strands of 
the unconscious that we would rather not acknowledge, and along with these, all aspects 
of our sexuality, both bodily and emotional. ”239  It is in prayer, the vulnerable moment of 
waiting for the gentle divine power that such transformation and expansion of the self 
occurs, and where a true love of self (including accepting our brokenness, the dark 
aspects of ourselves) happens as we see ourselves through the eyes of God and 
experience God’s unconditional love.   
Questioning gender assumptions within the movement of prayer.  Lest we think 
that this image of praying is still too passive (and hence too “feminine”) and the image of 
God transforming us as still too active (and hence “masculine”), Coakley argues that 
gender assumptions are also subverted within the very experience of prayer. Part of the 
transformation and expansion of the self is the transformation and integration of our 
sexuality.  This is part of the wholeness that she seeks, of finding balance within herself, 
as mentioned above.  As Coakley notes, “it is a not uncommon experience among those 
who give themselves seriously to the practice of prayer that sooner or later they have to 
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face their own need of an integrated sexuality, and of an inward personal balance 
between activity and receptivity, initiative and response….”240  
As mentioned, the very practice of prayer as a “willed” (that is active) passivity 
(waiting for God) is already a critique of the usual assumption of prayer as “passive”.  
More than this, Coakley also gives examples of mystics who in their practice show the 
breakdown of gender assumptions of “feminine” passivity and male “activity” within 
prayer.    About the Carmelites, she writes that “the notable adoption of the ‘feminine’ 
posture of the soul by John and the emergence of a strong voice of authority in Teresa 
illustrate the characteristic gender fluidity of mystical theology’s possibilities.”241  
Furthermore, as Jason Byassee has also noted, Coakley also gives the example of 
Gregory of Nyssa’s Life of Moses to show how, as one gets closer and closer to the divine 
life, the fluidity of gender roles is revealed.  There, Coakley observes that while most of 
the ascent features echoes of male sexuality, at the end, “‘masculinist eros tips over into 
what we might call a womb-like receptivity’…Now Gregory’s use of imagery becomes 
almost entirely feminine….Our prototypical human has gone from being male to 
female.”242 These examples strengthen Coakley’s claim that within contemplation, one 
finds the fluidity of gender roles, developing both activity and passivity, initiative and 
response, within the person.  It is through the development of both that one is enabled not 
only to have a more integrated and balanced sense of self, but also to be able to have the 
initiative and activity needed to respond to others and to the needs of the world. 
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However, questions regarding gender assumptions are not limited to issues of the 
self, but also the self’s experience of God within prayer.  The deeper one gets into one’s 
practice, the deeper one gets to the apophatic sense of God - the God who cannot be fully 
expressed in language and imagery.  At this level, one gets a sense of the inadequacy of 
our language and imagery of God, and the inaccuracy of only certain (usually male) 
imagery for God. The desire for wholeness and balance within oneself also corresponds 
with a more balanced perception of God, ultimately seen as Mystery.  Once again, 
Coakley turns to Gregory of Nyssa, insisting on the ultimate unknowability of God, and 
hence God’s transcendence of all categories of gender.  And yet, there is the realization 
that at the anthropomorphic level, there is a need to balance “masculine” and “feminine” 
traits in God. As Coakley writes: 
It has again and again been the insight of those given to prayer that description of the 
triune God which is not fatally inadequate must somehow encompass, as a matter of 
balance, what we are conditioned to call feminine characteristics – patience, compassion, 
endurance, forgiveness, warmth, sustenance and so on – no less than the strength, power, 
activity, initiative, wrath, and suchlike that our society has tended to regard as peculiarly 
masculine.243 
 
Hence, through an experience of sustained prayer, we experience the expansion of 
our own sense of self and sexuality, including the gender assumptions that we may have 
had. At the same time, it also expands our very experience of prayer, moving from 
various images and experiences of God, even to the experience of the “unknowability” of 
God who transcends all gender categories.  We see the need to break the gendered “idols” 
we have made and the need to have a balance of “masculine” and “feminine” 
characteristics in the God whom we ultimately experience as Mystery. It is in this 
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experience that we begin to have a sense of Coakley’s description of contemplation as a 
disciplined “unknowing” that leads to a deeper knowledge-beyond-knowledge; an 
experience of God greater than previously thought, becoming more apophatic while also 
recognizing the need to be able to capture that experience in language and imagery that is 
more wholistic.  In the end, this experience of prayer leads not only to a more balanced 
sense of self, but also to a more balanced, or as she says “more satisfying”, doctrine of 
the triune God, where God is seen as both “creative power” as well as “enduring in 
patient weakness.”  Furthermore, she writes,   
Both man and woman are ‘in the image of God’, and God is the fullness of the Trinity. 
The ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ qualities (as we call them) which we all share in varying 
admixture are both of them for us clues and glimpses of the wholeness of divine life and 
love.244 
 
Prayer and the turn to the “other”.  Though prayer is a very personal experience, it 
does not have to lead to a sense of individualism or isolation, as is often the objection of 
those who think that prayer disconnects one from the world.  Rather, as our prayer life, as 
our interior life deepens, we experience a new way of relating with ourselves and others 
as well.  This can lead to a deeper commitment to others, a deeper love, not just for the 
self, but for others and for all of God’s creation.  It can become an experience of the self, 
as a self-in-relation to others through an experience of being “in Christ” and being part of 
the body of Christ.245 Coakley describes it as such:  
 …to pray ‘in Christ’ is to intuit the mysterious interpenetration of individuals one with 
another, and thus to question our usual assumptions about the boundaries of the self. It is 
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to discover that central aspect of Pauline Christology, the notion of the mutual 
interdependence of the members of the ‘body of Christ’ (1 Cor. 12); it is to perceive the 
Trinitarian love coursing out to encompass the whole of humanity.246 
   
In prayer, seeing ourselves “in Christ” and part of the “body of Christ”, we begin 
to realize how we are not and cannot be separated from the rest of God’s creation.  
Instead, we see more clearly our connection with everything else.  We are all connected 
as God’s creatures, all part of the body of Christ.  Just as we realize that we are not alone 
in prayer, for God is there, we also realize that being in the presence of God means being 
in the presence of all of God’s creatures, united to them, through Christ.   Just as prayer 
slowly begins to teach us to love ourselves, so too the experience of the love of God 
transforms our love and pours out into a love for the other, realizing that we are like the 
other, and that we are all God’s creation.  Furthermore, just as we learned to see 
ourselves through God’s eyes, we begin to see others through the same lens which helps 
us to deepen our love for them, strengthening our relationship with them.  Many Christian 
mystics speak this way.  For example, Thomas Merton himself wrote a moving passage 
about his sense of communion with all humanity; that he (as a monk) is not different from 
everybody else.  He writes:  
Thank God, thank God that I am like other men, that I am only a man among others…It is 
a glorious destiny to be a member of the human race, though it is a race dedicated to 
many absurdities and one which makes many terrible mistakes; yet, with all that, God 
Himself gloried in becoming a member of the human!....I have the immense joy of being 
man, a member of a race in which God Himself became incarnate. As if the sorrows and 
stupidities of the human condition could overwhelm me, now I realize what we all 
are….There is no way of telling people that they are walking around shining like the 
sun.247 
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This passage gives us an insight into the movement in prayer which allows for the 
transformation of the self which leads to solidarity with others.  First of all, the passage 
shows his gratitude for being human.  One of the realizations in prayer is how good it is 
to be a human being despite, as Merton writes “our sorrows and stupidities.”  These do 
not overwhelm us; rather, we are able to see ourselves both in our weakness and in our 
glory, able to accept all of ourselves which leads to a true love of self. We learn to accept 
our frailties, “our absurdities and mistakes” and still be able to say how “great” we are 
because God chose to become one of us.  Hence, part of what it means to be “in Christ” 
or to have the “mind of Christ” is to see as Christ does and rejoice in the goodness of 
humanity and of oneself.   This is what we have shown above, how prayer transforms the 
self.  
However, the second movement is to rejoice that this goodness is the true nature 
of all humanity, and how we begin to connect to others. Our joy in seeing our own 
goodness becomes the lens through which we can see the goodness and dignity of others, 
allowing us to see them “shining like the sun.”  Just as we come to awareness and 
acceptance of our own brokenness and suffering, we can link to the brokenness and 
suffering of others. As Nouwen once wrote, “in the solitude of the heart, we can truly 
listen to the pains of the world because there we can recognize them not as strange and 
unfamiliar pains, but as pains that are indeed our own. There we can see that what is most 
universal is most personal and that indeed nothing human is strange to us.”248   More than 
this, we are not overwhelmed by the brokenness and the pains of this world, but are 
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moved by them into action, given the contrast to how we now truly see humanity.  Like 
Merton’s insight, Coakley writes that “…it has often been the perception of the mystics 
to see creation anticipatorily in the light of its true glory, even while it is yet in ‘bondage 
to decay’ and ‘groaning in travail’”.249  Given this shift in our perception of the other, to 
see one’s “true glory”, to see them “shining like the sun”, our sense of our commitment 
and love for the other changes.  We change our attitude and actions to reflect how we see 
the other’s “glory” while also acknowledging the current pains and struggles.  This can 
become the foundation for working for justice, working to make sure that we and others 
are able to live out just and dignified lives, reflective of the “true glory” that we all share, 
as God’s creatures.   
However, sometimes, the problem as we work towards justice for others is that 
we do not know how to truly listen to the voice of the other.  Our well-intentioned actions 
on their behalf lead us to objectify them, to become a voice for them without truly paying 
attention to them and their needs. Hence, beyond just realizing our shared “glorious” 
nature, having prayer as the foundation for our work for others, prayer can also lead to a 
deeper response to the other, and a deeper respect for them.  Prayer cultivates the 
necessary attitude to really learn to receive the other, not just in their similarities but in 
their differences and in their otherness.  As Coakley contends,  
the ascetic practices of contemplation are themselves indispensable means of a true 
attentiveness to the despised or marginalized other …its practiced self-emptying 
inculcates an attentiveness that is beyond merely good political intentions. Its practice is 
more discomforting, more destabilizing to settled presumptions, than a simple intentional 
design on empathy.250 
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 Here, she argues that prayer makes us truly attentive to the other, not “colonizing” 
their voice and turning them into our own agenda. Rather, prayer gives us the qualities 
needed in order to truly listen to and break our assumptions of the other.  In this way, we 
can truly see, recognize and love the other.  Coakley maintains that prayer is a “practiced 
self-emptying”, which means a kind of “non-grasping”, of not trying to control the 
agenda, or thinking that one already knows the results.  One comes to God “empty-
handed.”  However, the same attitude of “practiced self-emptying” is also the attitude 
necessary to truly be able to listen to the other, by creating a space where the other can be 
themselves, not controlling them, not setting the agenda for them.  As Coakley explains,      
Kenosis…involves a discussion of the deep difficulties of recognizing “otherness” 
without swallowing the other into a preconceived category or an item of personal need. 
The moral integrity of the ‘other’ is only maintained by a deliberate act of space-making, 
or perhaps – as Irigaray will have it – of mutual ‘ecstasy’ which waits on the other’s 
difference without demand for egotistical control.251 
 
 This space-making, the main quality cultivated in prayer, is what allows one to let 
go of one’s control, and on the one hand, to “let God be God”, and on the other, to let the 
other be other.  It is a practice that allows us to begin to hear our own voice and learn to 
accept and love ourselves.  In such a practice, we also begin to create a space so that 
another’s voice can be heard and respected, unmanipulated by the needs of the one who 
prays, because s/he is finding resources within prayer life and within themselves to purify 
their relationships.  In this case, what we find is that those who pray not only begin the 
transformation of themselves, but also a transformation in how they see and treat others. 
It is in a way a “purification”, not just of one’s views but also of one’s actions, in light of 
what happens within prayer.  For this reason, Coakley argues that prayer is never just a 
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personal nor private event, but a return to the hustle and bustle of daily life.  But our 
actions within that life are now “taken up and transfigured”252, made and re-made within 
the process of prayer.     
If this is truly the movement in prayer, then as Coakley claims, sustained prayer 
leads rather “to the building up of community than to its dissolution, to intensification 
rather than atrophy of concern for the life of the world.”253  In discovering the “true self”, 
we see ourselves as self-in-relation, but not in a way that risks assimilation or the loss of 
self. Understanding ourselves and our connections, grounded in Christ and being “like 
Christ” – in prayer then is where we begin to develop this prophetic voice with which we 
can speak of the brokenness of ourselves and our relationships, of our communities and 
of our world and work towards healing and wholeness just as Christ has done. 
Coakley gives the example of meditation in prison as an example of a kind of 
silent prayer in solidarity that shows the power of prayer.  She writes that “[s]hared 
silence in peace and solidarity is possibly the most subversive act of resistance to the 
jail’s culture of terrorization and violence.”254  She also wonders “[w]hat if the physical 
poise, calm and self-control that had been gained in such ‘miraculous’ solidarity in jail 
could be maintained outside?”255 In the end, she concludes that “[t]he practice of silent 
solidarity might have deep political as well as personal effects: the unleashing of “dark” 
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subversive divine power as the antidote to racist despair, marginalization and 
repression.”256 
 Conclusion  
 
In sum, Coakley writes that,  
…no human, contemplative or otherwise, is beyond the reach of either self-deception or 
manipulation by others…These problems and dangers can only be confronted; however, 
by the making of fine, but important, distinctions: between this ‘right’ vulnerability and 
mere invitation to abuse, between this contemplative ‘self-effacement’ and self-
destruction or self-repression, between the productive suffering of self-disclosure and the 
decentering torture of pain for pain’s sake.257 
 
Making such distinctions and discussing ways of holding on to “vulnerability” 
and “dependence” that can still be empowering for women has been the goal of many of 
her writings.   In this section, the goal has been to lay out her understanding of kenosis 
and of prayer as kenosis precisely as a process of “self-disclosure”, of the painful process 
of coming to know and ultimately love ourselves, of creating a space so that our voice 
and the voice of the other can be heard.  In her discussion of kenosis, Coakley reinterprets 
its meaning and focuses on the notion of “vulnerability” and “dependence” as a kind non-
grasping, of not trying to control the agenda in prayer, or assuming that one already 
knows.  It is, furthermore, a “space-making”, silence creating a space, not for silencing 
but so that one’s voice, the voice of God, and the voice of others can truly be heard and 
acknowledged.   
From this space where we discover and re-define God, ourselves, and others 
anew.  We are brought back to the world, seen with new eyes in the light of “glory” that 
has been revealed within prayer.  It is in seeing such “glory” that we can be moved to act 
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in this world of “bondage” and “groaning”, to be taken up and participate in making all 
things new.  This is the vision that can empower and sustain the action of transforming 
not just ourselves but the world around us.  Hence, this description of prayer and what 
happens in prayer, is exactly the opposite of the notions of kenosis and dependence and 
vulnerability that lead to abuse.  This experience of prayer shows the subtle distinction of 
a kind of “effacement” that leads to empowerment, and of power that is not abusive.  
In the end, this experience of prayer, as mentioned, far from leading to 
individualism and isolation, actually opens us to the other, even the religious other.  
Coakley observes that though her description of prayer is very Christian and focuses on 
the specificity and the distinguishing features of Christ and the Trinity, it doesn’t close 
her to other traditions, but leads to an openness and possible appreciation for similar 
strains of contemplation in other traditions.  She writes,  
For the obscurity, the darkness, the sheer defencelessness of wordless prayer usually lead 
rather to a greater openness to other traditions than to an assured sense of superiority; and 
the experience of God thus dimly perceived brings about a curious intuitional recognition 
of the activity of ‘contemplation’ in others, whether or not the concept of God to which 
they adhere is congruous with the Christian one.258 
 




 Mary Grey is a Roman Catholic theologian who has taught at various universities 
in Europe including Nijmegen University and the University of Wales.  She is also a co-
founder of Wells for India, a water irrigation project in poor communities, particularly in 
Rajasthan.  In much of her own writing and experience, there is a good amount of 
similarity with Coakley in terms of the focus on the importance of spirituality, of social 
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change (and feminism as the means for social change), and the reinterpretation and 
valuing of Christian doctrines for feminist theology.  As Joy McDougall has written, 
Grey’s focus is a “profoundly spiritual quest”259 that places faith in Christianity’s core 
symbols, particularly in the ministry of Jesus, in the mystery of the cross and 
resurrection, and the longing for redemption.260  However, unlike Coakley, Grey’s 
approach uses more contemporary, particularly feminist writers such as Etty Hillesum or 
Dorothy Soelle and usually begins with an assessment of the current situation/issues in 
the world which challenges theology today.  Furthermore, her work also puts more 
emphasis on the transformation of the Church and the community rather than the 
individual, though she also advocates the feminist project of finding the autonomous yet 
independent self.  Grey though, relies upon finding “epiphanies of connection” and she 
sees the church, or the community and its spiritual practices as integral to such a project.  
Some of the other influences in her writing include process theology and engagement 
with other traditions such as Buddhism. 
 Her main project can probably be best summarized in the epilogue of her latest 
work, Sacred Longings: The Ecological Spirit and Global Culture.  There she writes:  
“‘What do we really want?’ has been the focus all along. How to break the fetters of 
addiction to consumerism and the domination of the free market system has been the 
question. In ‘recovering heart’ we know the answers. I have suggested that the desiring 
heart finds true fulfillment in enabling the happiness of others: in hospitality and 
openness to the other we recover the joyous possibilities of our interconnected selves.”261 
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 From this quote, we see that her concern has been our culture’s disordered desires 
(that we no longer know what we want, or we are wanting the wrong things) and the 
phenomenon of globalization and our “addiction to consumerism and domination.”  She 
sees the current state of the world as one of suffering – the suffering of people 
(particularly women and marginalized groups) and the suffering of the earth.  This 
suffering is due to our addiction and our wrong desires fueled by such unstoppable 
consumerism.  Furthermore, such consumerism is connected to a strong sense of 
individualism that leads to a culture of separation and fragmentation within society, and 
hence the breakdown of relationships and communities.262  As she writes, “[t]o be an 
individual  - according to current wisdom – it is vital to compete and to succeed. To 
succeed one has to be a consumer.”263  As individuals and consumers, we have split 
ourselves from others and the world, and even from our own deepest self, our deepest 
desire.  This is why Grey characterizes the current climate as a “searching for soul”264 or 
“losing heart”265; that is, that we have lost sight of our true desire, and have separated 
from our own self (our heart/soul) which has driven our continued separation from others 
and the world.  Hence, in order to stop such consumerism and the fragmentation that has 
resulted from it, one must strike at this problem of individualism and recover our sense of 
connectedness with others as well as oneself. 
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 For this reason, many of her writings have focused on recovering our 
connectedness to others, seeing this as our true desire.  This is our task and the task of 
theology today, to gather the fragments and discover wholeness through rediscovering 
our connection, the “right relation” with all else.  In light of this primary insight, Grey re-
interprets the key doctrines within the Christian faith, that of redemption and revelation.  
For example, she argues for connectedness as the new metaphor for Christian revelation, 
understanding God as the source of connection and seeing our interconnectedness with all 
of creation.266 Moreover, she re-interprets redemption as a longing for wholeness, for 
“right relation” and the living out of our interconnection with all of creation.  She 
redefines redemption as the “dynamic energy of mutuality or the making of right 
relation”267 and further argues that,   
interdependence and relating are the very threads of the complicated tapestry of the world 
– its warp and woof ….And this is why relating is at the heart of what is redemptive 
[itals mine], and what may bring about the transformation of the world, its structures and 
its patterns of interrelation at every level.268  
 
Moreover, she relates this definition of redemption with women’s search for self 
and for right relationships. She argues that “this [redemption] is a concept which includes 
the journey to self-realization and pushes further to making this real in society, through 
the communal struggle and the political struggle. It is self-realization, but from within the 
experience of the ‘relational self’….”269  Here, we see her work, joining the project of so 
many other feminists, of finding the balance between self and other, between a strong 
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interior life as well as finding one’s public voice, and the re-interpretation of Christian 
doctrines in light of such feminist insights. 
The challenge then is how one begins to shift from the individualistic and 
consumerist mentality in order to begin to discover this sense of connectedness and hence 
recover our own heart/soul.  For Grey as for Coakley, the answer is to begin an interior 
journey to find one’s true desire again, and this is done through the path of 
contemplation, treading the path of kenosis. For this reason, Grey writes that she seeks to 
develop a feminist theology of contemplation “as the means to the recovery of 
community, and in order to find a way of staying with the struggle and re-source it in a 
way that frees new energy for gathering and re-shaping the cultural fragments.”270  
Furthermore, she contends,  
In the contemporary Western situation of postmodern cultural fragmentation …the image 
of the self-emptying, kenotic God re-emerges as a direct challenge to the idolatry of 
money. The very silence of God is deafening. It is as if the very filling-up of the world by 
global capitalism, so that there is no place to stand outside, has as its reverse the 
emptying-out process of the Divine.271  
 
The next section will explore what she means by kenosis and kenotic spirituality, 
and how such provides the solution to the current problem of consumerism and cultural 
fragmentation, as well as women’s search for self and right relationships.  
Grey’s re-interpretation of the doctrine of kenosis   
 
 Similar to Sarah Coakley, Mary Grey also acknowledges the problem that the 
doctrine of kenosis presents to women; that it promotes notions of dependence that may 
lead to “demeaning situations of economic poverty or emotional dependence which can 
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cripple the development of the autonomous self”272 or that “self-emptying” can lead to an 
understanding of “self-sacrifice” or “suffering” or “subordination” as the “rightful lot of 
women.”273  Given such caution, Grey acknowledges that to be able to re-interpret 
kenosis in a positive sense is a real challenge for theology, one that she has taken up in 
many of her writings.  Her main point has been to re-interpret kenosis particularly as 
God’s vulnerability and divine kenosis as the activity which allows God to share the 
suffering of humanity and the earth.  Witnessing to such a kenotic God, understood as a 
vulnerable God, brings about our own sense of vulnerability and hence openness to the 
suffering of others.  This in turn leads to a greater sense of solidarity and justice building, 
ultimately re-building our right relationship with others. As Joy McDougall summarizes,  
Christianity’s witness to a self-emptying, vulnerable God confronts the ethics of self-
interest and unchecked consumption that prevails in global capitalism. Such a God 
reeducates our disordered desires and calls our heartless society back to the spiritual 
practices of compassion, solidarity and justice-building with the marginalized and 
humiliated in our midst.274  
 
In order to make this re-interpretation of kenosis, Grey emphasizes the 
understanding of God as relational.  As she asserts, “God’s very self is relational; God is 
the power to make right relation; God even created the world out of yearning for 
relation.”275  From this statement, it is obvious that she sees the very act of creation as 
stemming from the very “essence” of God as relational.  Moreover, this “yearning for 
relation” continues in the Incarnation as God’s way of continuing to relate to God’s 
creation.  Grey contends that the “[k]enosis of God leads divine activity into the 
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ambiguity and tragedy of the human condition.”276  It is this “yearning for relation” that 
becomes the condition for God’s vulnerability, or more accurately, according to Grey, 
“…relational power is vulnerable” and God is the “pulsating heart” of relating.277  For in 
God’s “yearning for relation”, God enters, as mentioned above, the “ambiguity and 
tragedy of the human condition” becoming vulnerable, not only to the suffering in this 
world, but also to our response to such suffering.  This is how God is vulnerable; this is 
what she means by God’s kenosis, that God waits for our response while staying in the 
midst of our suffering.   
  Moreover, she claims that paradoxically, God is both “vulnerable to our response 
and yet, at the same time, empowering us out of this very vulnerability.”278  How does 
God empower us out of this vulnerability?  Grey reminds us how God and God’s 
vulnerability and suffering are not identical with that of humanity.  First, she states that 
“God’s vulnerability is voluntary, enabling God to share world suffering.”279  This 
ensures an understanding of suffering that does not sentimentalize it nor elevates it 
automatically to a “redemptive level.”  It is also meant as a reminder that most of the 
suffering in the world is not voluntary (and hence not redemptive) but rather is the kind 
of “vulnerability” that is the result of our consumerist/individualistic mentality that must 
be fought today.  Furthermore, she also asserts that “[t]he God of the covenant is 
steadfast and faithful, God’s power lies in staying power, in imagination, in 
compassionate love, even if this is – let us face it – unable at any given moment to 
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remove the suffering.”280  Notice here how she is re-defining the notion of God’s power.  
It is no longer simply understood as the “power” to end suffering; rather, she places the 
power in the ability to be with the other in their suffering (com-passion), to remain 
“steadfast and faithful” in the midst of the suffering, and to even be so powerful as to be 
patient enough to wait for our response.  Notice how this is exactly what she meant by 
God’s vulnerability.  God’s vulnerability is God’s power since “relational power is 
vulnerable.”  As McDougall puts it,    
Divine kenosis, she insists, does not mean that divine power is sacrificed but rather it is 
relocated in a ‘relational love’ that brings about forgiveness and awakens an ethics of 
care and compassion for others. God’s power remains steadfast in its embrace of the 
suffering and the vulnerable.281  
 
It is exactly this model of vulnerability, of “power” in the midst of suffering that 
empowers and gives an alternative model to the consumerist /individualistic mentality in 
society.  As Grey argues, to “discover the God of right relation means both discovering, 
as Etty Hillesum showed us, the vulnerable, not the omnipotent God, and being 
empowered by the paradoxical strength of her vulnerability.”282   In the face of the 
vulnerable God, one is forced to confront a new understanding of God and power – not as 
domination (which the notion of an “omnipotent God” might suggest), but the power of a 
steadfast and faithful love that awaits our response. To be empowered by a vulnerable 
God means “re-imaging vulnerability, not as weakness, but as the power of being present 
to, of suffering-with, of encouraging, of facing the truth, of respecting the fragility of 
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shared humanness.”283   This serves to give an alternative model for relationships to be 
based on respect and mutuality, and compassion for those who are suffering.  This is also 
a notion of God, power, and vulnerability that serves as an alternative to patriarchal 
interpretations that have led to the subordination and abuse of women in society. 
It is in the discovery of this kenotic, vulnerable God that we discover our own true 
desire, our own true kenotic humanity.  Grey contends that the challenge of the self-
emptying of human beings is the “need for the radical reconstruction of what is meant by 
human personhood”284 no longer defined and driven by consumerist/individualistic 
mentality but now modeled upon the vulnerable God whose very self is relational.  As 
Grey says, “[d]ivine power enables us to ‘cross over’ (lit. transcendere) out of self-
absorption into new relationships. This meaning of divine transcendence is reflected in 
the discovery of meaningful connections and the movement into deep, sustaining 
relationships of justice.”285  It is precisely the kenotic God who redefined “power” in 
terms of a different kind of vulnerability as described above, that moves us towards our 
own kenosis, towards becoming vulnerable to the suffering of another, out of our own 
self-concerns, and learning not just to be “with the other” in their suffering but to fight in 
order to get them out of such suffering.  Again, notice how she makes a difference here 
between the imposed suffering of others (that which should not be) and the voluntary 
suffering (once one learns to become vulnerable, open to the suffering of others) one 
takes on in order to fight against such suffering.  Grey argues for the importance of the 
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“witness of voluntary, chosen suffering for the process of redemption,”286 for this is the 
mark of someone who is becoming more and more like the vulnerable God whose heart is 
moved by suffering.  Notice though how it is the voluntary suffering which is redemptive, 
and not suffering per se.   
In the end, Grey still issues a couple of cautions in terms of understanding such 
kenotic humanity.  First, apart from saying above how such self-giving, self-emptying 
must be voluntary, a result of becoming vulnerable to the other, she says that it must also 
become the model for all humanity, not just women. “It is not for one gender to sustain 
the entire burden of caring for society”287 but rather “‘compassion, empathy and 
solidarity’ become the marks of perfection for all (itals mine) persons.”288  Furthermore, 
as McDougall reminds us,  
…the call to self-emptying praxis must never become an end in itself. A person’s 
voluntary encounter with human suffering should always be viewed as a cry of protest 
and a testimony of hope against the overwhelming evil that one experiences.289  
 
In the end, we see how her understanding of God’s kenosis impacts her 
understanding of our own and serves as a corrective to interpretations of kenosis that have 
been harmful to women.  Her main contention is that God’s self is relational, and just as 
God’s “yearning for relation” was the impetus for Creation and the Incarnation, so too is 
this “yearning for relation” at the heart of redemption, for “relating is at the heart of what 
is redemptive.”290  Ultimately it is what is the heart of being human (the core of our 
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desire, as Grey would say) because it is what it means to be “like God” (imago Dei) and 
ultimately what it means to be holy, She writes,  
 [i]f the relational process is at the heart of reality, at the heart of the great divine 
creative-redemptive dynamism, participating in this must be what is meant by ‘holiness.’  
So entering into deeper, more meaningful and at the same time juster structures of 
relating is the kind of redemptive spirituality needed for the transformation of the 
world.291 
 
Kenotic spirituality and the individual  
 
 For Grey, “…redemption as right relation includes prayer as a dimension.”292  As 
mentioned, she believes that it is only with a kenotic spirituality that we can go back to 
the importance of connections, have our desires re-ordered toward others and re-ordered 
back to God.    This is particularly important given our current situation where she 
observes that “there is a hunger for the prayer of silence and meditation.”293  One of her 
main projects has been the turn to the mystical theology of the early church and fusing it 
together with more modern spiritual writers in order to address our contemporary 
concerns.  She believes the “retrieval of the mystical way as vital for withered 
contemporary religious experience.”294  Furthermore, she sees mysticism as an 
“alternative to what is offered by the consumerist banquet of the global market”295 as well 
as important to the feminist search for self, right relationship and fullness of life.296   
 Like Coakley, Grey insists that the mystical experience is not the privilege of the 
elite but a possibility for everyone.297  Furthermore, this way that leads to self-discovery 
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and the discovery of God and the other is also a slow and painful process.298  She best 
summarizes the beginning of a kenotic spirituality in the words of T.S Eliot: “I said to my 
soul be still, and wait without hope, for hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait 
without love for love would be love of the wrong thing…”299  From this short verse, we 
can discern the key components of a kenotic spirituality for Grey.  It begins with a 
posture of “stillness” and “waiting without hope…”  This “stillness” means a calming of 
ourselves and moving away from the frenetic pace of daily life.  Moreover, it means the 
beginning of the practice of silence so that we can begin to truly pay attention to 
ourselves and hear our own voice amidst the cacophony of voices in daily life.  “Waiting 
without hope” means that we must learn to let go and not control what happens in prayer; 
that is, we must not try to control the outcome lest we get it wrong by loving or hoping 
for the wrong thing.  So this “kenotic” posture asks us to be open and vulnerable, to 
submit ourselves to the whole process, ultimately submitting ourselves to God as will be 
discussed later.  Second, this notion of “waiting” is not to be understood primarily as just 
a passive moment.  This time of stillness and waiting is neither empty nor passive for it is 
only within such a posture that we can come to a kind of focused attention, a “spirituality 
of attention”.   Here, Grey is influenced by Simone Weil who Grey describes as having 
been inspired by “‘focused waiting’ or attentiveness which is not opposed to action but 
rather was a bridge between the being and doing.”300  Such attentiveness allows us to 
discover ourselves more deeply, especially realizing one’s brokenness and fragmentation.  
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Moreover, it also becomes the space where we can begin to heal this brokenness, working 
towards wholeness and the integration of mind, body and soul.  This prepares us for 
appropriate response and action in the world, and becomes that necessary space between 
“being” and “doing” as mentioned above.  How is this possible?  First, in this focused 
waiting, she contends that we encounter the presence of the Watcher, where we are able 
to observe and understand and ultimately go to a deeper level of consciousness and hence 
learn to grow from our own experience.301  For with deepening awareness, we is able to 
pay attention to our many connections, particularly our broken connections and our 
fragmentation.  She writes that: 
At the personal level we wait, we pay attention to all the many connections, the 
disordered patterns of relation, hearkening, listening, discerning, pulling back from the 
rhythms we’ve moved to thoughtlessly – in other words, practicing a “spirituality of 
attention.”302  
 
Notice here how the notion of “attention” is about learning to truly listen, observe, 
discern, to not just “thoughtlessly” go through the motions, but to really be able to 
examine the dynamics that are going on within ourselves and in our relationships.  It is a 
posture of “unknowing” in order to truly see what is going on.  In so doing, we begin to 
realize that the patterns of relationships that we’ve had – with ourselves and with others – 
are not just “natural” but disordered patterns harmful to ourselves and others.  From this, 
the challenge is recognizing how such patterns stem from our wrong sense of 
individualism, of a sense of a “possessive self” which needs to control and master others, 
brought about by a culture of domination of which we are a part.  As Grey contends,  
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The starting point has to be the recognition of the way our basic patterns of knowing, 
perceiving and feelings are already damaged by the kyriarchal patterns of the ethics of 
domination … and the way all these come together in absolutising the “individualistic I”. 
This enclosed “I” which seeks “mastery” without counting the cost cannot comprehend 
the language of relation.303  
 
 To put ourselves back together means realizing how we have been caught up in 
such harmful relationships, how we (especially as women) have been seen as 
“possessions”, how others have abused us in their quest for “mastery” over us.  At the 
same time, as Mary Grey reminds us, we must acknowledge with Ruether that “women 
are not the great innocents of history” and that we have been an integral part of these 
oppressive structures ourselves.304  So part of our encounter with ourselves also requires 
the confession of the ways that abuse of power is present in our relationships, to explore 
the darker dimension of our own selves, particularly our “possessive selves” and the 
relationships we do not want to face.  
 Hence, to put ourselves back together, to begin to recover our wholeness and 
gather the fragments entails the “stripping away of the false notions of self, the distorting 
absolutizations of  the self.”305  This has traditionally been understood as the via 
purgativa on the mystical path.  This primarily entails recognizing the “poverty” of our 
notions of self, of seeing that we do not know our true selves as we ought and realizing 
that the notion of an “individualistic” self leads only to brokenness and fragmentation. “If 
it is the false egoistic self which is lost, rising to a new and widened concept of self 
means both widening perception of who we are, and deepening a sense of responsibility 
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within a wider relational understanding.”306  Particularly for women, Grey adds another 
important element in this process.  Beyond just the confrontation with our “darker 
strands” and a rejection of our “false selves,” she writes that “women can often require 
the integrating of positive images and experiences, together with the rejecting of the 
destructive ones.” 307  This is important lest women just continue to beat themselves over 
the head remaining in the belief of their inherent weakness and “badness” or do not have 
positive healing images upon which they can begin to accept and love themselves, before 
even branching out to others.  For the challenge of the via purgativa is preserving the two 
poles of relating, interdependence and autonomy.  The stripping away of the false, 
individualistic notions of self is an effort to reach a more “centered”, more balanced, a 
more wholistic sense of self within the broader understanding of our relationship with 
others.  In the end, Grey points to Carol Ochs who describes the via purgativa for women 
as,   
…the stripping away of all that stands in the way of our relationship with reality – such 
unworthy goals of wealth, fame and status, fears of failure, ridicule or isolation, and such 
habits as irresponsibility, laziness or forgetfulness….this is the movement of “letting go” 
(abgeschiedenheit) in order to facilitate in us the “birthing of God.”308  
 
 Notice how once again, Grey implies how this can only happen through a kind of 
kenosis, of “letting go” so that we can realize our broken connections and fragmented 
selves, and visualize alternative models of connection and desires.  This only happens by 
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way of “letting go” and surrender.  But this is not a surrender once again to the harmful 
culture of domination, nor is it a kind of passive surrender or giving up on ourselves.  
Rather, Grey contends that “breakthrough will come through the way of surrender – not 
to the forces of non-being, destructive of the fragile self…but surrender to God’s 
initiative.”309  In this kenotic spirituality of delving deep and moving inward, as we 
discover ourselves more intimately, we ultimately discover God, for the “experience of 
transcending the self as part of the process of self-realization often comes linked with the 
experience of the divine.”310  It is, as previously mentioned, a discovery of the God of 
right relation, of the vulnerable God who then empowers us and gives us an alternative 
desire (the desire for relation instead of individualism or autonomy), and an alternative 
model of relation (of learning to be vulnerable to the other versus dominating the other).    
It is in such an encounter with this vulnerable God, that we begin to be empowered by 
such an experience, giving us a new vision that can inspire us into a new sense of self and 
a new way of relating with others. As Grey says,   
The God we meet in the process toward wholeness is the God who energizes our whole 
being: the God we meet as our heart’s deepest desire, in our moments of clearest self-
knowledge. The God met in the depths is relationality’s deepest core.  This is the God 
who is urging us on to deepen our connectedness, weave new connections, unravel and 
re-weave the patterns of relating.311  
 
 Furthermore, in this experience with the vulnerable God, we are given the 
experience of the kind of loving relationship with God that allows us to become 
vulnerable.  It is an experience where we find God desiring our wholeness, respecting our 
autonomy and seeing our intrinsic value.  It is such an experience of love that we are then 
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challenged to emulate in our human experiences.  How is this possible?  First, in this 
encounter with God, according to mystical experience of religious tradition, there is the 
sense of “not seeing but being seen, held and dreamed…of being held by God, of never 
being able to fall out of God.”312  This is an important experience of being vulnerable, of 
letting go and “resting” in God, being held by God, and trusting that God will never let 
go.  Furthermore, unlike the experience of women being seen with “objectifying eyes” or 
“possessive eyes”, the experience of being seen by God, is an experience not of the 
“arrogant” eye that “wants to objectify, possess and control” but the “loving eye” that 
sees our inherent beauty, value, depth and dignity and longs for our wholeness and the 
integration of mind, body and soul.313  Furthermore, the experience of being held by a 
vulnerable God is also the experience of being thrown into a wider reality, a wider set of 
relations than we had before.  It becomes a way of breaking out of the narrow conception 
of self while still maintaining our sense of self.  This is truly the balance that is being 
sought within kenotic spirituality. It is the balance (of autonomy and interdependence) 
that we begin to experience in the face of the vulnerable God.  As Grey claims,  
The notion of being held in a wider whole, in other words, that there is a greater reality 
than oneself, will be the deepening experience which holds the two poles together. This is 
the redemptive sphere of the vulnerable and creative God.314 
 
This whole encounter then with God within contemplation breaks open our previous 
notions of self, other, and God.  It is the kind of spirituality that requires our “surrender”, 
to learn to let go so that we can feel ourselves held by God, our desires and vision of 
personhood re-modeled by the vulnerable God.  In this encounter where we feel ourselves 
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held in a “greater reality” than ourselves, we realize the poverty of our notions of self, of 
other and of God.  As Grey claims, “the kenotic, self-emptying God-in-process questions 
all constructions and dogmas about God as contextual, time-bound and partial.”315 
 Notice already how this very experience with God brings us to the deepest core of 
our being while at the same time thrusting us widely into relationship with the other, 
since the God we meet is the God of relationality.  So on the one hand, the experience of 
contemplation brings us more deeply with ourselves but also more broadly with another, 
learning to become vulnerable to the other as we experience the vulnerability of God.  As 
Grey argues, the “discovery and affirmation of the self – honest self-love – are a pre-
requisite for the process of redemption and transformation.”316  However, this is not 
enough; for the experience with the relational/vulnerable God thrusts us into the “tragedy 
and ambiguity” of the human situation and opens us to the suffering and vulnerability of 
the other.  This is why, for Grey, contemplation, “far from being an escape from the 
responsibilities of the world…can be reimagined as a deeper engagement with it, 
specifically as engaging with the fragmentation of culture which threatens to engulf 
us.”317 
 Having experienced the “loving eye” of God which affirms our very being, we 
begin to learn to see others with the same “loving eye” as God.  In the same way that we 
have discerned the harm of the “arrogant eye” that has possessed and objectified us; that 
we have learned that we are not possessions for others to use and abuse, we also begin to 
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look at others with this loving eye that sees their dignity, depth and inherent worth.  For 
Grey, such “sacramental perception” is how we must perceive, not just other people, but 
all of creation.  Such perception, based on our experience of the vulnerable God, can re-
order our desires and our relationship with others.  This begins by seeing ourselves with 
new eyes, to “re-image myself not as an individual defined over against another, but in-
relation-to, connected-with.”318  Re-imagined in this way (influenced by the image of the 
vulnerable, not “omnipotent” God), our hearts begin to open and learn to become 
vulnerable to the other, especially in their suffering.  Part of such vulnerability is learning 
to truly listen to the other, just as we learned in “stillness and waiting” to listen and 
discern and discover our own voice.  As Grey argues, “[l]istening is an activity which 
requires the whole person. It requires the vulnerability to the other which is presupposed 
in the idea of the connected self.”319  Just as it is only by “surrendering” and “letting go” 
of what we know that we come to know a deeper level of ourselves, so too it is only in 
“letting go” of what we think we know about others that we can truly know them.  This is 
the kind of “vulnerable” attitude that must accompany our relationship with others. Only 
with this kind of disposition of “listening” and vulnerability can we truly know the other, 
and not become “possessive” of them, or dominating, thinking that we already know how 
they are or what they need.  Rather, this “vulnerability” gives them the space to be 
themselves, and us the space to truly hear them. As Grey says, “being vulnerable to each 
other allows ‘other ways of knowing’ their full space.”320  In being vulnerable in such a 
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way, we allow our hearts to break open and be truly vulnerable, particularly to their 
suffering, and this becomes the impetus in our fight against injustice or oppression of 
others and of the earth. 
 An example Grey gives of someone who, by going on an “interior” journey 
through contemplation, achieves the kind of solidarity and “vulnerability” towards others 
is Thomas Merton.  She writes that Thomas Merton’s own journey echoes largely the 
concern of many feminist theologians – search for self, search for God (and the search for 
a kind of dependence that respects our freedom) and the search for fullness of life.321  
Moreover, Grey finds that Merton’s views on the self in solitude (as distinct from 
separation) find a resonance with feminist insights for “his sense of discovering 
connection with the human race while in solitude is exactly what is meant by the 
‘connected’ aloneness of the feminist mystic….”322  She points to his Louisville epiphany 
as a moment of delving deep within himself and in that solitude finding such great 
connection with others.  However, Grey also recognizes the limitations with Merton’s 
example, and the continuing challenge of a right understanding of “dependence” within 
the contemplative life as well as the challenge of working toward change in the world as 
against “escaping the world.”  In order to bridge this gap, Mary Grey turns to the example 
of Etty Hillesum, a young Jewish woman who lived and worked in Amsterdam during the 
German occupation and ultimately died at Auschwitz.  For Grey, her journey outlined in 
her diary shows the potency of a kenotic spirituality.  In particular, Hillesum’s idea of 
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“soulscape links interior growth with outward circumstances, in a way that bridges some 
of the duality” mentioned above.323  
 In her diary, Hillesum mentions how her external circumstances and surroundings 
were seen as a reflection of her own inner landscape.  This external landscape is a mirror 
into her own “soul-(land)scape.”  For Grey, this soulscape is about “connecting the 
fragmented elements of the physical, material, psychological and emotional elements of 
all our lives, with an intensity and a desire for wholeness….”324  It is about bringing the 
disparate elements of one’s life into one’s interior life, each flowing into the other, 
instead of being divided.  To do this, however, requires seeing the external world from 
the sacramental perception discussed above, acquired through focused awareness.  This is 
the way Hillesum writes about the things and events in her daily life, finding joy and 
wonder in the simple things.  As Grey says, this is what soulscaping about, “relating to 
these elements of ordinariness with tenderness, reverence and a sense of gratefulness, 
integrating them all into a process of self-becoming.”325 Furthermore, this interior life, 
sculpted from the exterior world, also brought her closer to God, particularly the 
vulnerable God as she became more exposed to the vulnerability around her, the 
vulnerability of the camps.  Moreover, the encounter with the vulnerable God, made her 
take greater responsibility for the vulnerability around her.  Notice here how the 
development of the “sacramental perception”, of seeing everything with “tenderness, 
reverence and gratefulness” did not mean putting on rose-colored glasses and becoming 
                                                
323 Grey, Prophecy and Mysticism, 17. 
324 Ibid., 17-8. 
325 Ibid., 18. 
  135 
blind to the suffering around her.  Instead, such perception, rooted in her interior life, 
actually gave her the courage to see the reality of suffering around her, to see things as 
they were, and to be moved to action in the world, due to her encounter with the 
vulnerable God.    Hence, Grey wonders, “[c]an this sense of taking responsibility for 
God, recognizing the vulnerability of God, lift us from the difficulty of how to nurture a 
real dependence on God while crushed with debilitating deprivations?”326 Her response is 
that Hillesum “…blazes a trail by affirming the need to strip away crippling notions of 
dependency and obedience through affirming life in its fullness, despite the horrors of the 
present.”327  In the end, Grey says that,  
For Hillesum God’s vulnerability – seen as inability, powerlessness to alter the disastrous 
situation – was a direct challenge for human response and participation in the task of 
restoring heart…Finding room for God in peoples’ hearts, bringing divine presence into 
humanity’s life was for Hillesum an awakening into joy and delight and into 
reconciliation as an alternative to hatred.328  
 
 In the end, it is the combination of the kenotic spirituality of Hillesum with the 
mysticism of Merton that Grey sees as the antidote to the consumerism today, and to 
women’s search for the balance between self and other-centeredness.  However, as Grey 
cautions, “[i]n the experience of transcending the self – the feeling of being part of a 
wider whole – comes authentic self-realization , yet a corresponding vulnerability to 
victimization.”329  This is why she emphasizes how God’s vulnerability is voluntary and 
how it respects our autonomy.  This is the model we are encouraged to follow, lest we 
become even more vulnerable to victimization; that our opening ourselves to others may 
lead us to lose ourselves instead of truly finding ourselves in the process.  For in the end, 
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the challenge is also about finding the balance between autonomy and interdependence.  
As Grey says, the task ahead will be to maintain this sense of ‘connected aloneness’, to 
be self-affirming as a choice-making, judging and acting individual, and yet to maintain 
that vital interconnectedness with the rest of creation.”330    
Kenotic spirituality and the community  
 
 Though Grey is very much concerned with the feminist project of finding oneself 
and right relations, and fighting against oppression and suffering, a good part of her 
writing also focuses on the transformation of communities, particularly on the Christian 
Church and its renewal. She believes that it is through empowered communities that the 
transformation of individuals and the consumerist society can take place.  It is such 
communities, more than just individuals, that offer counter-cultural models to fight 
against the fragmentation and suffering in the world today.  As she contends, having 
individual role models such as Mother Teresa or Archbishop Romero are good but they 
can also have a disempowering effect: “the hero/heroine mould idealises the individual 
concerned, who becomes a cult figure….Not only do their achievements seem 
unattainable by ordinary mortals, but they distract from the community taking 
responsibility for its own witness.”331 
 However, she begins by admitting that the Church itself has been perceived as 
unable to address the issues of the world, that it is disconnected from such concerns, and 
its rituals, doctrines and practices seen as irrelevant and detached from the crisis today.   
This, she contends, is part of the “Dark Night” of the Church.  As she says,    
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I want to move the metaphor of the Dark Night out of the cell of Julian of Norwich, out 
of Merton’s hermitage and John of the Cross’ prison, into the violent ghettoes of the inner 
city, the humiliated disrepair of our overcrowded prisons, the hopelessness of the ravaged 
women in the refuges.  This is the sense in which the lostness, pain and confusion of 
Dark Night metaphor fits a situation where the Church has lost its way and seems 
incapable of making an adequate response.332 
 
Furthermore, the Church has also become a place where more suffering, more darkness is 
experienced by women leading to their own “dark night” as part of a community that 
refuses to recognize them, and help them find their way back to themselves.  Grey 
describes the “dark night” of women in the Church as such: 
…most people assume women are angry and depressed because they are not allowed to 
be ordained priests.  But the Dark night comprehends a much deeper level of alienation 
and despair. It is a darkness born of a lack of nourishment by the liturgy, prayer-life and 
doctrine of the Christian church. It is the pain of the distorted symbols and lifeless rituals 
which exclude the humanity of women; it is the making of the Christ-mystery into 
something un-related to human living and the controlling of this by a class of clerical 
elite, many of whom live in a style remote from ordinary people.…333 
 
 Part of her project then has been to re-think ecclesiology, to help the Church 
recover its heart, just as she encouraged individuals, particularly women to recover theirs.  
She wants moreover to recover a prophetic Church by way of mysticism, as an antidote 
and inspiration for individuals, to become the space, the community where they can 
recover their own heart.  For, as she says, “[i]n communities inspired by the energizing 
presence of God, we find inspiration to speak the prophetic word to society.”334 
 What does such a prophetic community look like?  In Beyond the Dark Night, she 
describes such a community as primarily the opposite, counter-cultural community to the 
current stream of consumerism in society today.  In particular, such prophetic 
communities must not give way to consumerism and live in a way that makes it possible 
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to survive and live dignified lives.  They are communities that condemn the culture of 
violence, and above all, they are “safe spaces of trusting where women can speak the 
truth of their abuse, suffering and rejection, without fear.”335  For the Church specifically 
to become such a prophetic community, she says, it needs new models of authority, 
power and leadership, moving beyond patriarchal models that are associated with 
domination, competition and control.  However, in order to become such counter-cultural 
models, the Church has to become a community that “sees, hears and imagines 
differently.”336  Moreover, it needs to be able to operate out of a powerful memory, a 
“subversive memory which stands in judgment over the dominant culture, and the power 
to imagine and dream alternative visions of self and world.”337  These, for her, are at the 
prophetic heart of ecclesia.   
For the renewal of the Church, as it was for the individual, what is needed for the 
recovery of heart, is a kenotic spirituality, grounded in mysticism.   As she says, “What I 
referred to earlier on the level of the individual, I now urge at the level of the 
institution.”338 Here, she is urging institutions, particularly the Church to take up such 
kenosis and enter into the “spirituality of attention,” that brings us to the vulnerable God, 
teaching us to become vulnerable to the other, to truly listen to the other.  From such 
vulnerability comes our compassion, and the ministry to “bear up God in the world”.339   
Such spirituality of attention also means looking at how patterns in the institution, 
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particularly in our rituals, may lead more to broken connections than healing and 
wholeness.  As such, part of the kenotic process would be  
…learning new patterns and unlearning patterns of functioning that have stifled the 
Body’s life.  It means leaving behind sacramental practices that have become routine and 
which block off the earth.…340 
 
Furthermore, Grey states that the challenge of the Church is to “relinquish the idea that 
she dispenses and controls the Holy Ruah of God; equally she needs to lose the fear that 
the Spirit is experienced outside of official structures.”341 
In the end, she argues that if the Church can enter into this kenotic process, it can 
begin to recover its prophetic heart and become the space where individuals can come to 
recover their own hearts.  In particular, she sees a renewed understanding of liturgy as a 
powerful tool that can unleash the kind of subversive memory that can lead to a recovery 
of our own hearts.  For this reason, she wants the liturgy to be understood differently as a  
…place of ethical commitment, and eucharistic as a community act of solidarity with the 
suffering earth/suffering people.  A place to recover heart. A place where the great act of 
remembering, of anamnesis, becomes remembering what we were once, what we have 
been, what we can now never be, given so much destruction of earth’s creatures….A 
place where we commit ourselves concretely to life-styles geared to the flourishing and 
survival of threatened peoples.342 
 
In Prophecy and Mysticism¸ Grey lists seven steps that are necessary in order to move to 
such an empowering notion of liturgy as the place to recover heart.  It includes a re-
imagination or a recovery of the “earthly” symbols of water, bread, wine, etc., and re-
connecting with their “full ecological, material, economic, and political dimensions.”343  
It also means recovering our “subversive” community memory that reminds us of the 
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sacredness of all things.  This includes a renewed understanding of sacrifice, not just as 
“self-giving” (which has led to interpretations that condone unjust suffering) but also as 
“making sacred”.  Furthermore, this praxis of sacrifice needs to extend beyond our usual 
boundaries and limitations. It means solidarity and action beyond the usual limits, the 
willingness to move “out of safety, familiar attachments and convictions to come on 
board … a global movement embodying an ethic which is life-giving in the widest 
sense.”344  Through such rituals then, the memory of the vulnerable God may be 
remembered, and such communities can bring us life again, and help us to recover our 
own hearts. 
 In the end,  
The kenotic presence of God is understood not simply negatively, as the refusal of God to 
be merely a commodity within the system of global capitalism, but as an invitation to a 
process of self-emptying as a challenge to the way that this economic system has tried to 
occupy all available space. This language of voluntary self-emptying leads to recognizing 
vulnerability, God’s vulnerability and compassionate suffering shared with numerous 
vulnerable communities around the world. It is this divine generosity and self-effacing 
kenosis that was the very possibility of the incarnation of Jesus. But through the Holy 
Spirit of Christ, born of the kenosis of God and the self-giving of Jesus, a new vital force 
of divine presence has been enabled…We long for a dynamic presence of the sacred in 
our midst. Specifically, it is in communities activated by the renewing Spirit that we find 




Mary Grey states that, “Trinitarian love is kenotic in the Godhead’s generous self-
emptying of omnipotence and glory. This blazes a trail for the Churches in the face of 
globalization: how can we actually live and embody the kenotic way in both public space 
and interior life?”346  Here, we find Grey’s two-pronged concern – of one’s personal, 
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interior life and one’s life within society, emphasizing that these two are not separate, 
independent spheres but interdependent spheres that affect both the individual as well as 
the community.  It is in her conviction of such a relationship that she seeks to develop a 
kenotic spirituality that speaks to both these spaces, finding a way to integrate the two 
spaces again where one’s interior life empowers one’s action in society, and where one’s 
community and what happens in society are brought into one’s personal and interior life.  
This is one way to begin to gather the fragments of one’s self, by finding wholeness 
through integrating such personal and public spheres.  This is why, for Grey, the example 
of Etty Hillesum, as one whose soulscape brought both spheres together in a way that 
empowered her own struggle in the life of the camps, is an important model of such 
integration, and why contemplation and the path of kenosis is crucial in order to achieve 
this.   
On this path where we learn to “surrender” control and discover our “poverty” in 
our notions of self, other and God, we are met by the vulnerable God who shows us the 
way of right relations, reminding us of the greater reality that we are embedded in, a 
reality that we are also responsible for and accountable to.  Furthermore, such an 
encounter with God reminds us of the sacredness of all things.  Such a vision move us to 
fight against those that continue to demean and devalue all that is “sacred” by turning 
them into mere objects or possessions in a consumerist society.  For women, this includes 
recognizing the ways that we have been seen and treated as possessions, and moving out 
of such harmful and abusive relationships.  
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Moreover, such kenotic spirituality must open us in a way that goes beyond the 
limitations of our own religious communities and must spill over to the recognition of the 
dignity and wisdom of other religious traditions and communities.  This, she says, is a 
particular challenge for the Church.  As mentioned above, part of the kenotic process for 
the Church is to begin to relinquish the idea of being in control of God’s Spirit or even 
knowing where that Spirit is to be found.  Furthermore, she states that “Christian 
revelation is called to respond in humility to the changed inter-faith scene….Christianity 
is called to a vast movement of metanoia, or repentance, for its failure to recognize and 
listen to the revealed word of other faiths and to listen with humility to other 
wisdoms.”347  In the end, she writes,   
I dare to hope that even if the Dark Night is where we are, even if fragmentation is what we 
experience, yet like the phoenix rising from the ashes, our communities, both prophetic and 
mystical in their counter-cultural response, are already fashioning a new integrity for 




 Joy McDougall writes that feminist theologians such as Sarah Coakley and Mary 
Grey are those whose ultimate aim is not to deconstruct the Christian faith, but to 
strengthen its foundations and witness.349 In this case, we see both of them taking up the 
prickly topic of kenosis, understanding the dangers of connotations of dependence, 
sacrifice and loss of self that have led to the subordination and suffering of women, yet 
arguing that we cannot just let go of this language of kenosis but must rather reinterpret 
                                                
347 Grey, The Wisdom of Fools, 13. Part of her own response to this challenge has been to consider 
Buddhist feminist discussions regarding self and their view of the interdependence of all things.  Such 
considerations will be discussed in Chapter Four where the comparison between these Christian feminist 
theologians and Buddhist feminist theologians will be made. 
348 Ibid., Prophecy and Mysticism, 80. 
349 McDougall, 20. 
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it, in light of the feminist critique. In doing so, we may find that the right understanding 
of kenosis could actually be helpful in women’s search for self as well as the fight against 
the suffering in the world today. 
 Both of them insist on retaining the language of kenosis as “vulnerability” or 
“dependence” but only by turning the ordinary understanding of “power” on its head.  
Instead of continuing the propagation of the understanding of power as domination or 
control, they re-interpret power instead in kenosis; that is, that willed vulnerability, a 
willed surrender or letting go, particularly as dependence on God. It is with such a 
posture of “dependence” that one is empowered by God. Notice how both are careful to 
clarify that this kind of “vulnerability” is voluntary, a continued practice, and not 
something imposed upon by others.  Moreover, the notion of divine kenosis is also based 
upon the premise above.  Coakley writes about a gentle God, and divine kenosis as 
“choosing never to have certain forms of power”. In other words, giving up certain kinds 
of “power” is seen as a kind of “power” in itself.  Mary Grey on the other hand, writes of 
divine kenosis as God’s “power” being made manifest in choosing to be “vulnerable” to 
our suffering and to our response.  In both cases, we find the correlation between the 
notion of “power” and the language of “vulnerability” and dependence.  For this reason, 
Sarah Coakley writes of kenosis as “power-in-vulnerability” and why Grey insists that 
relational power is vulnerable. Furthermore, both argue that it is only with such a posture 
that a transformation of our disordered desires, a recovery of heart and of right relations, 
can truly happen. 
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 This kind of right kenosis can be found in the practice of prayer or contemplation.  
It is in this space that we can experience a kind of “dependence” that can be empowering, 
and discover ways of relating with ourselves and others that can begin to solve some of 
the issues regarding autonomy and relationality.  Though Coakley and Grey have 
different approaches to the discussion of contemplation (Coakley grounds it more on the 
Church Fathers, the Carmelites and other medieval mystics while Grey ties mystical 
theology with more contemporary (mostly) feminist writers), they are in agreement that 
contemplation is no elitist thing but a possibility (in some ways given the current 
situation in the world), even a necessity today.  Furthermore, what is cultivated is the 
practice of the “spirituality of attention” and “waiting” - a posture that begins to develop 
a way of “unknowing” or “unmastery” that then opens us up to truly listen, see and 
discover the self, God and others in ways that break the limitations of our previous 
knowledge.  It is in such a space of deeper knowing that we encounter the gentle, 
vulnerable God who knows us better than we know ourselves, and throws out all the old 
“distorted” illusions of our thoughts of self and other.  Furthermore, it is God who 
“yearns” for our wholeness and for relation.  It is an experience of “being seen” with the 
loving (and not possessive eyes) of God through which we realize our worth, our dignity, 
and a deeper sense of self previously unknown to us. 
Both writers contend (as do most other spiritual writers) that this process of 
prayer is slow and painful, requiring a lifetime of commitment and risk.  This process of 
coming to know our true selves begins with the “giving of oneself” to God, the “willed 
passivity” and “absolute dependence” only on God.  This process allows us to re-member 
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ourselves, to piece back together our disparate selves, replacing old and broken images 
and relationships and finding new, liberating images. 
Furthermore, this encounter with God in the deepest core of our being, also 
throws us into a wider, broader reality than we once thought.  It breaks open our 
limitations of self and brings about the experience of crossing over the boundaries of self 
into relationship with others, without the annihilation of self.  This is part of our 
discovery: that we are not just “autonomous” selves but we are also “connected selves” as 
Grey says.  And in the same way that the spirituality of attention allowed us to listen and 
hear our own voices, it is the same practice that can allow the space for us to truly listen, 
hear and respect the voices of the other, to begin to see them, not with the “arrogant” eye 
but with loving eyes that respect their differences and also see their vulnerability. Such 
loving eyes remind us of the “glory” and the “sacredness” of all things.  Such perception 
makes us truly grasp the realities of the world (seeing it in all its “glory” but also in its 
suffering and bondage), and far from escaping from it, asks us to respond and spurs us 
into action in the world.   
 Grey’s insistence of the integration of “public space” and our interior landscape 
also ensures that our own spiritual journey never becomes just an “escape from the 
world” but becomes a deeper engagement with the world.    With the example of 
Hillesum, Grey offers a way of being able to take in the vulnerability and suffering of the 
world into one’s practice, maybe even being the impetus for such practice while at the 
same time not letting go of their own journey of self-realization and discovery.  Rather 
the two can go hand and hand which again emphasizes the point of the fluidity of self-
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other, of private and public spaces and the interdependence of the two.  As we learn to 
protect the vulnerability of others, we also learn to protect our own vulnerability, and 
vice-versa.  The practice of contemplation, though opening us to our vulnerability and the 
vulnerability of the other, paradoxically also offers the space to empower us and gives us 
a stronger sense of self, and a stronger prophetic voice in order to act in society.  This 
reminder might serve to help counter the objections to Sarah Coakley’s discussions of 
kenosis and the question of whether the turn to contemplation truly helps to prevent or 
fight against abuse.350 
 Moreover, this interdependence of self-other can also be seen in Grey’s insistence 
on the renewal not just of individuals, but primarily of the community, especially the 
Church.  It is a recognition that individuals are also formed by communities and by 
society.  In the same way that the fragmentation of self came out of a consumeristic 
society, so too can alternative models of community serve as a resource for individuals to 
recover their own true desires, their own true self, and can serve as a reminder of the call 
towards right relation and right perception through their rituals and practices.  This 
insistence of the renewal of the community reminds us that our discovery and formation 
of our selves can never be formed in a vacuum, but already happens within a matrix of 
relationships.  Hence, in order for true change to happen, it has to happen on both the 
individual and the institutional/societal levels.    
 A particular challenge for the Church, according to Grey, is in her recognition of 
and respect for the difference of the religious other, a boundary that contributes to the 
                                                
350 For this objection, see Papanikolaou. 
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fragmentation of society.  However, in the space of contemplation, where we truly begin 
to pay attention and listen to the other in their particularity, we begin to develop the sense 
of “unknowing” and humility that can lead us to greater openness to other religious 
traditions, and the wisdom that they offer.  This is something that both Coakley and Grey 
argue from their experience of contemplation.  Interestingly, the specificity of the 
Christian path of contemplation leads not to separation but rather to the appreciation of 
and openness to such analogous experiences in other traditions which may continue to 
offer a path towards better inter-faith encounters.  This point will be further explored in 
the conclusion. 
In the end, Coakley states that “the final and safe test of contemplation can only 
be known by its fruits – and the fruits that feminist spirituality seeks apart from love, joy, 
peace – are personal empowerment, prophetic resistance, courage in the face of 
oppression, and the destruction of false idolatry.”351  However, such fruits begin in 
prayer, in making a space for God who then creates for us a safe and gentle space to 
explore our brokenness and begin the process towards healing and wholeness for 
ourselves and others. 
But such a process takes time.  Coming to know God and ourselves while 
allowing for our transformation and seeing our connections is a lifelong journey.  Yet, 
over a “lifetime of faithful observation of both public acts of worship and charity on the 
one hand, and private devotions on the other, one might hope ultimately to come to 
                                                
351 Coakley, “Kenosis and Subversion,” 110. 
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‘know’ God in God’s intimate life,” and truly know oneself and others through a sharing 
in the life of God.352    
In the end, the Christian path that is fruitful for women is truly illumined by the 
kenotic path.   It is in the “giving over of oneself” to God that we are truly transformed 
and empowered and we realize how we are intimately connected to all else as God’s 
creatures.  Such empowerment, such “right” relationship with God, self and other, 
becomes the foundation of our struggle for peace and justice, the support for our struggle 
for social change.  It is the vision and transformation that happens in prayer that grounds 
our work for change in the world. 
These two theologians give us an example of lives given over to such a task.  
Both theologians who argue for the primacy of prayer/contemplation, and both are 
committed to the task of justice and social change.  Through their lives, we see the 
coming together of the love of self, others and God, and of the commitment of their 
whole selves – head, heart and hands – to others and to God.  Such lives remind us of the 
ground of social change, of a deep spiritual life so that the “well is never empty” and we 
are able to truly be there for ourselves and others, empowering our cry for justice in an 
unjust world, a cry for wholeness in this broken world, but also being able to rest in the 
arms of God and in the arms of others when our work and our cries do not seem to be 
enough. 
  
                                                
352 Coakley, “Deepening Practices,” 92. 
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Chapter Three:  Buddhist feminists on emptiness (śūnyatā): 
The example of Anne Klein and Rita Gross 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Similar to the project of the Christian feminist writers in Chapter Two, there are 
also Western Buddhist feminists who are seeking to bring Buddhism and feminism into 
conversation with each other, allowing each to turn a critical eye on the other.  Some 
apply the feminist critique onto Buddhism, showing the problems with the interpretations 
of their doctrines and practices that do not take women’s experience into account.  For 
example, Eva Neumaier-Dargyay looks at the Buddhist doctrines of compassion (karunā) 
and no-self (anātman) and, similar to feminists in the Christian tradition, ask whether 
such doctrines are helpful to women who already suffer a loss of self.353  She also 
critiques the negative Buddhist images of woman as the locus of suffering and the womb 
as the place of filth as well as the positive images of the feminine, such as Tara, 
questioning whether such an image of what is culturally defined as “feminine” is placed 
on a pedestal for other women to emulate.354   
Others draw attention to the dangers of certain interpretations of emptiness 
(śūnyatā), especially those that border on nihilism or relativism; that is, the notion that 
since everything is “empty,” then either it means nothing or it can mean whatever we 
                                                
353 According to Daniel Arnold, other feminists such as bell hooks have also critiqued “egolessness” saying 
that “you can’t give up the ego and the self if you haven’t established a sense of yourself as subject.” 
Daniel Arnold, Mapping the Middle Way: Thoughts on a Buddhist Contribution to a Feminist Discussion” 
Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion Vol. 14/1 (2006): 66. In that article, he writes about the problem 
between modernist and postmodern feminist debates about “self” and “woman,” a debate that, as we shall 
see later, Anne Klein tries to address through her work 
354 Eva Neumaier-Dargyay writes that “the Buddhist concept of No-self is more critical, if investigated 
from a feminist perspective, since the general experience of women is that they do not have a sense of self.”  
See “Buddhist Thought from a Feminist Perspective” in Gender, Genre, and Religion: Feminist 
Reflections, eds.  Morny Joy and Eva K. Neumaier-Dargyay (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1995) 167. 
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want it to, or that our actions have no ethical consequences and therefore nothing has to 
be changed.  Anne Klein reminds us of Tsong-kha-pa’s warning that “emptiness should 
not be taught to those who will construe it to mean that the self does not exist, or that 
one’s actions and relationships do not matter because there is no karmic cause and effect, 
no ethical consequences.”355 Gross echoes such concerns in discussing the “poison of 
śūnyatā” and warns that though “things are not absolute but only relative does not make 
them irrelevant or non-existent.”  She argues that this kind of wrong understanding of 
śūnyatā has led to the continued gender inequality in Buddhist institutions.   Though 
Buddhist women may be aware of sexism within Buddhist institutions, they choose not to 
deal with it or allow things to remain the same because they think that emptiness means 
that “injustice and inappropriate social institutions don’t really exist” and therefore 
nothing needs to be changed or addressed. 356   
On the other hand, there are others who feel that Buddhism has much to offer to 
feminism.  For example, Daniel Arnold writes that much of the literature in feminist 
theory “attempt[s] to develop new conceptions of subjectivity. Questions of feminist 
ethics turn on our conceptions of the self.”  He proposes that the middle way of 
Buddhism can offer an alternative that at once deconstructs and allows for subjectivity, 
providing an alternative that bridges essentialist and postmodern feminist discussions on 
the self.357  Eva Neumaier-Dargyay, though critical of some Buddhist doctrines, also 
argues that “[t]he core concept of Buddhist thought, i.e. that the nature of the cosmos can 
                                                
355 Anne Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists, and the Art of the Self (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1995) 127. 
356 Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy, 179. 
357 Arnold, “Mapping the Middle Way,” 64. 
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be described only as a vacuity, emptiness, and that it transcends the realm of language 
and conceptual thinking…harbours great potential for stimulating a feminist search for 
spirituality.”358  The key doctrines of no-self and emptiness as well as meditation 
practices on these doctrines seem to take a central role in these discussions of the 
Buddhist contribution to feminist concerns.   
Anne Klein and Rita Gross are two key figures that have focused their work on 
this intersection of Buddhism and feminism, both in doing a feminist “retrieval” of 
Buddhism as well as looking at what Buddhism can offer to current feminist discussions 
about the self. Kay Koppendrayer describes these two authors as Western feminist 
Buddhists who “address questions related to the nature of being woman.  They ponder the 
implications of engendered being, as well as what place not just the embodied self but the 
female embodied self has in activity that is spiritually and socially transformative. Each 
author turns to the resources Buddhism offers to help push our understandings of gender, 
body, and being.”359  From this description, one can discern that the project of these 
authors is not only the reinterpretation of doctrines but also the articulation of a way of 
being for women that is spiritually nourishing as well as empowering within society.  
These are the kinds of discussions that mirror the project of the Christian feminists 
studied in Chapter Two, a project that seeks to define the self, to “find” the female self 
through spiritual practices and connecting such practices to the transformation of one’s 
self as well as one’s action in the world.   
                                                
358 Eva Neumaier-Dargyay, 167.   
359 Kay Koppedrayer, “Review Essay: Feminist Applications of Buddhist thought” Journal of Feminist 
Studies in Religion  23/1 (2007): 122. The other two authors that she reviews in her article are Judith 
Simmer-Brown and Winnie Tomm. 
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Gross and Klein turn the spotlight of gender analysis on Buddhist doctrines 
particularly on the nature of the self and interpret them in light of the experience of 
women.  Reciprocally, they also use these Buddhist doctrines of no-self, emptiness, and 
Buddha nature to shed light upon the feminist issue on the self-other divide.  This chapter 
then will focus on these two writers to see how their retrieval and use of emptiness can 
illumine the search for the elusive relational self, and how the realization of such is 
mediated through meditation practices.      




 Anne Klein is a Western Buddhist feminist whose knowledge of Buddhism comes 
not only from her “academic study but also her work with traditionally trained Tibetan 
Nyingmapa and Gelukpa Buddhists and from decades of practice.”360 Her primary 
interest is on issues of selfhood, an issue which she believes is important to both 
feminism and Buddhism.  She writes,     
Selfhood is, in different ways, at the core of both Buddhist and feminist concerns. In 
Buddhism one’s mistaken sense of self is considered to be the root of all other problems. 
In North America, an important feminist concern is to forge a strong identity that does 
not gain power primarily from its ability to exclude people who don’t share that identity. 
An oppositional stance toward ‘the other’ is deeply associated with patriarchy….In this 
regard, I think the aspect of Buddhist philosophy which radically questions common 
assumptions regarding identity is very relevant to feminism. The Buddhist material offers 
a critique of hyperindividualism as well as a very positive view of interdependently 
understood identity.361 
                                                
360 Kay Koppedrayer, 130.  In her footnote 37, she writes that “Klein completed her M.A. in the Buddhist 
Studies program founded by Richard Robinson (University of Wisconsin), her Ph.D. under Jeffrey Hopkins 
(University of Virginia), and ha studied and practiced with teachers of Geluk and Nyingma lineages in 
India, Nepal, and the United States. 
361 Anne Klein, “Roundtable Discussion: The Questions that won’t go away: A dialogue about women in 
Buddhism and Christianity” eds. Rita Nakashima Brock, Paula Cooey, and Anne Klein, Journal of 
Feminist Studies in Religion 6/2 (2004): 98. See also, Anne Klein, “Finding a Self: Buddhist and Feminist 
Perspectives” in Shaping New Vision: Gender and Values in American Culture, eds. Clarissa Atkinson, 
Constance Buchanan and Margaret Miles (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1987) 193. 
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Here, the intersection of Buddhist and feminist concerns regarding the self are 
made clear.  In both cases, the problem lies with articulations of the self and identity 
which are too autonomous and individuated and results in dualism or opposition to the 
other. In Buddhism, the key delusion is the sense of a separate, independent, autonomous 
self.  This is the mistaken sense of self mentioned above.  Such individualism can be seen 
as a kind of dualism, of separating “self” and “other” which is a cause of suffering and 
which obscures our true nature.  This is the Buddhist analysis of self contained in the 
doctrine of no-self and emptiness. 
Feminists, such as Catherine Keller, as previously mentioned, find this 
independent, separative selfhood as problematic for women who see relationships and 
friendships as a key aspect in defining one’s self. They are looking to find a strong yet 
relational self. In these discussions, Klein seeks to contribute to two interrelated areas of 
debate.  The first issue as mentioned above is about finding a strong identity that is not 
oppositional in nature.  In other words, like other feminists, she is trying to find an 
alternative to masculine styles of selfhood that have led to the oppression of women.  She 
writes, “[t]o gain a sense of self that is genuinely one’s own, and not a projection or 
product of patriarchy, is an important focus of concern for many women today.”362  She 
echoes the concern of other feminists that were discussed in Chapter Two.  These 
feminists have identified how women and women’s experiences are different from men.  
They are now looking to articulate a sense of self that is more congruent with their 
experience as women.  First, there is a need to reject the images and roles of women that 
                                                
362 Anne Klein, “Finding a Self,” 191. 
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have been projected upon them due to patriarchy.  This has been very detrimental to 
women and has led to the loss of their voice in their own self-definition. Second, 
according to such feminists, male styles of selfhood focus on individualism and 
autonomy.  Such styles have led to the “othering” of women which has resulted in their 
secondary role or status leading to their suffering.   Furthermore, it is also not congruent 
with women’s experience who prize relationality in their sense of identity.  However 
addressing the issue of women and “loss of self” or lack of self-esteem particularly in 
relationships, Klein is also searching for a theory of the self that would enable the 
conceptualization of a strong, centralized self which does not conceive itself as separate 
from other.  Hence, for Klein, rejecting the “oppositionality that characterizes patriarchal 
styles of selfhood”363, women are seeking a “style of identity that is powerful, yet favors 
the relational over the individual.”364  Her project is about articulating “another way of 
thinking of a strong self whose power does not depend on its ability to oppose, project or 
conceive itself as radically separate.”365     
She also hopes to contribute to the divide between modern feminists and 
postmodern feminists and their descriptions of selfhood.366  Modern feminists argue for a 
particular way of being woman, an “essence” of being a woman that all women share, 
                                                
363 Klein, “Finding a Self,” 192. 
364 Ibid., 193. 
365 Ibid., 196.  Aside from this article, she also writes about issues of dualism and finding a strong yet 
powerful self in “Nondualism and the Great Bliss Queen: A Study in Tibetan Buddhist Ontology and 
Symbolism” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 1/1 (Spring 1985): 73-98. 
366 She discusses these two positions in her book Meeting the Great Bliss Queen and the article “Presence 
with a Difference: Buddhists and Feminists on Subjectivity” Hypatia 9/4 (Fall 1994): 112-130. As 
mentioned above, Daniel Arnold also tackles this specific debate among feminists and suggests Buddhism 
as the solution.  However, differentiating his work/approach from Klein’s, he writes, “Klein, then, is 
particularly concerned with the implications of the practice of Buddhism. Here [in his article], I have 
chosen to focus instead on the strictly philosophical and rhetorical contributions of Buddhism. I would like 
to think such an emphasis could complement Klein’s work.”  Arnold, 70. 
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while postmodern feminists argue that the meaning of “woman” is something that is 
constantly in the process, something that she is constantly becoming or creating. Klein 
wants to offer another alternative to these two debates, to describe a self that is neither 
overly essentialized nor contingently constructed.  In this way, she is hoping to forge a 
way between modern and postmodern feminists and the debates about the “essential” vs. 
the “contingently constructed” self.  She believes that “issues of personal power, 
connection, independence, and relationship lie at the heart of the feminist essentialist-
postmodern debate.”367   
As mentioned in the first quote, she believes that Buddhism has a lot to offer to 
such debates.  In particular, she sees the Buddhist analysis of self and the doctrines of no-
self and emptiness as the main teachings from Buddhist philosophy that are most helpful 
in the feminist search for a relational self.  She writes that “Buddhist analyses of self as 
active and empty offers one approach to the articulation of selfhood that addresses 
tension between social interrelatedness and psychological individuality.”368  Furthermore, 
she argues that Buddhist meditation practice is the main way to experience and realize 
this relational self.  It is through mindfulness practice, and the practices that cultivate 
both wisdom and compassion that one may experience this strong self who is properly 
related to others and does not lose herself in these relationships.  She speaks of how 
mindfulness meditation can give a sense of groundedness and centering while seeing the 
constructedness and flux of self and identity.  Furthermore, “mindfulness and 
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concentration are not merely sources of new ideas about the self, but comprise a new 
sensibility and subjectivity.”369   
The Doctrine of Emptiness and the search for a relational self  
 
Before applying Buddhist analysis and philosophy to the issue of strong yet 
relational self, Klein makes it clear that such analyses have never taken gender into 
account.370 In fact, she writes of how Tibetan Buddhist women’s notion of “self” is very 
different from Western notions of self.371  For example, she notes how the Western 
understanding of “self” has focused on the individual and finding what is unique about 
oneself so that one can differentiate oneself from others. Furthermore, the predominant 
image of such a self is the Enlightenment “man of reason.”  The focus on individuation, 
autonomy and reason has been problematic for Western women who are seen as the 
opposite of this “man of reason” and therefore are delegated to secondary status.  For 
example then, “[t]o the extent that Western culture suspiciously regards relationality as a 
threat to ‘genuine’ autonomy, birth, mothering, and nurturing are likely to be 
denigrated.”372  On the other hand, the Tibetan sense of self and identity has a strong 
emphasis on the community and social connectedness.  “No matter how isolated, even 
high in a solitary cave, one remains part of a community of values, and of people and 
spirits also.”373  For Tibetan women and men, social cohesion was a given.  The choice 
for Tibetan women was between marriage and entering the religious life.  “There was no 
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‘public sphere’ to speak of that might tempt her away from home….”374 All these serve 
as a caution before proceeding into how Buddhist analyses of self and the doctrine of no-
self and emptiness can still be applied to and are relevant to the Western feminist search 
for a relational self.  As Klein cautions, “‘[f]inding oneself’ in the contemporary Western 
sense means identifying one’s unique talents, limitations, and place in the world so as to 
make choices consistent with this identity. Buddhist practices, by contrast, are celebrated 
for their ability to access universal faculties such as clarity, focus, or an experience of the 
unconditioned.”375 
 First, she distinguishes between the doctrine of no-self (or selflessness) and 
emptiness in Buddhism versus issues of “selflessness” in Western feminist discussions.376  
As previously mentioned, some feminists like Neumaier-Dargyay conflate the doctrine of 
“no-self” with issues of selflessness or loss of self or self-sacrifice that have been 
problematic for women.     However, Klein clarifies that the doctrine of no-self is not to 
be equated with Western notions of “ego”, particularly the weak ego that is usually 
associated with women.  Rather, the doctrine of “no-self” is not about loss of self or self-
sacrifice, but rather is about an understanding of the existential status of persons, the 
illusion of permanency and solidity that obscures the clarity about our true nature. 
                                                
374 Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, 56. 
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376 Anne Klein equates “selflessness” and “emptiness” in her discussions.  For example, she writes that 
“[e]mptiness is synonymous here with selflessness” at least in terms of understanding that the notion of 
permanent, unchanging, self-sufficient self is an illusion. See “Nondualism and the Great Bliss Queen,” 83.  
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See “Presence with a Difference,” 122. 
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Selflessness in Buddhism is insight into the lack of an inherently existing, autonomous 
self.  As Klein writes,  
The self observed by ordinary awareness and then denied in theories of selflessness is not 
a psychological self characterized by certain personality traits, dominant emotions and so 
forth. It refers rather to a style of selfhood, to the ontological or existential status of such 
a self.  Specifically, it refers to the assumption of a greatly exaggerated existential status.  
In the language of Buddhist philosophy, this reified sense of self is known as true or 
inherent existence….[t]his concept of ‘true existence’ easily becomes the basis for an 
overbearing sense of hierarchy and thus provides fuel for oppression.377  
 
 From this definition, it is clear that the doctrine of “no-self” cannot simply be 
equated with Western discussions about ego or persons.  Furthermore, Klein says, “[i]t is 
very important not to confuse this meaning of “self” with the integrated sense of self-
worth that neither modern psychoanalysis nor Buddhist traditions would urge one to 
discard.”378  The kind of “selflessness” that Neumaier-Dargyay and other feminists worry 
about would actually be considered another form of clinging, another kind of the “greatly 
exaggerated existential status” or a “reified sense of self” that leads to suffering.  As 
Klein argues, “[i]n the Buddhist view, it is not only the powerful, confident person who 
has an ontologically overwrought sense of self. A person with a fragile, psychological 
self or low self-esteem is just as likely to have this, although the ontology of that self may 
be less accessible to awareness.”379 This is so because in both cases, a person is clinging 
onto a particular identity, an identity that they experience as solid, permanent, 
unchanging – regardless of whether it is a “strong” or “weak” identity.  Such clinging and 
such illusion about the self leads to suffering.  Hence, a “powerful ego” as well as a 
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dependent personality or “weak ego” are considered illusions of self that lead to 
suffering.   
 Applying such analysis of self, women can begin to ask themselves about their 
“reified sense of self”?  What have been their definitions and experiences of selfhood?  
To what degree have these been reified, or greatly exaggerated? Here, women can begin 
to question how the projection of others, social constructions, roles they have been given 
are just another form of such ‘reified forms of self” projected onto them.   How has such 
a reified and exaggerated sense of self led to their suffering or led to the suffering of 
others? This reminder of a “reified and exaggerated sense of self” as “no-self” – can lead 
to introspection, to a closer investigation into the true nature of self.  And if both a 
“powerful” and “weak” sense of self or ego are not the true self, then what is the true self 
that Buddhist philosophy speaks of?   
 According to Klein,  
The conclusion that the self does not exist at all is not drawn but rather that the self is 
utterly unreifiable, non-inherently existent. Understanding this emphasizes the 
contingent, dependent, interconnected, and non-autonomous nature of the self’s 
existence. An active, effective self exists but not in any sense independently….the self 
affirmed in Buddhism is dependently constituted.   It is created through association, 
rather than separation, and in relation, rather than from nothing.380  
 
 In this quote, notions of selfhood that are tied to independence and permanence 
are rejected.  This is the view of self that is an illusion and leads to suffering.  Instead, as 
Klein says, the “true self” is an “active, effective self” but it is one that does not exist 
independently of others.  It is in this Buddhist analysis of self as contingent and non-
autonomous and the implications of emptiness and dependent arising, that one can see 
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why Klein finds such Buddhist doctrines helpful for feminists.  In this analysis, we are 
given a new description of selfhood that focuses on relationship without undermining a 
“sense of self.”  It is a description that precisely challenges the patriarchal descriptions of 
selfhood that focus on independence and autonomy.  In this Buddhist description, 
independence and autonomy are illusions that lead to suffering. Instead, the “true self” is 
“contingent, dependent, interconnected, and non-autonomous.” It comes into being 
“through relationships” and not through separation.”  Yet, this self is “active and 
effective” and not merely passive.  Hence, one cannot be anything but a self-in-relation 
though one can never lose either side of this tension.  Proper relationality can only be 
realized through a vigorous introspection, an analysis of self that leads to the proper 
understanding of self and other.  This happens in meditation, and will be discussed in the 
next section.  
 Understanding the empty nature of reality, the lack of inherent existence 
(emptiness) and one’s dependent and contingent existence (dependent arising) 
emphasizes how the very nature of persons is interdependence.  Since all is empty, 
everything depends on everything else for its existence.  The true self is an 
interdependent and relational self.  If this is so, then fundamentally everything is 
interconnected and one realizes that there is no duality between self and other.  Rather, 
there is recognition of the other as oneself, as sharing this fundamental “empty nature”.  
Furthermore, there is also the recognition of the other as constitutive of oneself since 
everyone is mutually interdependent.  One of the expressions of this, as previously 
mentioned, is the vision of  Indra’s net and how each jewel reflected all the other jewels 
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that make up the net. Each jewel is then constituted by all the other jewels – an image of 
emptiness (lack of inherent existence) and dependent origination.  This is one vision that 
expresses the understanding of emptiness as dependent origination.  Emptiness is not 
nothingness but the dependent arising of all things, each constituted by the other.  
Emptiness then is what helps one realize that others are just like one’s own self and that 
everyone is dependent and related to others, without losing one’s “self”. In understanding 
selflessness and emptiness, one’s eyes are opened to the interconnection and 
interdependence of all things.    
It is from the realization of emptiness that compassion for others develops.  As 
Klein argues, “[t] experience of emptiness … is associated with the development of a 
compassionate sense of relatedness in which self and other are seen not as oppositional 
but as relative designations, like the far and near banks of a river.  The identity of each is 
utterly contingent on the other….Emptiness theory therefore is crucial to the full 
development of relational understanding and compassionate involvement”381  
Furthermore, it “undermine[s] psychological or ontological self-sufficiency and 
confirm[s] the existence of a self that is ontologically relational and whose primary 
emotional characteristic is compassion for others.”382 
 Furthermore, wisdom and compassion, expressed metaphorically as two wings of 
a bird, are the path of the bodhisattva, as discussed in Chapter 2.  In the cultivation of 
wisdom, one encounters a self that is “dependent, contingent” and yet the discovery and 
cultivation of such also leads to an experience of a self that is strong, powerful and 
                                                
381 Klein, “Finding a Self,” 205. 
382 Ibid., 209. 
  162 
grounded.  Fully realizing the implications of the wisdom of emptiness, one sees others as 
just as “empty”, “dependent and contingent” like oneself.  Compassion arises as one 
recognizes the other as oneself. It is in such a realization of wisdom and compassion, a 
vision of the “empty yet dependent” nature of all reality that women can glimpse a view 
of relationality that balances self and other.  In realizing emptiness and compassion, one 
sees the other as oneself, but one only discovers the other by discovering oneself first.  In 
the end, Klein writes, “[e]mptiness is an awareness one continually cultivates so as to 
integrate it into more and more aspects of one’s life, including one’s relationship to 
others.”383  
The Doctrine of Emptiness and meditation practice  
 
 According to Anne Klein, meditative rituals particularly Tibetan ones, often 
“explore the way things are…and the way they ought to be understood….They are best 
understood emically as practices that transform subjectivity and understandings of self in 
a palpable way that can be maintained outside the ritual circle.”384  In Buddhist 
philosophy, the description of the way things are and the way they ought to be understood 
is explained through the key doctrines that have been discussed, the doctrine of “no-self” 
(the way the self is usually experienced) and the doctrine of emptiness/dependent co-
arising (the way it ought to be understood).  It is precisely through meditation practices 
that one is led to the realization of emptiness that leads to a new understanding and 
experience of self, to the strong, powerful yet relational self that women seek.  In the end, 
the realization of emptiness does not revolve around thinking or talking about what it is.  
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Instead, “[d]eveloping an experience does not involve further knowledge ‘about’ it but 
rather increased concentration and focus on it.”385 
To understand emptiness, one must begin with an observation of the ordinary 
experience of self.386 In the development of a steady observation of self, one can begin to 
develop the qualities necessary for a “strong self,” qualities such as focused attention, 
stability, and calm. At the same time, it equips the practitioner with the skills needed to 
analyze and question wrong notions of self, particularly the independent autonomous self.  
This opens one to the possibility of seeing the self as dependent and relational.  This 
practice begins with cultivating the skills of mindfulness and concentration, necessary for 
a steady observation of the self, and for experiencing emptiness. As Klein writes, 
“…certain ontological truths are available only to particular subjective states. For 
example, direct insight of what Buddhism calls the empty nature of the self – a special 
quality of oneself – is only experienced by a mind conjoined with specifically defined 
styles of stability, clarity, intensity, and ultimately insight.”387 
   In her book, The Great Bliss Queen, Klein describes the practice of mindfulness 
as a way to “develop new subjective states and discover unnoticed aspects of oneself.”388  
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Furthermore, she writes that “the most salient characteristic of such mindfulness is its 
capacity to maintain clear and stable observation of a chosen object, whether a visualized 
image or some aspect of one’s body or mind.” 389  This kind of clear and stable 
observation is important in women’s search for a strong self.  Such observation entails a 
kind of “nonjudgmental awareness”, focusing on the present, focusing on her thoughts 
without any judgment, just being fully present in the moment.  As she says, “[m]erely a 
gentle observer, mindfulness is a way of being there. It does so by fostering a capacity to 
relate to oneself without trying to oppose, judge, or change what is observed.”390 Hence, 
this kind of “nonjudgmental awareness” of being a “gentle observer” allows her to begin 
to accept herself just as she is, to create a safe space for her to face herself and to accept 
all of herself, without judgment and condemnation.  This, according to Klein, is 
important especially in a “culture where self-hatred is an issue.”391 
 Furthermore, mindfulness also allows her to begin to discover herself in ways that 
are not defined by others.  She is able to discern her true self from an externally imposed 
patriarchal self that is based on internalized gendered roles and expectations. This is so, 
because the same “nonjudgmental awareness” that allows her to accept herself as she is, 
also does not impose any kind of ideal on her.  Klein says, “It permits self-knowledge 
without the crippling weight of an ideal against which she inevitably falls short.”392  
Hence, mindfulness practice can teach her a way of seeing herself in a healing way, 
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accepting who she already is while also giving her the clarity to begin to define who she 
wants to be, for herself. As Klein says, “a person who is mindful is present, accepting, 
focused and clear. This is a state in which all the self’s various voices can be heard.”393  
As she learns to be present to herself, without judgment, without the oppressive presence 
of ideals, she can begin to hear her own voices, and begin to find her own self.  This can 
be the beginning of constructive personal power. 
Mindfulness practice also brings about the experience of being “stable yet 
changing” while at the same time, getting a glimpse of how things really are and 
developing a way of questioning the constructedness of reality, including gender 
roles/identities.  Klein writes,  
…mindfulness is physically centering, it provides a visceral sense of personal continuity 
in the midst of clearly observed flux….The experience of mind and body as only a 
seething flow of sensations is a dismembering of the self. But there is also a 
remembering, a bringing together, in a sense that mind and self are reconstituted for one’s 
experience. Re-membering steadies and integrates. Paradoxically, the more one’s mindful 
concentration develops, and the more grounded one is in present experience and in the 
steadfast flow of consciousness itself, the clearer one is about the fragile and constructed 
nature of mind and body.394 
 
This experience of being “stable yet changing” of being “dismembered and 
remembered” are important processes in women’s search for a relational self. It is also 
crucial in the modern-postmodern debates.  First, this experience of seeing herself as 
constantly changing, of being in flux, of being dismembered is important because it 
allows her to see the possibility of change, of not being stuck in a certain identity or in 
certain roles that may have been imposed on her by herself or others.  It helps her to 
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question the usually unquestioned categories about herself and her identity, and helps 
reveal the constructedness of gender and identity.  
At the same time, she is also centered, able to re-member and reintegrate herself, 
define who she is for herself, in a way that is neither oppositional nor based on societal 
impositions.  Having such centeredness and stability are important because as Valerie 
Saiving once argued, “distractibility and diffuseness, the lack of an organizing center or 
focus, are among the chief female ‘sins’”.395  Hence, with mindfulness practice, women 
are able to find a steady ground, to have a stronger sense of “self” that sees “the fragile 
and constructed nature of mind and body.”   Even as she is able to center herself, she is 
also able to “de-center” and de-stabilize all constructs of self and other – seeing how 
everything is in flux and how reified perceptions of “self” and “other” are.  Hence, 
mindfulness meditation reduces dependence on others’ attention as she learns to pay 
attention to herself. 396  It also “demonstrates the self’s constructedness and identity”397 – 
which can help to break reified notions of self and other that she holds or that others 
impose on her. 
Furthermore, this experience in meditation of being centered, of having stability 
and observing flux, is the kind of experience that can bridge the essentialist and 
postmodern discussions regarding the self.  This experience is an articulation that holds 
both a sense of “essentialism” in the experience of being grounded, of having a sense of 
personal continuity and a reintegration of mind and body.  It is not “essentialist” in the 
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sense of having definite, immutable definitions of being “female” or “male” but it does 
hold to some kind of core and continuity in the person while at the same time observing 
and realizing the possibility of change, of “dismemberment” which is closer to 
postmodern sensibilities.  It is then in the practice of meditation, that this sense of a 
dismembered yet remembered self, of an experience of personal continuity in the midst of 
observed flux, that a new experience, a new articulation of self and subjectivity is made 
possible that brings both essentialist and postmodern experience of self into a kind of 
coherent experience.     
One dimension of mindfulness that Klein points to is silence.  This may be 
controversial for some feminists as Sarah Coakley has pointed out in the previous 
chapter.  However, Klein argues that mindfulness practice and nonjudgmental 
observation are only possible within silence, for “mindfulness is a silent observer of 
voices, saying nothing, but potent and effective in other ways….The silence of 
mindfulness comes from a capacity of mind, not a failure of speech.  This capacity, 
moreover, can be intentionally, deliberately, cultivated. The point is not that the mindful 
subject is silent – incapable of expressing herself – but that she deliberately has silence as 
a possibility.”398  Through this description, Klein tries to clarify the kind of powerful 
silence that women can deliberately choose to cultivate against the silencing of the voices 
of women or the kind of Orientalist view of the hushed voices of Asian women.  This 
silence, the “observer of voices”, is precisely what is necessary in order to begin to hear 
and honor one’s own voices as well as that of others.  In other words, it is what allows for 
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“deep listening” which is necessary if one is to truly be able to know oneself and others 
and respond accordingly. Silence offers that space where one can hold those voices, 
without judgment or condemnation, “an observer of voices”.  Only from such a space can 
effective knowledge and response be given, free of the usual attachments and emotions 
that such voices are associated with.  This is why Klein says that such silence is the 
“background of all speech” which offers a “space for the subject apart from its 
dominating knowledge….”399  Furthermore, she writes “[f]or Buddhists, silence and the 
categories of mind most closely associated with it – mindfulness, calm, and concentration 
– allow the subject a sense of proceeding beyond the play of voices (without necessarily 
hushing them) into a different dimension of subjectivity.”400  
In the end, silence and mindfulness meditation are the foundation for the 
development of the wisdom of emptiness that cuts through delusion about one’s self and 
other, cutting through dualistic tendencies that are the basis of patriarchy and the 
suffering of women.  First, as one maintains a continued observation, one begins to 
realize one’s “selflessness.”  As she says, “[m]indful observation … reveals that we 
usually assume the existence of an “I” that is either wholly independent of its parts or 
inalienably fused with them. Either of those positions is a misconception of the actual 
status of the self.  It is a misconception that makes the self seem more reified and less 
open to new possibilities than it actually is.”401  This as discussed is what is meant by the 
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doctrine of “no-self”, seeing the lack of an inherent, independent, unchanging self, 
experiencing the sensations and thoughts changing from moment and moment.  However, 
selflessness does not mean a negation of self, as if the self did not exist at all.  Rather, it 
is a negation of the way one previously thought or assumed that self to be, that the self 
does not exist in the way it is ordinarily experienced.  As Klein says, “the absence of the 
self one has been trying to find, and not absence in general, is called emptiness or 
selflessness.”402 In terms of women’s search for a powerful/strong self, this experience of 
a mistaken sense of self can teach women to question identities that they have constructed 
or that society has imposed on them.  It shows her the limitations of such a reified sense 
of self and the possibilities beyond such a self, also giving her the tools to explore these 
possibilities. In particular, Klein gives the example of feelings and how mindfulness 
practice can help one to acknowledge one’s feelings without identifying with them and 
clinging to them as one’s identity.  Through mindfulness practice, one gets to experience 
and explore one’s mind better, recognizing one aspect of its “emptiness” as its 
spaciousness; that is much more open and infinite than one previously thought.  Given 
this then, “no single quality or emotion, nor any combination of these, can completely fill 
or occupy it. None can own or define it completely. Thus, intense feeling can be present 
without consuming one’s identity.”403  To discover a dimension of oneself that can never 
be filled and therefore can never be limited or identified with just that one thought or 
emotion may be important to women who have suffered abuse or a lot of pain in life that 
                                                                                                                                            
and body are revealed as nothing but a great disappearing act. The more one’s mindful concentration 
develops, the clearer one is about one’s fragile and constructed nature.” Klein, “Presence with a  
Difference,” 117. 
402 Klein, Meeting the Great Bliss Queen, 127. 
403 Ibid., 200. 
  170 
it is now consuming them; this has become their identity.  Klein gives her own example 
of feeling grief and how chanting “ah” together with others allowed her relationship with 
grief to be transformed.  She was able to find a way to “hold the grief as well as a 
connection with a part of my self not colored by it.”404  Through this example, she shows 
how mindfulness, together with silence, calm and concentration, allows us to experience 
emptiness as a kind of spaciousness so that we can honor our thoughts or feelings without 
locking us into those thoughts or feelings, hardening one’s identity based on them.  
Rather, realizing emptiness, and the various illusory selves one has held on to that have 
limited her, such practices teach her to discover a new sense of self and learn to love and 
accept herself for who she is. As Klein says, “For me, and I think for many women, one 
of the important aspects of mindfulness is self-acceptance. This means that you are 
willing to see yourself and be with yourself as you are. Settling the mind is physically 
grounding as well as mentally stabilizing. It can be a real source of strength and personal 
ease.”405  Practices of mindfulness lead to self-acceptance and strength that in turn 
become the foundation for the acceptance of others, and compassionate action on their 
behalf.  
Having realized that the ordinary experience of self as permanent, autonomous, 
reified or solid are mistaken assumptions about the self, the self that is discovered 
through such mindful observation is the dependently arisen self, one constituted by other 
causes and conditions.  This discovery about the nature of one’s self leads to the 
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realization that everyone else shares in this same “empty”, dependently arising nature.  
This insight leads to the development of compassion.  She discovers that this self is not 
an isolated self.  Rather the sense of separation is seen as the key delusion that has led to 
her suffering.  The true self is an interconnected and interdependent self.  As Alice Keefe 
explains “nothing at all, most of all that which we call the self exists independently, in 
and of itself. Rather, everything arises in dependence upon everything else.”406  It is such 
a realization, the development of wisdom that sees the interdependent self, which leads to 
the development of compassion, the wish to free all beings from suffering.  Klein says, 
“…the mind which understands or experiences emptiness …is inclined to be ethical, 
active, and compassionate.”407   
 First, one who is mindful is less “prone to harming” others.  “To control one’s 
mind is much emphasized …not only for the benefits it brings to oneself, but also for the 
way it protects others from being harmed by one’s own carelessness or worse.”408  
Furthermore, one who has cultivated mindfulness is able to be more respectful of others, 
to listen and hear others in the same way that she has learned to listen and hear her own 
self, and “when all the voices of self are fully owned, they are less likely to be projected 
onto others. In this way self-acceptance translates into acceptance of the other.”409  Just as 
through mindfulness practice a woman can to break free from the “idolatry of ideals”, she 
can then also learn not to subject others to such kind of idolatry, to be mindful of the 
labels and identity that she imposes upon others just as she has become mindful of how 
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these were imposed upon her.  This allows her to break many of the oppositional 
tendencies she may have that are harmful to her and the other, to label self and other as 
“abuser” vs. “abused”, for example, labels that lead to separation and in Buddhism, lack 
of compassion and equanimity that can cloud the development of wisdom. 
 Apart from mindfulness practice, there are other practices that can lead to a 
greater sense of connection to others and practices that cultivate compassion and holding 
self-other in equal concern.  For example, there are many meditation practices that begin 
with a visualization that focus on bringing to mind various connections to people, past 
and present, imagining oneself surrounded by family, loved ones, teachers, or spiritual 
friends (kalyanamitra).  So from the beginning, “one practices as a self embodied and 
assisted by others.  Buddhist traditions thus generally see no dichotomy between a sense 
of relatedness on the one hand and a sense of personal effectiveness on the other.”410  
These visualizations foster a great sense of connection to others while focusing on 
oneself at the same time.  Combined with other practices, it becomes one of the methods 
that help develop wisdom and compassion.    
 In a meditation example that Klein gives in Chapter 4 of Meeting the Great Bliss 
Queen, the development of equanimity is the preparation/foundation for developing 
compassion.  Equanimity, Tsong-kha pa says, is the “separation from desire and hatred 
and an equal-mindedness toward living beings.”411 In these meditations, she realizes how 
similar she is to others – both in their suffering and their wish to be free of suffering. 
Hence, as she learns to develop love and compassion for herself, she begins to develop a 
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love and compassion for the other, who is now seen as herself.  As Lati Rinboche says, 
“We are dear to ourselves because we want happiness and don’t want suffering, and this 
is the same for others.”412 This becomes the foundation for universal compassion.  Hence, 
the importance of developing equanimity, of seeing “self” and “other” as not different, 
seeing “friends”, “strangers” and “enemies” as all deserving of love and compassion.   
 Notice how the cultivation of equanimity contributes to the realization of wisdom 
and compassion.  By meditating upon “friends”, “strangers” and “enemies”, we begin to 
break the boundaries of our usual perception of others, to separate such perception from 
“desire and hatred” as Tsong Kha pa said.  The disappearance of such division 
contributes to realizing the empty nature of all persons, that the identity of “friend”, 
“stranger” and “enemy” are all labels that have been placed on them in order to protect 
our own mistaken sense of self.  To destroy the barrier of self and other, of labels, is the 
beginning of the development of wisdom.  It is such wisdom that leads to universal 
compassion.  Only by recognizing one’s empty nature, and thereby realizing the empty 
nature of all others, and seeing their interdependence upon each other can one see how 
self and other are equally deserving of compassion, and how one’s own happiness is 
interconnected with the happiness of everyone else.  Once she truly and powerfully 
realizes the wisdom of our interconnection, then compassion can flow through.  It is also 
from such wisdom of emptiness, seeing everyone as sharing in the same “empty” nature, 
that one ensures that compassion is universal, everyone deserving of that.  As Klein 
writes, “acknowledging our own wish for happiness means naming a quality found in all 
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other persons as well. This recognition, a discovery embedded within a developmental 
process of reflection, requires a sympathetic understanding of her own situation, as well 
as recognition that it is inappropriate to seek for herself alone the happiness that everyone 
wants.”413   
 Some techniques that cultivate equanimity would be to think of all beings as 
having been in every possible relationship to oneself due to innumerable rebirths.  Hence, 
if everyone has been “friend”, “stranger” or “enemy”, there is no reason to treat them 
differently since they have been or will be all these things.  One can also look at the 
connections in this life which have made one’s life possible.  For example, “one can 
consider the great numbers of persons, known and unknown, on whose efforts life 
depends each time one travels in a plane, or the benefits received from medicines 
discovered long ago.”414  Such practices of equanimity and visualization techniques on 
one’s spiritual friends, break the boundaries of self and other, helping to realize the 
wisdom of emptiness and compassion which can lead to a strong experience of one’s 
interconnection.  At the same time, it can also lead to an experience of a strong self, in 
terms of having independence of mind.  For in these meditations where one’s action or 
reaction toward others is no longer predicated upon their labels or their feelings of desire 
or hatred, one can develop a mind that is not swayed by perception or social convention.  
“Because equanimity frees the mind from being merely reactive, it protects one from 
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being emotionally overpowered by any given situation. In these ways, the cultivation of 
equanimity, like mindfulness, encourages a certain independence of mind.”415  
 An important feminist concern that can serve to further make these practices 
fruitful for women is the emphasis that such meditations on emptiness and compassion 
should include oneself among those who deserve compassion.  If discovering the empty 
nature of self and other leads to a universal compassion for everyone whose nature is 
similar to oneself, then one should also be deserving of the same compassion as others.  
However, as Klein notes, the practice of compassion in Tibet was usually entered into by 
those who already had powerful positions in the world.  They did not consider whether 
such practices would increase self-esteem or heal childhood trauma.416  Hence, in actual 
practice today, care of self should be emphasized in ways that it may not have 
traditionally been. It must highlight how compassion for others needs to start with 
compassion for oneself, fully analyzing oneself, seeing the mistaken sense of self before 
one realizes the true nature of self and other.  This starts with practices such as 
mindfulness, visualization, etc. that leads to a discovery and love of self that develops 
into universal compassion for everyone else. This is an important point for women who 
lose themselves in their care for others, thinking that others deserve more compassion.  
As Klein states, “including oneself in the circle of care, an idea that has received much 
attention from feminist psychologists and ethicists in the past decade or so, is an 
important step in creating a compassion that is self-empowering.”417    
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 In these meditation practices, one is able to hold the middle way between self-care 
and compassion for others.  In these practices, the nonduality of the self and other 
(emptiness) is realized precisely by paying attention to oneself.  Only when one truly and 
powerfully recognizes emptiness can great compassion (mahākarunā) flow through in an 
endless fount, since this love does not come from one person but is precisely the love that 
is realized in one’s interdependence with others.  It is for this reason that bodhisattvas can 
be reborn again and again and never be exhausted in the work of liberating all beings 
from suffering (bodhisattva vow).  It is from this understanding that many engaged 
Buddhists have worked toward justice in the world.  As Alice Keefe says, understanding 
the web of mutuality means that “personal transformation is always interdependent with 
social transformation, inner peace with world peace.”418     
Conclusion 
Paula Cooey describes Anne Klein’s project best when she says that “Anne takes 
on the difficult project of trying to understand how identity emerges out of 
interrelatedness and individuality out of community in the context of experience….What 
I found most fascinating about an ontology of self that combines psychology with 
epistemology was the whole notion that the realization of emptiness or cultivating 
awareness undercuts reification – our way of looking at selves and others as substances in 
opposition to one another.”419  This is exactly what we have described in this section.  
Anne Klein uses the Buddhist analysis of self – using the doctrines of no-self and 
emptiness - in order to find a self that does not form its identity through separation or 
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autonomy, the kind of self that has led to patriarchy and the abuse of women.  In 
particular, by looking at specific meditation practices, she is able to articulate how such 
an identity that is both individual yet interrelated comes about as one realizes 
selflessness/emptiness through meditation. Such practices and experiences that begin to 
mold one’s personal power become the foundation for developing compassion for others, 
seeing how we all share the same nature.  Through her exposition, she has provided a 
way of experiencing such a strong yet relational self, and an alternative to the essentialist-
postmodern debates on self. She showed the deep connection between doctrine, ritual 
practice and ethical practice.  It is through ritual practice that the doctrines are realized 
while understanding that such doctrines empower ritual practice.  Furthermore, such 
practices, in transforming the practitioner, ultimately affect the way that person is in the 
world.  Hence, ritual practices have an effect on one’s ethical practice.  She writes that 
“[t]o take these categories of subjectivity seriously is to shift the terrain of contemporary 
Western ways of understanding religion, which might bring the unlanguaged subject out 
of the dim and shrouded realm of the mystical (a realm all the more mysterious because it 
is absent in predominant cultural understandings of “ordinary life”) and into daily life 
where it more properly belongs.”420  As a very particular example, she writes of the 
importance of realizing the sameness of all people in order to combat violence in the 
world today.  She writes “…people must unite against injustice across lines of nation, 
race, and culture. I believe it is important to spread the understanding – in whatever 
cultural, religious or philosophical terms are most effective – that there is a dimension 
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through which persons can connect precisely because this dimension is free from the 
particularities that otherwise define us.”421  In this case of Buddhism, it offers the 
doctrine of no-self and emptiness and its accompanying practices to realize one’s Buddha 
nature as the same nature as others, seeing the world as one’s own body and hence acting 
accordingly, caring for oneself and for others and the world as oneself.  
Though she does not spend as much time writing of what feminism can contribute 
to Buddhism, she does make a few points about how Buddhist practices can be critiqued 
and enhanced by a feminist lens.  This answers some of the concerns of feminists 
(Buddhist and non Buddhist) who contend that, though Buddhist practices may offer 
many possibilities for women, the reality of the traditional male-centered institutions and 
the power differentials expressed in the practices may still leave women in subject 
positions.422  First, she writes that “[b]uddhist texts often refer to the ‘skillful 
means’(upāya) by which compassion is manifested according to the needs of a specific 
situation, but these texts do not encourage or demonstrate a nuanced curiosity about the 
intimate details of a person’s life…. The sense of the ‘personal’ is, from a Western 
perspective, missing in Indian and Tibetan discussions of compassion. This is where 
feminism, as well as psychology more generally, makes an important contribution to 
Buddhist practice in the West.”423  In some ways, her work that highlights the specific 
experience and problem of women and selfhood is already an example of a way that 
feminism contributes to Buddhist practice by bringing in the “personal” experience of 
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women.  In discussions of compassion, aware of the specific concern about women’s 
notions of “self-sacrifice” or losing themselves in relationships, Buddhist teachers can 
become more critical of the ways of teaching or handing down practices on compassion 
that may continue this particular suffering for women.  They can skillfully adapt 
teachings and practices to focus on cultivating self-love and concern within the circle of 
compassion in ways that they may not have traditionally done, but may be more fruitful 
for women.   At the same time, teachers can find ways to honor and encourage people’s 
individuality and personal stories, as part of who they are without clinging to them, 
constitutive of any transformation of self that may occur. 
Second, the role of interpersonal relationships in cultivating compassion in 
Buddhism is found to be more theoretical or philosophical.  Compassion is often framed 
as the result of a solitary contemplative practice, and not from actual interpersonal 
interaction with others.  This lack of the development of compassion through mutual 
interpersonal exchanges is seen as a significant lacuna from a Western feminist 
perspective for “personal interaction ‘implies the possibility of learning from others in 
ways that transform the self.’ That is, the self is no longer an integer, but a dynamic 
engager of others, ‘defined not by reflection but by interaction, the responsiveness of 
human engagement.’”424   Though the vision of an interconnected self can be experienced 
through Buddhist meditation practice, the practice itself can still be seen as a solitary one, 
and not one that necessarily engages other people, nor the world.  Hence, there is a need 
to emphasize the necessity of interpersonal engagement within ritual practice to truly 
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realize one’s interdependence with others.  One suggestion from Klein is that it may be 
“helpful to initiate workshops or retreats where traditional practice is combined with 
interpersonal practice, for example, in developing the ability to speak without entirely 
obscuring or forgetting the unlanguaged dimension of oneself and others, in being 
sensitive to other persons within this experience, and in allowing other persons to see one 
struggle toward these goals.”425  
 In the end, the focus on Anne Klein’s work has been to offer a new way of 
thinking about self and subjectivity from a Buddhist perspective that can contribute to the 
feminist search for a strong yet relational self.  To a certain degree, she does offer a 
feminist critique of Buddhist practices, and how such practices can be changed or adapted 
to be more aware of women’s issues.  However, this is not her main goal. Neither is she 
as interested in looking at how a feminist lens can be used to reinterpret or critique 
Buddhist doctrines or the Buddhist institution for that matter.  This falls more within the 
domain of our next author, Rita Gross, who looks not only to Buddhism to see how it is 
helpful to feminism but also undertakes what she calls the “revalorization of Buddhism”, 
looking at how feminism challenges or urges changes not only in the understanding of 
Buddhist doctrines, but changes in the practices and in the institution itself. In so doing, 
she believes in the mutual transformation that can occur when Buddhism and feminism 
come into dialogue with each other. 
III.  Rita Gross 
Introduction  
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Rita Gross calls herself a “Buddhist feminist theologian”, an identification that 
illustrates the intersection of Buddhism and feminism in her life.  On the one hand, it 
shows the influence of Christian theologians such as John Cobb, who spoke of the mutual 
transformation that can take place in Buddhist-Christian dialogue, and many other 
Christian, primarily feminist theologians, such as Rosemary Radford Ruether, with whom 
she has been in conversation and helped shaped the feminist lens with which she analyzes 
Buddhism.  At the same time, it also indicates her “conversion” to Buddhism and how 
she sees Buddhism as a dialogue partner with feminism. Based on her personal 
experience, she writes,  
 For many years now, I have been seriously practicing both Buddhism and feminism. Like 
other Western Buddhist Women, I find each of these practices vital; I also find that each 
practice enhances and complements the other. In a deep way Buddhism and feminism share 
many essential insights. Each one also contributes important insights and practices that the 
other very much needs to discover and utilize.426 
 
Furthermore, identifying herself as a “theologian”, she differentiates herself from 
other scholars of religion, writing that “I do not confine my discussions of Buddhism to 
reports about Buddhist history and doctrine, but insist on doing reflective world 
construction, mainly in a feminist vein, with the explicit aim of contributing to the 
development of Buddhism.”427  Here, we see how her project is similar to the project of 
many Christian feminist theologians; a reconstruction or retrieval of one’s religious 
tradition in light of the experience of women.  As Kay Koppedrayer describes it, Gross’s 
career is one that combines “scholarship, critical engagement, advocacy and feminist 
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concerns. Gross’ project is a ‘feminist revalorization of Buddhism,’ using feminist values 
to probe Buddhist thought and practice from within."428  This is the main task in her 
book, Buddhism After Patriarchy.  There, she argues that to revalorize Buddhism 
particularly in light of the feminist critique means to “repair the tradition, often bringing 
it much more into line with its own fundamental values and vision than was its 
patriarchal form.”429 
Furthermore, she also takes up the important feminist task of searching for a 
strong identity that does not rely on individualism or independence.  Similar to Anne 
Klein and others, she discusses the problems with current patriarchal styles of selfhood, 
and finds Buddhist doctrines and meditation practices helpful in articulating and 
experiencing such a powerful interdependent self.  For example, in her article “Some 
Reflections About Community and Survival,” Gross takes up the problem with the 
prevalent North American culture of individualism.  As she observes, “[i]t has become 
more common for North American social commentators to suggest that we have gone too 
far with individualism as a way of life.”430  She observes how American culture has 
focused so much on work and the nuclear family trying to do everything without the help 
of the community.  She wonders  
 [w]ould not these parents and children be more relaxed, happier, and better off in a 
different kind of ‘family,’ one more embedded in community and friendships? And 
wouldn’t marriages be more likely to endure in such less stress-filled conditions? 
Priorities need to be switched. If we had functioning, village like communities, family 
life would be less stressful and less time-consuming.431 
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Furthermore, she argues that such a way of life, such “[i]ssues of work, family 
and community will not be resolved without attention to gender and the gender norms 
that became dominant in the 19th century….”432  In particular, she points to how women 
and women’s roles were limited to the house and to emotionally supporting their 
husbands. Men were expected to work, and women were expected to stay at home and 
provide the loving atmosphere for their families. With the feminist movement, the 
mistake was in aiming for the same roles as men so that now “no one had the time for the 
essential tasks of nurturing and taking care of relationships and friendships, as everyone, 
women and men alike pursue traditionally male goals.”433  In the end, such “exaggerated 
gender complementarity fostered to facilitate the separation of domestic and work lives 
and the elevation of the nuclear family as the dominant human social unit always 
produced unbalanced, psychologically unhealthy adults….There is nothing to recommend 
the conventional gendered division between work and love.”434 
 She suggests, without going into extensive detail, that the “Buddhist concept of 
interdependence might be very useful in providing tools with which to think about why 
this hyper-individualism cannot survive.”435  This has been one of the main 
preoccupations in her writings.  The search for community, finding social networks or 
relationships that are “stronger, more satisfying, and more emotionally sustaining,” is, for 
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Gross, one of the key intersections in Buddhism and feminism.436  Her very definition of 
feminism, as that which “involves the radical practice of co-humanity of women and 
men,” already belies this search for a right kind of relationship between women and men, 
a search for an anthropology, a model that stresses the humanity of both.  This, she 
claims, is where “the key concepts in Buddhism and the key claims of feminism mutually 
entail each other.”437  This reveals her preoccupation with notions of subjectivity similar 
to other Christian and Buddhist feminists that have been discussed.  Similar to Klein, she 
sees the Buddhist analysis of self, and the doctrines of selflessness and emptiness, as 
helpful in these discussions.  In particular, “her feminist contribution to Buddhist 
discussions of ego and egolessness is predicated upon the view of a healthy self that 
‘arises with awareness and gives rise to calmness, equanimity, and energy.’”438  
 She also believes that a “healthy” self that realizes emptiness can only be 
developed through meditation.  Hence, for her, “Buddhist meditation is a powerful ally 
and source of strength and growth for a feminist.”439  Furthermore, the “[t]wo aspects of 
Buddhadharma are especially influential, applicable, and not elsewhere available. These 
are (1) the actual discipline of meditation practice and (2) the open, basic state of mind 
known in Buddhist terminology as egolessness, that is the fruition of practice.”440  In this 
section, I will look at how Gross critiques and evaluates the key Buddhist doctrines of 
selflessness, emptiness and Buddha nature, and how she reinterprets them in light of 
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women’s search for a strong, healthy view of self.  Then I will analyze the role of 
meditation practice in the realization of these doctrines.  Finally, I will look at her 
feminist reconstruction of Buddhism, looking at her articulation of the implications of the 
feminist critique, not only on Buddhist doctrines, but on practices and the Buddhist 
institution itself, a discussion that was not as fully developed in Klein’s work. 
 A Feminist Analysis of Key Buddhist Concepts  
     
In order to demonstrate that Buddhism has something to offer to the discussion on 
individualism and the search for relationships and communities free from gender roles 
and gender complementarity, she first needs to address whether Buddhism in general is 
misogynist/patriarchal or not, and therefore whether it can be a resource for women or 
not.  This is the main task in the first two sections of her book, Buddhism After 
Patriarchy.  In the first section, she looks at the images of women, of “female” and the 
“feminine” within Buddhism throughout its history and concludes that such images of 
women can be both as heroines and tokens at the same time.  She writes that “Buddhism 
has a usable past, but, as a model for the future, it is neither sufficient nor adequate.”441  
After critiquing the history of Buddhism and how women have been portrayed within that 
history, she locates her project as part of the future of Buddhism that can more adequately 
address the current issues of women and of feminism.  This is what she tries to 
accomplish in the remaining sections of her book.  In the second section, which is of 
primary interest here, Gross discusses what she identifies as the key Buddhist concepts - 
“egolessness” (anātman), “emptiness” (śūnyatā), and Buddhanature (tathāgatagarbha) 
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analyzing not only their traditional interpretations but also bringing them into 
conversation with feminist discussions.  As she says, “[t]he primary theses of this part of 
this book are that no major Buddhist teaching provides any basis for gender privilege or 
gender hierarchy and that these doctrines, in fact, mandate gender equality at the same 
time as they undercut the relevance of gender.  Furthermore, it is also my thesis that these 
major teachings are much more compatible with feminist rather than with patriarchal 
manifestations of Buddhism.”442  This section will follow her discussions on these key 
Buddhist concepts. 
She uses the schema of the “three turnings of the wheel of dharma” to discuss the 
key Buddhist doctrines relevant to gender.  First, she looks at foundational Buddhism and 
the teachings of the Four Noble Truths and particularly “egolessness”, one of the three 
marks of existence.  Then she focuses on Mahāyāna Buddhism and discussions on 
emptiness (what it is not) as well as its relationship to compassion.  Finally with 
Vajrayana, she looks at a more developed view of emptiness (emptiness is not nothing), 
in particular the development of the doctrine of Buddha nature.  She writes that “each of 
the three turnings provides a major concept that invites an extremely provocative 
discussion of gender, even though in classic Buddhist sources, the implications of these 
teachings for gender issues have been noticed only with the second turning. And with 
each turning, we will discover a progressively richer and fuller basis for reconstructing 
androgynous Buddhism.”443 I would add that with each turning, she also demonstrates 
how the teachings can contribute to women’s search for an authentic self that is not 
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projected onto them by men or by a patriarchal society, and for relationships that are 
empowering of that authentic self. 
Doctrine of no-self / egolessness (anātman) 
Similar to Klein’s point that discussions of “self” are a point of intersection 
between Buddhism and feminism, Gross sees such intersection particularly in the analysis 
and discussions on “ego” or self, and the destructive patterns that have been harmful to 
women.  She writes, “Buddhism and feminism are more like each other than either is like 
Western patriarchal thought, in that both explore how dysfunctional habitual patterns of 
mind cause great suffering.”444  In particular, “Buddhist discussion of ego as the creation 
of the duality of self and other is almost identical with the feminist discussion of what 
men do to women in patriarchy.”445 
Similar to Klein, she also debunks any understanding of “egolessness” as 
equivalent to a loss of self/identity and thus harmful to women.  She clarifies in a 
discussion with Buddhist and Christian women scholars that,  
 [t]his question about no-self not being a good ideal for women is one of those 
problematic translations because of what “ego” means, namely any problematic or 
neurotic being in the world. Being self-effacing is just as much having an ego as being 
self-asserting. When we talk about self and no-self and true self we are talking about 
getting rid of neurotic ways of being in the world. So no-self is a perfect way of teaching 
women to get rid of the problematic ego styles we have.446 
   
Furthermore, she writes in her book,  
it is often claimed by feminists that Buddhist concepts of ego and egolessness would be 
more relevant for men than for women because many women ‘need more ego, a stronger 
self-concept, not less ego.’ From the Buddhist point of view, someone who is intensely 
co-dependent and someone who is intensely macho or self-aggrandizing suffer equally 
from ego. Ego…is any style of habitual patterns and responses that clouds over the clarity 
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and openness of basic human nature. Self-effacement is just a style of ego different from 
self-aggrandizement, but both equally cause suffering to self and others.447 
 
In both these arguments, she makes a similar claim to Klein about the proper 
understanding and application of the doctrine of no-self. The doctrine of no-self is not the 
same as “forgetting oneself” or “losing oneself” or becoming “self-sacrificial”, the way it 
has meant in many feminist, particularly Christian feminist discussions and debate.  
Rather, it points to the habits of the mind to project a particular reified image of self, a 
projection one uses that clouds one’s true existence.  It is a way of grasping, a fixation, 
and a way of separating “self” and “other” in ways that are harmful. As Gross states, both 
having “too much” or “too little” ego are both ways of clinging, of fixation to a certain 
“self” that is harmful.  Hence, the doctrine of no-self can be used to criticize both styles 
of selfhood as deluded, unhealthy ways of being that lead to suffering.   
In particular, she applies the doctrine of no-self to the discussion on gender, 
arguing that gender essentialism is another form of a “reified self”, or another form of 
ego-clinging that causes suffering to oneself and others.  She writes that “[t]he strong 
tendency to reify things, including ideas about what gender mean, and then to cling to 
these ideas, is often called ‘habitual patterns’…One of the strongest and most persistent 
habitual patterns is to attribute invariant and fixed meaning to gender.”448 In other words, 
the mind has been conditioned to continually make a separation/opposition between 
“male” and “female”, attaching particular characteristics or identities to both, as if such 
characteristics are fixed, unchanging, “normal” or “innate” to each.  Such habitual 
conditioning regarding gender has led over time to the acceptance of gender and gender 
                                                
447 Gross, Buddhism After Patriarchy, 161-2. 
448 Gross, A Garland of Feminist Reflections, 296. 
  189 
categories. It has resulted in the demarcation of roles, and specific qualities of each 
(usually women “complementing” men’s qualities) that have resulted in the unquestioned 
secondary status of women as “normal.”   This habitual pattern on gender is just another 
form of ego that needs to be analyzed and debunked through the doctrine of no-self.  For 
her, “[t]he feminist contribution to discussions of ego and egolessness … is to 
demonstrate, incontrovertibly and powerfully, the extent to which gender-fixation is part 
of ego, and therefore, damaging and destructive.”449 
To begin to realize this truth means to analyze, focus, and develop oneself.   How 
do we dismantle such wrong notions of “self”?  “Not by ignoring it and pretending it does 
not exist, but by studying it very carefully.”450 One needs to analyze oneself and see the 
identities that have been formed and clung to, all the wrongs ways of being, including 
gender essentializing notions of “woman” or “female”, or ways of self-effacement or 
self-aggrandizement that have led to suffering.    Realizing one’s wrong and deluded 
ways of being does not lead to “nothingness” or to “no sense of self at all” as some 
feminists worry.  Rather, such analysis of a wrong and unhealthy sense of self is the 
beginning of the development of a stronger sense of self, free from the trap of delusions 
and projections upon one’s identity.  One becomes more free to engage with the world.  
As Gross says, “[a]n egoless person is quite the opposite of a zombie. Rather, she is 
cheerful, calm, humorous, compassionate, empowered, and energized because she has 
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dropped the burden of ego. She has found a sane, healthy, and mature way of being free 
within the world; she has discovered how to ‘find [her] ease in impermanence’”.451 
Furthermore, she is adamant that another important lesson women can learn from 
these first turning teachings is how, at this initial stage, the focus and concern is on 
oneself. Practices of compassion towards others and the development to become a 
compassionate person for others come later, as a result of one’s own training on oneself 
and developing compassion for oneself.  She writes, “At this stage of development, it is 
important to pull back for a while, to pull into one’s self and to develop the foundations 
of sane and wholeness habits and modes of interacting.”452 Moreover, “self-development, 
leading to individual liberation, must be the first step. In Buddhist perspective, such 
attention to self-development is the most compassionate thing one could possibly do; 
otherwise one will be trying to help others aggressively, on the basis of one’s own 
confusion and negativity….For women, socialized not to take themselves seriously, to 
take care of everyone else before attending to their own needs, such a map of spiritual 
path is welcome and relevant.”453 
Doctrine of Emptiness (what śūnyatā is not) 
 
Moving on to the second turning (Mahāyāna) teachings, Gross focuses on the 
doctrines of emptiness and the relationship between the wisdom of emptiness and 
compassion.   As she points out, “[ś]unyata is the logical outcome of thoroughly 
understanding egolessness and interdependent co-arising …[Things are] empty or lack 
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‘own-being’ inherent existence. They do not exist in and of themselves, but only relative 
to their matrix, dependent on causes and conditions.”454  She also writes that 
“Mahayanists are careful to point out that emptiness should not be reified. Everything 
lacks own-being, including emptiness, which is a tool used to cup conceptual fixation, not 
an alternative concept out of which to build a worldview…undercuts all assertions.”455  
These descriptions of emptiness echo the traditional understanding of emptiness and its 
development from the doctrines of no-self and dependent arising in foundational 
Buddhism. Similar to her application of the doctrine of no-self, she uses emptiness, the 
“logical outcome” of egolessness, as a tool to extend her critique to undercut the 
“conceptual fixation” on gender.  After debunking the fixedness of the categories of 
“man” and “woman” and the roles that have been identified/attached to each, she uses 
emptiness to show the “emptiness” of the categories of “male” and “female” and how 
there are no innate characteristics to either one.  They are merely social constructs.  She 
writes that “‘[m]ale’ and ‘female,’ like all other labels and designations, are empty and 
lack substantial reality. Therefore, they cannot be used in a rigid and fixed way to delimit 
people.”456   In particular, she writes against streams within Buddhism that focus on 
negative images of women who are seen as spiritually inferior and not as capable as men 
of enlightenment.   Instead, she argues how the doctrine of emptiness shows “gender 
fluidity”, the emptiness of the categories of “male” and “female” and the characteristics 
and roles usually attached to them.  To bolster such an application of emptiness, she uses 
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the example of the goddess from the Vimalakīrti sutra, a beloved Mahāyāna text.457  
Upon being asked by Śariputra why she does not turn herself into a man, the goddess 
replies “I have been here for twelve years and have looked for the innate characteristics 
of the female sex and haven’t been able to find them.”  Afterwards, she changes him into 
a female and after making her point of how gender does not matter, eventually changes 
him back.  Gross interprets this story to show how “maleness and femaleness do not exist 
as fixed, inherently existing forms, but only as convenient designations and mere 
tokens”458 and that “conventional social arrangements, including those common to 
Buddhist institutions contradict the essential Mahayana teaching of emptiness.”459  In this 
way, she extends the critique of “no-self” to show the emptiness of the categories of 
“male” and “female”. Hence, there is nothing one can cling on to, for these categories are 
all empty and therefore fluid, open to possibilities not previously experienced or 
imagined.  If that is so, then gender roles are more fluid than one thinks and putting 
women in certain roles or discriminating against women in Buddhist institutions goes 
against this logic of emptiness.   
Apart from being a tool, she also discusses emptiness as the logical outcome of 
interdependent co-arising, and as understanding how things lacking “own being” does not 
mean that they do not exist at all, but they exist in a matrix, dependent on causes and 
conditions.  It is this understanding of emptiness and dependent arising that leads to the 
development of the wisdom that gives rise to compassion, realizing how interconnected 
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and interdependent we are on each other for our existence. She writes, “…in Buddhist 
perspective, human nature, beneath the constructions of ego, is basically good. Though it 
has been much less explicitly noted, experiencing that basic good nature also means 
experiencing one’s sane, enlightened self as fundamentally relational rather than 
essentially autonomous…One sees one’s life as fundamentally and inextricably 
interlinked with all other lives.”460    Similar to Klein’s point above, after we focus on 
ourselves, seeing the “wrong notions of self”, the fixed and rigid ways we’ve held on to 
identities, we can then begin to have some clarity about the true nature of self, not only 
its impermanence, but now also its emptiness, seeing our similarity with others and our 
dependence upon them for our existence. Here again, we see how the corollary to 
emptiness is seeing our interdependence with all else.  It is also about the realization of 
our basic goodness (the underlying nature of clarity, openness and positive capacity).  
This is Buddha nature which will be discussed in the next section. 
It is precisely such realization of the wisdom of emptiness that brings one to 
compassion. The kind of compassion that is cultivated together with wisdom is an 
important contribution for women.  It is a compassion that is “not dutiful nor based on 
fear and need. It is utterly uncompelled and unstrategized and, therefore, completely 
genuine.”461 In other words, it is not the kind of compassion that has exhausted women, 
forced to be there for others, even when she does not have the energy and strength for 
herself.  Furthermore, as was emphasized, such compassion is not the beginning of the 
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path.  It is the result of starting with one’s own self and one’s realization about that self, 
thereby developing a healthy sense of self before one even begins to develop compassion 
for others.  It is also the result of the realization of emptiness, where one can see and treat 
oneself and others similarly, ensuring that compassion is universal, and not attached to 
emotions.  As Gross argues,  
 [a]s we have seen, for Buddhism, the development of compassion is not the first message 
or agenda for spiritual development. The first step is non-harming, which includes 
learning to overcome self-destructive ego patterns, such as loving too much or caring 
unwisely in unhealthy ways. Caring, by itself, is not enough. One needs to learn to care 
with the detached and all-encompassing compassion of a bodhisattva; in order to be able 
to do that, one first needs to learn non-harming and to develop some understanding of 
egolessness and emptiness.462  
 
Doctrine of Buddha Nature (Tathāgatagarbha: śūnyatā is not nothing)  
The third turning of the wheel is still considered to be part of the Mahāyāna 
development but instead of focusing on the “negative”/deconstructive aspect of 
emptiness, focuses on the positive/reconstructive side of it.  In other words, it shows the 
flip side of emptiness (śūnyatā) which is “fullness” or “suchness” (tathatā) which leads 
to a more wholistic, nondualistic view.  For Gross’ purposes, it leads beyond just a 
critique of the “emptiness” of the categories of male and female to the possibility of a 
reconstruction of an identity that is neither male nor female, but beyond gender, that is 
full of the potential for enlightenment and for being a whole, healthy self.  She writes,  
“[t]he second turning interpretation of shunyata undercuts gender bias by showing the 
non-existence of essential feminine or masculine characteristics.  The third turning 
teachings about tathāgatagarbha, in explaining what is there beyond emptiness, give 
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even greater strength to feminist criticism of Buddhist gender practices and to feminist 
interpretations of Buddhism.”463 
While the second turning focused on undercutting all characteristics that one 
clung to, question all categories of self and other, of all dualisms, such as “male” and 
“female”, the third turning does not just leave one with nothing to hold onto beyond the 
deconstruction of all these categories.  Rather, what one finds beyond such dualisms, 
beyond such categories is one’s Buddha Nature; that is, that everyone – beyond 
obscurations and superficial differences – has the qualities of a Buddha, qualities of 
enlightenment and innate goodness as well as a capacity for deepest peace, all inclusive 
love, compassion, and penetrating wisdom. 464  Gross uses this doctrine to strengthen her 
argument against the perceived inferiority of women, and to show the equality of women 
with men, particularly in their potential for enlightenment.  Bringing together the second 
and third turning teachings builds a stronger argument against gender privilege and a 
stronger argument for egalitarian gender arrangements.465  She writes,  
On the one hand, because all phenomena are empty and lack inherent existence, intrinsic 
maleness and femaleness cannot be found. Therefore women and men should not be 
defined by gender traits nor limited by gender roles and stereotypes. On the other hand, 
the intrinsic nature of all people, without regard for gender, is their potential for 
Buddhahood. Therefore, it is not appropriate to place institutional obstacles, such as 
formal subordination, lower expectations, or discouragement from the life of study and 
practice, in the path of either gender.466  
 
 Furthermore, bringing these two turnings together also strengthens one’s way of 
being in the world, without being caught up in that world with the projections and 
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expectations of gender and roles, free to “perform” oneself and enact wise compassion 
for others.  Discovering that everything is empty and also imbued with Buddha Nature, 
one recognizes the primordial purity and goodness of all that is, without becoming 
attached to them.  It becomes a way of being able to hold one’s “deconstruction” and 
“reconstruction” of reality, or a way of being back in the world without being of the 
world, since one is now coming from the view of emptiness and thusness, resulting in a 
nondualistic view of the world. “The primary meaning of thusness is, as we have seen 
above, to see things in a nondualistic manner, to see the ever-flowing stream of events 
without reification, without imposing a subject-object dichotomy on them….Such seeing 
also means accurately seeing what is, rather than the usual projections and 
preconceptions that color phenomena.”467 Seeing accurately what is, seeing what are 
“adventitious defilements” vs. the “purity” beneath, those that were previously judged to 
be inferior, impure or obstacles to enlightenment can now be enjoyed, and brought to the 
path.  This is significant for women, for they, together with aspects that have been 
associated with them – body, sexuality, emotions – can now be seen as pure, and can lead 
to their celebration of being women, and the enjoyment of their body, their sexuality and 
their emotions, in ways that do not lead to more attachment, reification, and therefore 
suffering.468  Gross writes,  
…emptiness, thoroughly understood, is not nothing; it is the basis for appreciating 
phenomena without reifying them.  Phenomena are no longer seen as seductive elements 
that engender unwholesome reactions of clinging and fixation, but as primordially pure, 
vivid, non-dual Suchness.  As such they need not be avoided, but can be appreciated, 
celebrated, and liberated.  All elements of ordinary phenomenal existence can now be 
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seen in this sacred manner, which means everything can be included in spiritual 
discipline.469  
 
 From her discussion on emptiness which ended with her conclusion that “the 
dharma is neither male nor female”, she contends that, with Vajrayāna, there is the 
further development that leads on the other hand to the conclusion that “the dharma is 
also both male and female.”  In this case, one does not disregard differences as if they do 
not matter or that they are just the cause of suffering; rather, the aim is for the 
development of both qualities by all beings, breaking down all separation and dualism.  
As Gross says, “The two, masculine and feminine, however, are not an oppositional 
duality; they are a non-dual pair, a dyadic unit…One does not identify with one against 
the other as is done in dualist thinking. Rather, one regards the two as interdependent, 
complementary aspects of the Whole, aspects which cannot be collapsed into monistic 
unity any more than they can brought into real opposition. Further, one identifies with 
and develops both elements of the pair.”470 
 Importance of meditation 
 
Such a nondualistic view and the realization of these doctrines are only possible 
through practice.  Gross claims that “[t]here is a very intimate link between a formal 
practice and manifesting that mind of clarity, insight, and compassion in the world. Those 
of us who have meditated a long time tend to feel that without the formal discipline it is 
going to be much harder to have detachment.”471  In other words, one cannot fully realize 
the doctrines of egolessness, emptiness and Buddha-nature without an accompanying 
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practice.  This is why, for Gross as it was with Klein, the most relevant contribution and 
application of Buddhism are not its doctrinal or theoretical insights but its meditation 
practice itself.472 
First, Gross notes how it is through meditation practices that women can develop 
a healthier sense of self, finding techniques helpful for their self-cultivation and 
development.  She writes,  
In the simple and basic practices of mindfulness and awareness, one is taught how to 
experience thoughts without repressing them, judging them or acting them out. One is 
taught to observe and notice, to increase awareness, to become much more familiar with 
one’s thought patterns and habitual tendencies without immediately trying to fix them or 
change them.473  
 
This is similar to Klein’s discussion of the development of a non-judgmental awareness 
that is necessary for women to break out of habitual patterns of thought that lead them to 
construct their identities based on patriarchal ideals and to become more gentle in their 
assessment of themselves, beginning to learn to accept, discover and love themselves in 
the process.  Gross says that such a practice undercuts women’s sense of self-hatred 
under patriarchy.  It can also undercut her sense of frustration, feeling that she has been 
denied her full potential because she is female.474  Furthermore, it also helps her develop 
a certain “independence of mind” as Klein writes above, becoming less reactive and more 
receptive (but not passive), thereby having more clarity of mind to truly understand her 
dynamic of self and her dynamic with others. Gross describes the results of mindfulness 
practice as such,  
A feeling of spaciousness and an ability to accommodate one’s experience with all its ups 
and downs, is beginning to replace the claustrophobia, paranoia, grasping, and rage that 
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one’s experience used to generate.  One spreads one’s kleśas or basic neuroses around a 
little less, one is less prone to habitual reactions laden with painful emotionalism, and one 
is kinder and less harsh both to oneself and to the world.475 
 
Furthermore, she also writes,  
 
There is a sense of dawning that arises from developing egolessness as an inevitable 
result of śamatha- vipaśyanā or mindfulness meditation practice. It has a basic effect that 
I would characterize as ever-increasing gentleness, softness and openness that has 
nothing to do with being weak, powerless or submissive. In fact, if anything, a sense of 
dignity, strength, and invulnerability in the positive sense increases with increasing 
gentleness and softness.476   
 
 This first step of self-cultivation and development through mindfulness practice 
becomes the stepping stone for the development of compassion for others.  As one gains 
this sense of “dignity, strength and invulnerability” through “gentleness and softness”, 
one begins to be able to turn such “gentleness and softness” onto others in an ever 
expanding way.  As one continues to realize egolessness and emptiness, one begins to 
uncover not only one’s own Buddha nature, the innate capacity for goodness, peace, etc. 
as described above, but one also realizes that this is the fundamental nature of all beings. 
Hence, as she wrote above, one becomes kinder and less harsh, not only to oneself but to 
others, seeing that everyone shares in this same fundamental nature.  Through practice, 
one’s heart becomes wider and wider as the clarity of one’s mind about our true nature 
becomes clearer and clearer.  This is where one develops the perfection of wisdom that 
leads to compassion.  As Gross says, “it sees śūnyatā (emptiness) and two-fold 
egolessness (egolessness of both self and other); in such complete clear seeing, 
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compassion arises freely, spontaneously, and appropriately. Thus the fruition of the 
Mahāyāna is the simultaneity of emptiness and compassion….”477 
However, in light of feminist concerns regarding the virtue of compassion, or 
being for the “other” in ways harmful to oneself as mentioned previously, Gross is 
insistent that the practice must begin with practices of self-cultivation and development, 
in line with developing the clarity of wisdom (of emptiness).  As seen in the quote above, 
compassion arises OUT of such wisdom, a wisdom that is focused on self-awareness and 
self-compassion.  This is a key point to emphasize because it is the development of such 
wisdom that allows one’s compassion to be “skillful” instead of harmful to one’s self or 
to another.  As Gross notes, “Some self-liberation inevitably leads to, but also must 
precede attempts to help others and change the situation.  Without prior clarity, which 
presupposes taming one’s self somewhat, concern for others, no matter how sincere, is 
often misguided, and worse, quite aggressive.”478  This serves as an important reminder 
for women who want to put others first, that some self-reflection, self-development is 
necessary to purify one’s actions for others, examining carefully one’s intentions so that 
concern is not “seen” as aggression, nor a kind of dependence nor clinging onto another 
person instead of a genuine concern for the other.  It also ensures that such actions do not 
cause harm to ourselves, diffusing our energies for others, disabling us from giving 
ourselves the same concern that we are giving to others. In the end, such 
complementarity, better yet, nonduality between wisdom and compassion is one of the 
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important aspects in Vajrayāna Buddhism that Gross sees is important for feminism.  As 
she says,  
…learning to recognize space, to do nothing, to develop wisdom (prajna) is the harder 
part of spiritual training.  Once unobstructed space – vision unclouded by conventionality 
and discursiveness - is developed, then appropriate skillful and compassionate activity 
arises spontaneously and blissfully, whereas before such vision is developed, activity is 
usually futile and misdirected. Thus, wisdom provides the ground for compassionate and 
skillful activity, which completes the dyadic unity. Without compassion, wisdom is too 
cold and hard, even destructive. But together, like the right and left sides of the body, 
they can co-operate to do what needs to be done.479  
 
 More generally, the concept of nonduality is a key contribution of Vajrayāna 
teachings and practices.  Apart from realizing the fundamental nonduality of wisdom and 
compassion, one also begins to realize that since everything is imbued with Buddha 
nature, then everything can be taken into the path, even those that used to be considered 
an obstacle to the path.  Such a development of a “sacred outlook” is emphasized in 
Vajrayana.  As Gross says,  
In terms of meditation-in-action, developing a sacred outlook involves transmutation of 
basic energies from their confused or neurotic manifestation to their enlightened 
potential. This teaching of transmutation is probably the most powerful, provocative, 
and basic of the Vajrayāna teachings [emphasis mine]; it summarizes or condenses the 
whole Buddhist non-dualistic approach to working with the human existential situation.  
Whereas earlier in the journey, some energies might have been rejected as unworkable, 
now the fundamental potential of that energy is tapped because one recognizes that the 
energy itself not only is without problem, but is the very and only basis for enlightened 
activity.480 
 
As mentioned, this “sacred outlook” or the nondualistic approach, is important for 
women who have been traditionally associated with the body, emotions, etc. as obstacles 
to enlightenment, as the “dual” inferior halves to men.  Furthermore, it is also important 
because it allows a woman to appreciate and use what she already has, her emotions, 
“negative” energies which are transformed as part of her path. This allows her to “honor 
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her emotions”, to not just dismiss them, or diminish their importance but to really learn to 
listen to their wisdom.  As Gross says, “emotion itself always contains tremendous 
wisdom, even if that wisdom is clouded and obscured by its deluded counterpart.  
Therefore, emotions are to be dealt with, not by denying them, overlooking their validity, 
or banishing them, but by harkening to their wisdom.”481 This is an important reminder for 
women who are caricatured as “emotional” and not “rational” creatures and hence whose 
voice or opinions are questioned or ignored.  Furthermore, a view that shows the 
nonduality of emotion and wisdom is also important in giving an alternative view in the 
current tendency to bifurcate “reason” (as a male trait) and “emotion” (as a female trait) 
that has led to the view of the inferiority of women.   
 She gives the example of working with anger as a “negative” energy that can be 
transformed into clarity (wisdom), and how this can be helpful for feminists.  She writes 
from her own experience having seen how closely “anger and clarity are related, how 
they are the same energy, and how clarity grows out of anger.”482  She describes that over 
the course of her practice she could “no longer dredge up the same feelings of release and 
emotional satisfaction by aggressive expressions of my frustration and rage….I was only 
causing mutual entrenchment.”483 Rather, what remained was her clarity, her “critical 
intelligence” that allowed her to see injustice and perversions of peace but without the 
murkiness that the emotion of anger brings.  Clarity without anger does not bring about 
“apathy” but can bring about real compassion, a “concern for the entire matrix not based 
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on the distinction between self and other.”484  This can already lead to a breaking out of 
our individual, alienated self (possibly alienated further due to one’s anger) and bring us 
into right relationship with others. Instead of bringing further separation or dualism with 
the object of our anger or feeling that we are “righteous” and the other is not, we can 
focus on the issues without blame, or hatred, and find more effective solutions without 
the emotional attachment to anger that can usually be exhausting. Such a transformation 
of emotions (and not a rejection of them) can be very helpful to many feminists.  As 
Gross says, Buddhist meditation training and the Buddhist emphasis on gentleness will 
modulate the prophetic voice, which can be strident in expressing its truths and 
insights.485  Furthermore, such “gentling effects of deep spiritual discipline” can prevent 
one’s anger and attachment from growing into an ideological fixation – an “expression 
deeply tinged with aggression.”486  Here, we see her arguing for a way that Buddhists can 
be concerned with the world, without attachment and anger – and hence take up the 
feminist agenda, but also transforming it, “purifying it” so only clarity and wisdom come 
through, making one’s words and actions more effective in the world.       
 Conclusion  
 Looking at Gross’s revalorization of the Buddhist teachings on no-self, emptiness 
and Buddha-nature, one sees how this can contribute to the feminist search for a strong 
interdependent self.  She uses these Buddhist teachings of egolessness and emptiness as a 
critical lens to show the social constructedness of gender roles, thereby questioning the 
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categories of “women/female” and “men/male”, and the superiority of one to the other, 
and the social roles that have been imputed onto them. Instead, she argues that all are 
called to develop both the ‘masculine’ and feminine principle, and that all – women and 
men – have the same spiritual capacity for transformation, for all have Buddha nature.  
This is her ground for a new anthropology that can lead to equality/co-humanity between 
women and men.  Furthermore, she uses the doctrine of emptiness to counter the 
problematic patriarchal styles of selfhood.  No one is an individual or an autonomous, 
separate, substantial being.  Rather, everyone exists within matrices of interconnections; 
within relationships – an important aspect for many feminists – particularly those who 
see separation / individualization as part of the problem of sexism. Such a realization 
leads to the right kind of interdependence and connection with others that does not risk 
losing oneself in such relationships. 
 Her main vision of co-humanity is encompassed in her discussions of androgyny 
which does not mean the disappearance or nondistinction between “male and female” but 
the affirmation of the particularities of being “male” and “female.”  As she writes in 
Buddhism After Patriarchy,  
…the meaning of “androgyny,” as the term is being used in this book, is “both male and 
female.” As scholarly method, model of humanity, and mode of consciousness, it 
contrasts with ‘androcentrism or male-centered consciousness.  But it also contrasts 
significantly with sex-neutral models and ideals, in which something is said to be “neither 
male nor female.” Androgyny affirms both male and female, whatever those labels may 
involve, while the sex-neutral model denies them both. Both styles of language and 
thought are useful and appropriate in different contexts. But the sex-neutral model is not 
sufficient to overcome and undo androcentrism….487 
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This description of androgyny counters the androcentric view that subsumes the 
category of “women” into the category of “men.”488  Instead, it precisely looks at the 
women’s particularity and their needs on the one hand, while recognizing “sameness” 
with men in terms of equality in potential for enlightenment, and the need to find the 
balance between “masculine” and “feminine” characteristics in everyone.  Such a vision 
of androgyny, the co-equality of women and men while recognizing the specific needs of 
women, has implications for change within Buddhist institutions and practices 
accordingly.  Such changes are worked out in the last section of her book, Buddhism 
After Patriarchy.  As Koppedrayer summarizes it,  “‘Post-patriarchal’ Buddhism, in 
Gross’s view, can prompt change, from the redefinition of the sangha (community), to 
the introduction of gender equity that echoes Western affirmative-action programs, to a 
revalorization of everyday life, which finds the potential for insight in ‘ordinary’ 
activities.”489     
There are a couple of aspects among these changes that are particularly important 
for this discussion.  One, she pushes strongly the need for more female dharma teachers.  
She argues that if one were to take seriously the Buddhist belief that everyone is capable 
of enlightenment, then there should be an equal number of male and female teachers.  
However, historically, women, being seen as inferior or obstacles to the path (which she 
has judged as not being an accurate interpretation of the Buddhist teaching) were not 
given these opportunities.  As she says, “At least as strong as the habitual tendency to 
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fixate on gender identity is the habitual pattern of evaluating men as superior to and more 
important than women, which is the basis for setting up social and religious institutions 
that favor men over women.”490 Realizing it now requires that women be given the 
opportunity to cultivate their own capacities and become teachers in their own right.  As 
she says, “[t]he acid test for whether Buddhism has overcome its male-dominant heritage 
is the frequency with which women become dharma teachers.”491  This is important so that 
women not only have feminine images within the practice to work with, but actually also 
have women teachers, particularly those who can skillfully adapt the practices to the 
needs of women, as she has tried to demonstrate. 
At the same time, given her emphasis and the feminist interest in relationality, and 
how such can be an aid (and not an obstacle) to finding one’s true self, she writes of a 
“revalorization” of the sangha, the forgotten aspect of the three Jewels.  She writes how 
the “sangha as the matrix of companionship and psychological comfort, contradicts some 
prevalent impressions of Buddhism” because the path is often understood as an individual 
one, that one is supposed to travel alone on this path, since each one must come to 
enlightenment on their own.492  Yet the sangha is one of the 3 refuges in Buddhism and 
has its place in the spiritual formation of each practitioner. Here, she says, feminism can 
transform Buddhism by its emphasis on relationships and their empowering nature, and 
showing how companionship through the sangha can provide the base in which personal 
transformation can be realized. Through such a lens, one no longer sees the Sangha as a 
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poor third, but as it really should be, as the focus of “personal nurture and supportive 
community.”493  She suggests that this be done by “fill[ing] the profound and provocative 
category ‘sangha’ with the feminist values of community, nurturance, communication, 
relationship, and friendship. To emphasize these values is to recognize how critical they 
are, and always have been, as matrix and container for emulation of the Buddha and for 
meditative and philosophical pursuits of the dharma.”494 
Finally, as discussed, Gross contends that the most important contribution of 
Buddhism to feminism is its meditation practice that helps women to realize a strong 
“healthy” self, seeing themselves within matrices of relationships, allowing them to 
develop a kind of wise compassion, and transforming their emotions to be brought into 
their spiritual practice. It reminds them that practice must begin with oneself, with self-
cultivation and development before one can help others. It also allows women to be more 
involved in the world, but in ways that are empowering for them and others, not allowing 
them to be consumed by anger or frustration at the process.  As mentioned, she wrote of 
the gentling effect of such practices to make our words and actions more effective.  In 
effect, she is also making the argument of how spiritual practice is tied together with 
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social action and how each can purify and strengthen the other.  This, again is another 
key contribution of Buddhism to feminism.  She writes,  
Buddhism has two things to contribute to those involved in feminism. One is the 
immediate need for the skillful means of developing and maintaining equanimity and 
peacefulness in the face of opposition, oppression and conflict ….The second great gift of 
Buddhism to political process is its ability to develop staying power in those who practice 
in spiritual disciplines…I have argued that part of one’s practice as a Buddhist might be 
to practice the inseparability of spiritual disciplines and politics….With true 
inseparability, we learn  much about deep Buddhist insights through involvement with 
causes, and our immersion in Buddhist practices teaches us how to remain involved in 
politics – skillfully.495  
 
IV. The Great Bliss Queen:  A Buddhist Feminist Retrieval496  
 
Her Story  
For both Klein and Gross, the story, image and most importantly, the ritual of the 
Great Bliss Queen, Yeshe Tsogyel, is a key example that shows how Buddhist doctrines 
are enacted/realized/empowered practices that are most helpful for women in cultivating 
a strong, healthy interconnected self.  Furthermore, her image and her story also provide 
an alternative to the predominant male examples of those who have achieved 
enlightenment, providing women with a story and an image that they may identify with, 
something to aspire to, and eventually realize that they are already her.  As Klein says, 
“Yeshey Tsogyal in a deep sense represents one’s own capacity for mindfulness, 
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compassion and wisdom.…Meeting the Great Bliss Queen is not about meeting someone 
else, it’s about meeting yourself in a deep way.”497  
 Yeshe Tsogyal is one of the most prominent and influential female teachers and 
religious exemplars from Tibet.  Her story, a combination of history and hagiography, is 
both a typical and atypical story of a woman but also the story of an enlightened one. 
Historically, she is identified to have lived in the eighth century, and is a disciple and 
consort to Padmasambhava, an important figure in the transmission of Buddhism from 
India to Tibet.   However, hagiographically/mythically, her biography starts like those of 
great Buddhas and bodhisattvas, with her decision to appear in the world and teach, 
followed by stories of her birth filled with auspicious signs and miracles.  Her journey 
through life mirrors some of the hardships women faced at that time.  She encountered 
many obstacles trying to reach her goal of enlightenment. In her refusal to get married, 
she was beaten by the men who wanted her.  They “took a lash of iron thorns, and 
stripping me naked they began to whip me.”498  To end the fighting (and seeing how her 
qualities made her a fitting partner to the Emperor), she was eventually given to the 
Emperor Tri-song-day-tsen, who was a supporter of the spread of Buddhism into Tibet.  
He would later give her as a consort to Padmasambhava as an offering to his guru, who 
also then becomes her guru.  She then proceeds to deepen her own training, finding her 
own spiritual consorts, practicing arduous austerity and discipline in solitude for three 
years in a cave, finally achieving realization and working for the benefit of sentient 
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beings.  This is the story of the perseverance and strength of a woman, her struggles 
through her own spiritual development, her “struggles” with men, and ultimately her 
choice to benefit all beings.  This is an important story for women, for as Klein points 
out, “the qualities of courage, nobility, and perseverance detailed in Yeshe Tsogyal’s 
biography gave open recognition to women’s capacity for enlightenment and contributed 
to the prevailing view that women are as suited as men for the most exalted teachings of 
Buddhism, as well as for Buddhahood itself. Accomplished women might become gurus 
themselves, as did Yeshey Tsogyal.”499 This is part of the story that women can learn 
from her.  She gives women a model, an example that women truly are capable of 
spiritual enlightenment.   
Another important aspect of her story is the role of others (her guru, her spiritual 
consorts, disciples) in her realization.   This is an important point for feminists who seek 
to value relationality but not at the expense of one’s self.  Yeshe Tsogyal is a model of 
one whose spiritual path is marked by her relationships that are transformed by her 
practice or that transform her in practice.  As Klein notes, “In many ways, her story is 
like that of a hero – alone, overcoming obstacles – even though the principles her story 
puts forward undermine that model of highly individuated, oppositional 
accomplishment.”500  In her story, everyone she comes into contact with - her guru, her 
consorts, and others who either cause her suffering or come to her for teaching -  are all 
constitutive of her own path, part of her realization.   Gross focuses on this point in her 
analysis of the story of Tsogyal.  She writes that “I know of no similar story of a woman 
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whose relational life and spiritual journey are so intertwined and support each other so 
thoroughly.”501  Gross points out the interesting dynamic between the men and women in 
Tsogyal’s life and Tsogyal’s spiritual path.  First, though some of her most important 
encounters were with men, not all of them were positive.  On the one hand, she found 
male consorts who would help in her practice and ultimately had her guru 
Padmasambhava.  On the other hand, she also experienced much cruelty and abuse by 
other men such as her suitors as well as bandits who robbed and raped her.  In these 
cases, Gross notes how she turned such experiences with men either into insight that 
brought her deeper into her own practice, or used this opportunity to convert these men 
who ultimately become her disciples.  Gross also points out Tsogyal’s relationship with 
women who became her disciples or others with whom she exchanged advance teachings, 
each helping the other deepen in their practice.  These relationships are important for 
Gross, because they give an example of the kind of relationship that does not just exhaust 
women or take away their “sense of self”.  Rather these are the kinds of relationship that 
help women to more fully discover themselves in their interaction with others; that others 
are constitutive of one’s own growth.  For Gross, the lesson from Tsogyal’s life is that it 
is relationships within the context of spiritual practice which are the most fruitful 
relationships, and that through spiritual practices, difficult relationships or situations with 
others can be transformed. Gross writes,  
What Tsogyel’s relational biography shows is that relationships carried on in the context 
of a spiritual discipline can dissolve clinging, grasping, and fixation and need not involve 
the anxiety, neurotic passion, and jealousy of conventional relationships. So often in 
conventional relationships, expectations, needs, and neurotic passions cause the 
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relationship to increase rather than to ease suffering.  The only way out of this situation is 
to dissolve the unrealistic expectations surrounding the relationship.   These ego-fixations 
and ego-orientations dissolve through spiritual discipline.”502  
 
Having discussed above how practices of mindfulness, and of gentle observation 
allow one to truly listen and discover one’s own voice, and to be able to acknowledge 
one’s emotions without reactively acting upon them, one can now see how relationships 
can be transformed in ways that are not just about one’s own selfish, or as Gross puts it 
“neurotic”, expectations and needs that cause suffering to one or both parties.  Through 
practice, one can see the dynamic of what is truly going on, and skillfully work towards 
transforming such relationships into fruitful ones.  This is the example that Tsogyal’s life 
gives us.  She brought all her experiences with others – positive and negative – into her 
practice and allowed them to bring her deeper into the practice.  She also allowed her 
practice to help her transform others and invite them into their own practice.  As Gross 
writes, she is an inspiring and comforting model for women, able to “be a companion to 
her consorts while not losing her vision of her own reason to live – enlightenment and 
service.”503 
Her Ritual 
 As we turn to her ritual, it is a reminder that she is not just a model to be emulated 
but rather, that we are already like her, containing all the qualities needed for 
enlightenment.  As Klein mentioned above, she is not just who we want to be, but already 
who we are.  She shows us how we meet ourselves in this deep way.  The ritual is a way 
of embodying and practicing it in ways that can be sustained outside the ritual, reminding 
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us of who we already are.  On the one hand, some may object that the biography of 
Tsogyal may be too lofty an ideal for women, another “idolatry of ideals” as Klein 
mentioned above that may be harmful for women.  Furthermore, portions of her 
biography may easily be misread, making her seem like she was passive in the face of 
abuse or self-sacrificial in ways that were harmful to her.  Both Klein and Gross agree 
that such stories must be interpreted in light of her whole life, particularly her 
hagiography.  For example, where she seems impassive at the abuse of some, Klein 
writes that she “did not passively endure degradation or worse; the context of this passage 
emphasizes that she was beyond danger of discomfort because of her actively cultivated 
realization.”504 Or Gross clarifies that in stories where Tsogyal offers her body to others, 
such self-sacrifice “should not be seen as everyday practice or the inevitable lot of a 
woman. She is nearing Buddhahood by the time it is appropriate for her to take on such 
self-sacrifice on behalf of others.”505  In other words, much care and feminist critique 
must be given as the story of Tsogyal is used as an inspiration and basis for women’s 
practice.  Furthermore, in terms of actually taking on the practice itself, the ritual of the 
Great Bliss Queen is a fairly advanced practice, as both Klein and Gross mention.  It is 
not for those who are beginning. Rather, practices of mindfulness and other practices that 
help with women’s self-development and cultivation are necessary.  As Klein says,  
Yeshey Tsogyel is from the beginning of her ritual regarded as identical with oneself, an 
expression of the primordial purity and spontaneous excellence of one’s own mind, even 
if the actual experience and nature of that identity is at first obscure. This is why meeting 
the Great Bliss Queen is in a very specific sense meeting the most primal part of oneself. 
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If one does not yet know that aspect of oneself, other practices are required to prepare for 
this meeting.506 
 
The example of her ritual is important, according to Klein and Gross, because it offers an 
alternative that undercuts the usual dualistic models that predominantly feature male 
figures and imagery.  For Klein, the ritual of the Great Bliss Queen demonstrates the 
presence of a female divinity and positive meditations on the female body as divine 
metaphor.  Such are important elements in undoing dualistic tendencies that have resulted 
in patriarchy.507 Gross, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of the balance of 
the masculine and the feminine and the search to go beyond towards nondualism, as the 
most fruitful aspect of the ritual for her.  She writes,  
Being introduced to practice of the sadhana of Vajrayoginī – felt empowerment through 
having access to this sadhana involving a female myth-model…I suggested that though 
this spiritual practice had not been designed to solve the problems inherent in Western 
patriarchal religious symbolism, it had done so for me because of the “healing power of 
non-patriarchal, non-sexist anthropomorphic symbolism.”508  
 
Further on, she says,  
 
This upaya, this skillful method of initiating me into a meditation-liturgy connected with 
a female yidam, restored the balance of masculine and feminine principles in a way that 
nothing else could have. It not only restored the feminine in the dyadic unity; it also 
restored the masculine.509 
 
 The ritual itself is a good example of many of the key points made by both Klein 
and Gross.  It shows how a practice is supported by the key Buddhist doctrines of 
emptiness and Buddha nature but the goal is to have an experience, a realization of such 
doctrines through the practice.   Furthermore, at its center is a female deity and female 
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body that remind women not only of their spiritual capacity but also of the value of 
women’s bodies.  Ultimately, it is the kind of practice that can lead a woman to a strong 
yet interconnected self, merging her personal story with that of the Great Bliss Queen, 
who ultimately is herself.   
The ritual itself is made up of three parts.  It begins by taking refuge in the Great 
Bliss Queen, followed by a visualization of one’s surroundings and one’s self as the 
Great Bliss Queen.  This second segment makes up the bulk of the ritual and will be the 
focus here.  Lastly, there is the dedication of merit for the benefit of all sentient beings.  
Visualization of the Great Bliss Queen begins with the recitation/chanting of “ah”.  This 
seemingly simple practice of taking a breath and slowly releasing while chanting “ah” 
can be the place where one can already begin to have a glimmer of an experience of a 
strong centered self within a matrix of relationships.  On the one hand, the chanting of 
“ah” is meant to “produce a centering effect on the body, as well as a calming and 
clarifying effect on the mind.”510  Effects such as these on both body and mind can be 
helpful in developing a stronger sense of self for women.  More importantly, “ah” is 
meant to be a reminder of the doctrine of emptiness and Buddha nature (or primordial 
purity) that undergirds the practice and empowers the practitioner.  It is the belief in one’s 
empty nature, one’s “pure nature” free of defilements, that one shares in the nature of the 
Buddhas that one can visualize oneself as the Great Bliss Queen, and discover that this is 
already oneself, and also the nature of others. This is the sacred outlook that Gross talks 
about.  It is such a view of the world, and of oneself and others, that can lead to wise 
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compassionate action in the world.  As Klein writes, “…the practitioner is not rejecting 
the world but understanding it and thus seeing more clearly. And the overriding purpose 
for seeking this understanding is to be able to act effectively in the world for the benefit 
of others.”511  All this is invoked, remembered as one slowly chants “ah” and enters into 
the ritual.   
Just as sound both emerges from silence and is an expression of it, just as thoughts 
emerge from primordial clarity and are a manifestation of it, so in the course of the ritual, 
visualizations appear from empty space. These visualized images are understood as 
manifestations of the emptiness or primordial purity of the birthless matrix that is the 
mind’s essence.512 
 
 As the practitioner becomes more settled, the mind more calm and capable of 
greater clarity, one begins to visualize the mandala and the Great Bliss Queen, probing 
even deeper into realizing the emptiness and purity of all things through such 
visualizations.  First, one visualizes the mandala which is particular interest for women 
for it uses very specific female imagery, the womb and female organs, to represent both 
wisdom and compassion.  One visualizes oneself in a kind of “mandala-mansion”, 
symbolized by a circle, one’s residence where one finds the potent purity of all things. 
This “mandala-mansion” is usually associated with the womb.  As Klein explains, “[t]he 
expanse of reality is a womb, not only in the sense that it makes all change and worldly 
activity possible, but because in realizing this reality, one is born as an enlightened 
being.”513  As one enters more deeply into the mandala, one visualizes what resembles 
the “star of David”, each triangle signifying the female organ as the opening to 
enlightenment.  It is a reminder of how wisdom and compassion always go together, and 
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how “emptiness and conventional objects do not cancel each other out but abide in each 
other.”514  Ultimately, Klein says, “Her womb and other female organs are emblematic of 
enlightened wisdom and the state of Buddhahood itself, and are among the most 
important symbols associated with the Great Bliss Queen. We see here the valorization, 
not just of female imagery in general, but of female body imagery….”515 This can be an 
important visualization for women whose bodies and very nature are usually seen as 
inferior to men.  Furthermore, such visualization which brings together the nature of the 
mind through symbols of the female body, may also be helpful in undoing some of the 
split between mind and body that has supported the inferior view of women.  
 Moreover, Klein writes, “…each aspect of the Great Bliss Queen embodies 
primordial purity or emptiness. Ritual identification with her is meant to manifest clarity 
with respect to the primordial purity and spontaneous effulgence of the practitioner’s own 
mind and its innate awareness.”516  For example, she writes about the knife seen as 
cutting through subject-object dualism to see emptiness, or the drum with two skulls that 
symbolize the nondualism of samsara and nirvana, another implication of the doctrine of 
emptiness, her two hands as signifying wisdom and compassion.  She is also seen as 
cheerful, smiling or laughing and of course, as her title suggests, she is blissful.  This 
bliss comes from recognizing the true nature of all beings as emptiness or primordial 
purity.  As Klein explains 
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…her bliss expresses her freedom from the limitations of dualistic thinking. The 
opposition between self and other dissolves into her compassion. The opposition between 
conditioned and unconditioned dissolves in her wisdom; and the opposition between 
ordinary and enlightened dissolves in the recognition that her enlightened mind is one’s 
own.  Her bliss is an expression of being released from the limitations of these dualisms; 
her passion is to share this with others.517 
 
 Hence, bliss comes with the realization of emptiness, of breaking free from 
dualistic tendencies.  Particularly for women, it comes as such dualistic tendencies that 
have placed her as secondary or inferior are broken for her, and she realizes that she 
herself shares in this nature. She is the Great Bliss Queen.  This is the last step of the 
visualization, to imagine the actual Great Bliss Queen coming and dissolving into 
oneself.  ; her wisdom and her compassion flowing into one’s own; they are one’s own.   
 During the visualization, one is usually chanting with others, chanting the liturgy, 
chanting the description of the appearance of the Great Bliss Queen which one is 
visualizing.  For Klein, such chanting is another element where one can experience the 
notion of being interrelated with others without losing one’s own self, an experience of 
emptiness and dependent arising.  As she describes it,  
 [c]hanting with others, one is embedded in a social matrix of practitioners and a resonant 
matrix of sound. The voices of others melt into the experience of self as one 
kinesthetically experiences the vibration of one’s own voice, which one cannot separate 
from the surrounding sound of others. One is both an individual and part of a unity, and 
yet not entirely either. The experience of chanting is thus well in tune with a sense of 
oneself as dependently constructed yet singular, and with selves as interrelational yet 
independent.518 
 
Such chanting, such practice in a group, shows the importance of relationality and 
community that both Klein and Gross have argued for.  Furthermore, it becomes another 
embodied practice through which the practitioner can access an experience of emptiness, 
an alternative way of experiencing herself and others, even as she goes deeper into the 
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ritual of the Great Bliss Queen.  This could be another place where she experiences the 
coming together of wisdom and compassion, in the mingling of sounds and voices whose 
sounds are well placed within a matrix of chanting and visualization.  This could be 
another access point to break such dualistic tendencies that can result in bliss and in wise 
and compassionate action towards oneself and others. 
 At the very end of the ritual, she dedicates the merit of the practice for the benefit 
of all sentient beings.  Then she comes out of practice and tries to go about her daily 
activities imbued with the vision of the purity of all things, and hopefully, reminded that 
hers is the nature of the Great Bliss Queen.  
 In the end, the ritual of the Great Bliss Queen, with its chanting, visualization, 
practices of mindfulness are all meant to bring the practitioner to a realization of wisdom 
and compassion; to see from the “sacred outlook”, the nondual perspective that sees the 
primordial purity of all things. As Klein suggests, its liturgy “is an excellent resource for 
exploring how the more explicitly philosophical expressions of Buddhism, which in their 
most rigorous form were accessible to a relative minority of Tibetan Buddhists, were 
assimilated to widely known styles of practice.”519 In other words, it is a good example of 
how doctrine/philosophy is interdependent with practice; how each is understood, 
realized or deepened through the other.  In particular, for women, it is a way for women 
to experience a strong yet interdependent self; to begin to cultivate a strong and “healthy” 
sense of self that realizes her connection with others which leads to her compassionate 
action.  For one, as Klein claims, “[t]he practices of chanting, calm, and concentration all 
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assume that the subject has depth as well as breadth, motion as well as ideas, and that 
these qualities provide personal coherence and power.”520 A ritual that cultivates such 
qualities is helpful for women who feel diffuseness or a sense of loss.  It provides them 
with stability, clear thinking, and a groundedness that is necessary to begin to discover 
one’s own voice, to find the underlying identity that is more essential than the ordinary 
sense of their identity and its components like gender.   
 More specifically, visualizing a female deity and a female body has even deeper 
implications for women.  To see a woman and a woman’s body as symbolizing 
enlightenment and bliss is a reminder of how women have the same capacity for 
enlightenment as men, and that they too are inherently pure, breaking dualistic bonds that 
have left them inferior.  She is the Great Bliss Queen and she has the same capacities.  
Such visualization can serve as a helpful reminder to women of their great capacities; that 
they must begin with themselves, and empower them to break out of the image of 
passivity and helplessness that may have defined them.  As Klein says, “[f]rom a feminist 
perspective, the fact that a female form and specific body imagery is used to transcend 
polarities is significant. Not only is the degrading subject-object dichotomy questioned, 
but the ‘passivity’ with which women are frequently associated is reframed.”521   
 Klein writes, “In her ritual context she [Tsogyel] is not a mask; she is not a role 
model. She is an expression of one’s own capacity and potential.  To meet her in this way 
means, for Western women, to possess and come to terms with their own story. It is also 
to recognize that, however fine or tragic our stories are, they cannot define us completely. 
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There are other dimensions of embodied subjective experience.”522  To engage in the 
ritual is to begin to meet the most fundamental and powerful part of ourselves; for 
women to see their own capacity and potential.  Furthermore, within the ritual, they find 
the power to transform their own selves by identifying, ultimately merging and dissolving 
with the image of the Great Bliss Queen.  At the same time, the ritual also cultivates 
compassion for others, seeing the primordial purity of all things and therefore 
remembering the context of the ritual as benefiting all sentient beings.  Once one has the 
clarity of mind, having seen the emptiness and primordial purity of all things, then “one’s 
real purpose – which is not autonomy but manifold beneficial activity – can be acted out. 
One’s relationship to others becomes more than ever one of responsibility and profound 
care, while at the same time one’s own personal power increases as never before.”523  In 
other words, the practice is never meant for individual or selfish purposes only; it is not 
meant to isolate one from the world or others but is a foundation for compassionate 
action in the world, by starting with one’s own self, one’s own mind. 
 However, Klein does warn that such a ritual, such identification with the Great 
Bliss Queen, must be adapted by Western women with some caution.  Already cognizant 
of women’s tendencies to “lose themselves”, practices of identification such as these may 
lead to even further loss of women’s own identity, of their own story.  Hence, Klein 
argues that Western practitioners must be careful not to lose their story, and in the ritual 
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of the Great Bliss Queen, to identify “with her inessential essence in order to discover it 
in oneself and part of one’s own identity.”524  In the end, Klein writes, 
Among the most stimulating challenges for Western Buddhists is to find a way to 
integrate personal narrative and historical specificity into the nonconceptual universals 
considered the goals of much of Buddhist practice. In the midst of negotiating this 
delicate intersection of uniqueness and connectedness, it is crucial that an engagement 
with ‘traditions’ such as those of Tibetan Buddhism does not tip the balance by 
obstructing personal creativity and inspiration. Conversely, particularity is crucial, but it 
is important not to get lost in one’s particulars, or to overidentify with them.  There is a 
middle way where meet the two narratives engaged throughout this book: how feminists 
and Buddhists can expand each others’ narrative horizons, and what Western women 




 In the end, both Klein and Gross argue that a dialogue between Buddhism and 
feminism is important particularly around the issue of selfhood that has plagued many 
Western feminists.  Buddhist discussions of analysis of self, using the doctrines of no-self 
and emptiness are helpful for women in search of a powerful yet relational self.  Though 
the category of gender has never been used in Buddhist analysis and notions of “no-self” 
may be misunderstood as the problematic “selflessness” of women, Klein and Gross 
argue that the doctrines are helpful in critiquing wrong notions of “self” or identity that 
have been harmful to women, particularly identities tied to patriarchal impositions that 
have left women in an inferior position.  Such doctrines can be used to demonstrate how 
gender roles and identities are merely social constructs and projections.  Moreover, 
emptiness as thusness or Buddha nature, gives a more positive image for women; that 
they are not mere obstacles to enlightenment but have the same spiritual capacities as 
men and hence cannot be treated in any kind of inferior or secondary way.  This is the 
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kind of nondual outlook, a “sacred outlook” that Vajrayana Buddhism tries to develop. 
This kind of outlook can help women find a more positive way of relating with 
themselves as well as with their bodies or emotions which have been associated with 
them and seen as inferior to the mind and reason that are usually associated as “male 
traits.”  Such an outlook shows the interrelation of mind and body, of emotion with 
reason (or wisdom), and of finding the balance between the “masculine” and “feminine” 
principles, and bringing all of this into the spiritual path.      
 These doctrines and the vision of emptiness and interdependence are realized 
through meditation practices.  It is through such practices that women can cultivate the 
qualities of mind necessary to develop and experience a strong and healthy sense of self 
that is also deeply connected to others, undoing the harmful dualism upon which 
patriarchy is based.  In the discussions above, practices of silence and mindfulness that 
cultivate calm, concentration, and focus are helpful in developing and experiencing a 
more stable, centered, grounded and stronger sense of self.  In such mindfulness and the 
beginning of insight into emptiness, a kind of gentle awareness is cultivated that leads to 
a healthy self-acceptance, able to listen to the multiplicity of one’s voices, see the 
spaciousness and fluidity of one’s identity, without fear, judgment and condemnation.  It 
is such practices then that can be the foundation for the development of a strong sense of 
self for women, able to critique the patriarchal voices they’ve heard and begin to hear 
their own voice. 
 As insight into emptiness is developed through such practices, compassion for 
others also develops.   Hence, just as a strong sense of self develops, a stronger sense of 
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one’s connection to others develops as well.  Just as one was able to hear and honor one’s 
own voice, one is now better able to hear and honor the voices of others, letting their 
compassion be more effective, less clingy and clouded with one’s own needs and 
expectations.  Furthermore, having cultivated the “sacred outlook” through practice, one 
sees how the nature of oneself and of the other are similar.  This allows women and men 
to care for others in the same way that they care for themselves.  In other words, the 
initial introspection on oneself does not lead to being closed to others, but leads to 
healthier relationships with others based on one’s spiritual practice.  This is one of the 
key points in the teaching on the interdependence of wisdom (of emptiness) and 
compassion; that one’s own liberation is tied with that of others, or in this case, one’s 
own self-development is tied to that of others, and others are constitutive of one’s own 
liberation, but it must start with oneself.  This teaching is an important reminder for 
women who want to develop a strong yet relational self, in order to balance both love for 
self and love for the other so that she does not lose herself in her compassion for others.  
For both Klein and Gross argue that compassion can only be enacted by having the 
wisdom of emptiness which allows the person to be grounded in their self, in their very 
center, clearly seeing the situation which allows for “dispassionate” (not ruled by 
disturbing emotions such as desire or attachment) and wise compassion for others (seeing 
their nature as the same as one’s own).  Furthermore, given the predilection of women to 
focus too much on others, both Klein and Gross remind women that self-care is just as 
important as compassion for others.  Klein reminds women that they must include 
themselves in the circle of care while Gross reminds them that some level of self-
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development and self-liberation is necessary for effective compassion for others that is 
free of aggression or may be harmful to oneself or to another.     
 Both give the example of the Great Bliss Queen as a model of wisdom and 
compassion, but also whose ritual can bring about such an experience of the strong sense 
of self that is relational and compassionate.  Her story can be used skillfully to point to 
how relationships are constitutive of developing one’s own sense of self and deepening 
one’s own practice, and how one’s practice can transform and purify one’s relationships.  
Furthermore, her ritual gives women an example not only of a female deity but also a 
very positive valuation of the female body, again emphasizing the equal potential of 
women, ultimately able to visualize herself as the Great Bliss Queen.  The cheerful, calm, 
blissful, wise and compassionate Queen is oneself.  This is not a model that is another 
impossible ideal, but depicts capacities one already has.  All that she needs is already 
within herself.  Such a model and ritual can go a long way in undoing many of the 
negative views of women that have been projected upon them, and empowering their own 
transformation towards being strong yet relational selves.  It is through such a practice 
that the transformation of the self happens. 
 This insistence on the centrality of spiritual practice in the realization of doctrine 
and for effective compassion and transformed self and relationships illustrates how 
doctrine, spiritual practice (worship), and moral action are all interdependent.  On the one 
hand, the doctrines of wisdom and compassion are what empower and inform the 
practices, but it is through the them that one actually realizes or has an experience of such 
wisdom and compassion.  This shows the relationship of doctrine with spiritual practice.  
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Furthermore, this spiritual practice that promotes the transformation of the self and 
liberation of all beings also becomes the foundation for moral/social action.  As one is 
transformed or one more fully realizes one’s empty nature, one sees one’s interrelation 
with all else and the purity of all things. Such a transformation also allows for “clear 
seeing” which may help one to undo harmful patterns in relationships.  Such a vision, 
cultivated through spiritual practice, can be the fuel that lights one’s action for others in 
the world, so that the transformation of oneself can truly lead to the transformation of the 
whole world.  This, for Gross, is one of the challenges to Buddhism today, making the 
“language of meditation socially relevant.”  She says, “[t]hat is a fusion of spirituality and 
feminism for me.”526 
 In the end, it is such meditation practices that Gross and Klein argue are the 
biggest contribution of Buddhism to feminism and the feminist search for the strong yet 
relational self.  However, such meditation practices still cannot just be taken wholesale, 
in order to be helpful to women.  As Leah Weiss-Ekstrom once argued, just as feminists 
have proposed that doctrines and scriptures must be analyzed for their impact on the 
experience and lived reality of women, so too must spiritual practices be addressed, 
asking how they support or undermine women’s practical and spiritual needs.527 
Moreover, they must once again be skillfully adapted to address those needs.  This is 
what we find in Gross and Klein’s work.  Their discussions on mindfulness and other 
meditation practices show how they can address the particular need of women searching 
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for a strong yet relational self.  At the same time, they also give caution and suggestions 
on how to continually make changes cognizant of the issues of women.  For example, 
Klein mentioned the importance of personal stories, of emphasizing self-care and the 
importance of interpersonal interactions within one’s practice. Gross, on the other hand, 
mentioned the need to emphasize how self-development must come before compassion, 
to have more female dharma teachers and ultimately to revalue the third refuge, the 
sangha filled with the feminist value of community, nurturance, communication, 
relationship and friendship.  In this way, spiritual practice itself can truly be not just a 
personal or individuated experience, but one of an interrelated self transformed within 
and through a community of practice. 
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Chapter Four:  Comparing Christian and Buddhist Feminists critiques  
and reconstructions of kenosis and emptiness:  
mutual learning through comparison and dialogue 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
According to Anne Carr, there are three main tasks/agendas in Christian feminist 
theology:  (1) a critique of the past, (2) the recovery of the lost voices of women, and (3) 
revisioning Christian categories to include the experience of women.528  Having surveyed 
the feminist reconstructions of kenosis and emptiness within their respective traditions, in 
this chapter, I will explore how the three tasks above can be enriched through 
comparison, seeing how Buddhist feminist reconstructions of emptiness can be helpful in 
Christian women’s critique and revisioning of kenosis and their search for a relational 
self.  In this way, Christian feminist theology is enriched through dialogue and 
comparison and becomes an example of the kind of theology that Frank Clooney, as we 
saw in the introduction, argues for: a theology that is “interreligious, comparative, 
dialogical and confessional.”  
Comparative theology is theology, an act of “faith seeking understanding,” 
through dialogue and learning from other religious traditions.  As Clooney says,  
Comparative theology – comparative and theological beginning to end – marks acts of 
faith seeking understanding which are rooted in a particular faith tradition but which, 
from that foundation, venture into learning from one or more other faith traditions. This 
learning is sought for the sake of fresh theological insights that are indebted to the newly 
encountered tradition/s as well as the home tradition.529 
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Hence, the comparative method that will be operative in this Christian feminist 
reconstruction of kenosis begins with an attitude, a stance that there is something to be 
learned from the other, of taking seriously the religious other – the way they understand 
the world, the human condition and human persons, and their relationship with ultimate 
reality.  If one begins with such a stance, then the comparative method can only begin 
with a serious look into the truth that this other brings while also recognizing that one’s 
understanding of the other is always to some extent also conditioned by one’s own 
tradition.  
For Clooney, one’s entrance into the truth of the other begins with reading their 
texts which, in a sense, serves as a window into their world.  He writes,  
In my view, the foremost prospect for a fruitful comparative theology is the reading of 
texts….If we wish to learn and be changed by what we learn, we are unlikely to find 
another practice as reliably rich and fruitful as such reading….comparative practice 
occurs when acts of reading have been undertaken, as we read back and forth across 
religious borders, examining multiple texts, individually but then too in light of one 
another.530 
 
This kind of reading is not about finding information that confirms already one’s 
preconceived ideas and conclusions but must be done in an attitude of openness and 
vulnerability so that the truth of the other can truly lay a claim on you.  This attitude is 
how a comparativist can begin to partially overcome their otherness to the text and the 
other tradition; for a major challenge in a comparative reading is how an “outsider” can 
begin to have an “insider’s” understanding of the other religion. Engaged reading – with 
such openness and vulnerability – must allow for the reader to be transformed and led 
into the world of other.  Reading then is a kind of practice, particularly the “self-
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effacement before the text,” of shaping the self to allow the truth of the other to transform 
and shape the reader.531  
This humble practice changes readers, as they are inevitably drawn into the worlds 
brought to life in their reading. Readers who are willing to take this risk become 
competent to read religiously and, upon receiving the riches of the great texts, they also 
become able to speak, act, and write with spiritual insight and power.532 
 
Hence, such a transformed self can have heightened awareness or sensitivity when they 
go back to their own religious tradition.    Revisiting one’s own tradition again, the reader 
can come to it with “new eyes” – new angles, new questions, and new ways of looking at 
it.  The reader is led back to reflect on one’s own truth in light of truth found in the other 
– and maybe to look for it in places which have been neglected and forgotten (an 
important task in feminist theology itself).  Hence, one’s reflections can lead to the 
retrieval of forgotten aspects within one’s own tradition or make a new analysis, re-
assessed due to the comparison.  Such comparison then can help the reader to re-write 
Christian theology out of this new comparative context, offer new ways to understand 
conundrums within one’s tradition and challenge or problematize other aspects of it.   
For, as Clooney says,  
…the comparative process reaches fruition in the transformation of theologians’ 
consciousness and theological practice. Intelligent and attentive scholars become able to 
theologize within their own traditions in a way that neither blocks thinking across 
religious boundaries nor interprets reductively the similarities that become obvious.533 
 
Clooney believes it is best to be selective and not try to cover the entirety of 
traditions.  He focuses more on theologizing by way of particular examples and asserts 
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that “[t]heology becomes interreligious when we actually take examples seriously.”534  In 
this chapter, I will look at the examples of Western Buddhist feminists and their retrieval 
of the doctrine of emptiness as a resource for Christian feminist theologians’ revisioning 
of kenosis.  I will focus on how the reading of Buddhist feminist “texts” can challenge 
and enrich Christian feminist discussions regarding kenosis and the search for a relational 
anthropology.  In particular, my engagement with the Buddhist doctrines of the human 
condition and human person (“no-self”, “emptiness”, “dependent arising” and “Buddha 
nature”), will inform and challenge the Christian understanding of the human person (sin, 
image of God), help Christians find new ways of re-envisioning the human (as Body of 
Christ and as a community of believers), and help Christian feminists re-think kenosis (of 
what one gives up and what one gains) in the process of “self-emptying.”  I will also look 
at how the understanding of kenosis in the ethical and spiritual life of Christians can be 
enriched by the Buddhist feminist discussions regarding wisdom and compassion as well 
as the importance of meditation in order to realize emptiness.  Specifically, the discussion 
about the story and ritual of the Great Bliss Queen brings me back to the story and 
traditions around Mary as a continuing resource for feminist theology, and particularly in 
the retrieval of kenosis.  Ultimately, my aim is to contribute to Christian theological 
anthropology by bringing in the “interruption” of another religious tradition, Buddhism, 
in order to see how key Buddhist doctrines and practices may inform aspects of Christian 
feminism and theology, primarily in their task to “correlate the central and liberating 
themes of biblical and Christian tradition with the experience of women in the 
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contemporary situation,” in this case, the specific theme of kenosis and relational 
anthropology. 535 
Having seen what Christian feminists can learn from Buddhist feminist 
discussions on emptiness and spiritual practice, the second section will focus on a 
reflection on these Buddhist feminist discussions in light of some of the differences 
between the two traditions, continuing and deepening the dialogue between these two 
traditions. Hopefully in the process, I did not water down either tradition but show 
particularly how Christian theologizing can be deepened and challenged by Buddhist 
analysis and vice versa.  
In the end, one of the great challenges of such a comparison is analogous to the 
concern about the relationship of the self and other – how can I relate with the other and 
leave their otherness intact but how do I also do theology in a way that does not lead to a 
‘loss of self’ but a discovery of a transformed self through dialogue with the other?  
There is a need then for a respect for the particularities of each tradition even as one 
opens one’s tradition to the truth of the other, making one vulnerable and open to change 
and transformation.  This, as we saw, was Boeve’s concern in Chapter 1.  Despite this 
challenge, I hope to demonstrate that comparative work can develop solidarity among 
women, in their common suffering and their search for an empowered self, and how 
religions can continue to be resources of hope and transformation for their own believers 
as well as for each other and the world.  As Karma Lekshe Tsomo wrote,  
Buddhist and Christian women have much to share and much to learn from one another, 
especially in terms of meditation and social action….By networking in their local 
communities, women spiritual practitioners can provide each other with encouragement 
                                                
535 Anne Carr, 8-9. 
  233 
and support for the spiritual values they share and learn to appreciate their differences. 
By developing solidarity on an international level, women can effect great benefit in the 
world through a sharing and mutual infusion of spiritual values directed at personal and 
social change. By bridging religious differences, women set an example for the people in 
the world to emulate in overcoming strife and discovering commonalities in the human 
heritage on the deepest spiritual level.536 
 
II. What Christian feminists can learn from Buddhism:  The reconstruction of 
kenosis and the vision of a new humanity through dialogue with Buddhist feminists  
 
According to Gregory Ornatowski, the doctrine of emptiness has taken a variety 
of meanings throughout Buddhist history and its translation into English has included 
expressions such as “emptiness,” “nothingness,” “nonsubstantiality,” “relativity,” and 
“voidness.”  Furthermore, it has been described as referring to a “(1) religious attitude, 
(2) focus of meditation, (3) manner of ethical action, (4) statement about reality, such as 
corresponding to the Buddhist notion of the interrelated nature of all existing things.”537  
In the previous chapters, I attempted to show this depth and breadth of the meaning and 
function of emptiness (Chapter 1), and how American Buddhist feminists have taken the 
depth and richness of this doctrine to articulate a new vision of self and human 
community that takes into consideration their particular experience as women, and the 
suffering of women in society (Chapter 3).  For example, emptiness was wielded as a tool 
to break down the dualistic constructs of male and female binaries that saw women as 
inferior or weak, and to challenge the “givenness” of gendered social roles where women 
end up becoming subordinate to men.  Furthermore, emptiness as thusness reinforced a 
more positive image for women reminding them of their equal status with men, 
possessing the same capacity for spiritual enlightenment and having the nature of the 
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Buddha.  In the end, understanding emptiness as dependent origination, these feminists 
offered a vision of humanity as an interdependent matrix of relations, where the self is 
constituted by its relationship with others without being subsumed in these relationships.  
This vision helps support the search for a strong and empowered self as well as mutual 
love and giving in relationships, the kind of reciprocal relationships desired by the 
Buddhist feminists discussed in the previous chapter.  
The Christian feminists’ discussion regarding kenosis centered on the correction 
and re-interpretation of the doctrine in light of the experience of women (Chapter Two).  
The challenge facing the Christian feminists was to show the continued relevance of such 
a doctrine in the face of the critique that it continues the dependence or abuse of women 
by its insistence on an uncritical command of self-sacrificial love. Sarah Coakley and 
Mary Grey re-focused the discussion in terms of understanding kenosis as finding 
personal empowerment, as seeing strength and power in vulnerability and questioning the 
assumptions regarding male and female in terms of dominance-submission or active-
passive in the spiritual life as well as in society. In all this, there is the continued 
insistence of not losing the language of dependence or vulnerability seen as central to 
Christian discipleship and the power of the cross and resurrection (Coakley) as well as 
the desire to find empowering relationships, new ways of being community to fight the 
fragmentation in society today (Grey).  The next section then will outline how Buddhist 
feminists’ articulations of self and community in light of the doctrine of emptiness can 
help illumine, deepen or challenge the Christian feminist articulations of kenosis and the 
relational self.  
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Kenosis and the Human (vision of self within the human community) 
 
The Christian feminist discussions regarding kenosis highlighted the problem of 
the interpretation of sin as pride and attributing this sin more to men than to women.  On 
the other hand, if women’s sin is that of selflessness, then the call for kenosis understood 
as self-sacrificial only exacerbates women’s loss of self, particularly in their 
relationships.  Hence, the Christian feminist reconstruction of kenosis entailed a re-
orientation of the notions of dependence and vulnerability and re-contextualized these as 
postures in the spiritual life that can bring empowerment and a stronger sense of self.  
They also re-interpreted the notion of divine kenosis to mean the “giving up of worldly 
(patriarchal power)” and Jesus’ whole life as a critique to such dominating and abusive 
power.  In light of the Buddhist feminist discussions of “no-self” and “emptiness,” how 
can these reconstructions of the understanding of sin and kenosis be deepened or 
strengthened? 
On the doctrine of “no-self” and the doctrine of sin.  First, the doctrine of no-self 
and the analysis of the human tendency to reify the self or to establish an independent, 
autonomous substantial self resonates with Christian interpretations of sin and the Fall; 
that is, our independent, autonomous, self-sufficient stance in the face of God, a refusal to 
accept “creaturehood.” However, this insight into sin as pride can be deepened by the 
doctrine of no-self in its insistence that this reification leads to individuation and 
separation, a sense of independence, autonomy and dualistic tendencies that leads to 
suffering, including the suffering of women as Gross argued in the previous chapter. 
Individuation and separation have led to the dualistic tendencies that in turn have resulted 
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in perceptions of women as inferior, emotional, and passive while men are seen to be 
superior, rational and active.  These erroneous perceptions resulted in the subordination 
of women in society as well as in the Church and many other religious institutions.  For 
this reason, Catherine Keller writes that “separation and sexism have functioned together 
as the most fundamental self-shaping assumptions of our culture.  That any subject, 
human or non-human, is what it is only in clear division from everything else; and that 
men, by nature and by right, exercise the primary prerogatives of civilization: these two 
presuppositions collaborate like two eyes to sustain a single worldview.”538  This insight 
shows how subordination or dominance over others is part of the sinful situation of the 
world today, part of the “ought not be” that must be fought if Christians are to come 
closer to the vision of the fullness of humanity.   
Moreover, as these feminist Buddhists have also pointed out, the doctrine of ‘no-
self’ goes beyond the notion of a strong, powerful, autonomous self, but points to all false 
notions of self; of all harmful modes of being which includes selflessness.  Hence, the 
doctrine of ‘no-self’ applies as well to the objection of many Christian feminists of the 
insufficiency of understanding sin as pride while women’s sin is selflessness.  As Rita 
Gross has argued, someone who is too independent or too ‘proud’ and another who is too 
dependent or too ‘meek’ both suffer from ego or the delusion of Self.  Hence the doctrine 
of ‘no-self” applies to any kind of pattern, any mode of being that clouds the true nature 
of the Self which is not a permanent, autonomous Self.  In light of this, one could extend 
the notion of sin to cover any pattern or mode of being that obscures the true nature of 
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persons and inhibits the proper relationship with others and with God – which can either 
come from the stance of too much autonomy or too much dependence.  Given this 
understanding, kenosis can then be re-interpreted as giving up both wrong modes of 
being, of giving up the false and sinful self (of either pride or selflessness) understood as 
any sense of self that does not equate with the dignity of the human person, any mode or 
state that leads to indignity or the diminishment of one’s self or the other, and realizing 
that both modes (of pride or selflessness) lead to suffering of both one’s self as well as 
the other. Kenosis¸ in this sense then, is a more nuanced understanding of the “loss of 
self” as a giving up of wrong (sinful) notions of self so that this can give way to a fuller, 
more empowered self, who is in right relationship with the self, God and the other.      
The Doctrine of emptiness and Kenosis as “letting go” of limited gendered 
perceptions of self and God.  In light of this insight, one of the aspects that must be given 
up is the dualistic tendency that leave women in a subordinate position, as mentioned 
above.  Helpful in this endeavor is the Buddhist feminists’ use of the doctrine of 
emptiness as an epistemological tool to break out of such tendencies to show the social 
constructedness of hierarchies and of social patterns that seem “natural.” The doctrine of 
emptiness can further deepen and support such analysis of social construction by showing 
the “empty nature” of all things, of how they lack inherent existence and are not as we 
think they are.  We do not see them in their ‘thusness’ but only in our delusional, self-
grasping, sinful view.  Such a doctrine then can help to question the reified notions of 
“male” and “female,” “masculine” and “feminine,” and the way that such categories limit 
our perception of another to just one aspect of who they are, reifying them by seeing 
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them only through the lens of that one aspect which cannot capture their full reality. 539 
Such an interpretation of emptiness applied to gender critiques could enrich, for example, 
Coakley’s claims about the need for “mental patterns of unmastery” so that we can get to 
a deeper knowledge of God and the other while having the humility to realize that the 
depth and richness of God and the other cannot be fully captured.  In this case, one does 
not end up reifying or limiting one’s perception of others to labels such as “male” and 
“female”, and one can begin the “unmastery” of gender categories that obscure the 
realization of the full reality of the other.    
Though many feminists have already spoken of how dualistic male-female, 
masculine-feminine, God-world thinking has been harmful to women, other oppositional 
trends are disclosed through the use of emptiness that can soften some of the dualistic 
tendencies that have led to oppressive thinking and action.  For example, to think of 
“oppressed” and “oppressor,” of “poor” and “rich,” “victim,” and “victimizer” is not to 
say that there is no truth to such an analysis that many insist is necessary to fight for 
justice, but in this process, one can miss a deeper dimension of humanity, and how all of 
us are somehow involved in both poles.  For example, are women just “oppressed” and 
never “oppressor,” just “victim” and not also somehow a “victimizer?”  The doctrine of 
emptiness can serve to soften such hard, dualistic, reductionistic, polemical boundaries 
and move one to think beyond such categories to see the fullness of persons. Tempered in 
this way, there would be less temptation to romanticize the “poor” and demonize the 
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“rich” or to sentimentalize women as victims and strip them of their agency.  This, as we 
have seen, was of particular concern for both Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey who kept 
insisting that women are not just dependent and hold no power over others, or that they 
were just victims and always “innocent.”  In this case, the doctrine of emptiness can help 
temper those tendencies to sentimentalize women, projecting an illusion of women and 
women’s experience (whether as “too good” or “too bad”).   
Regarding questions of power, such nondualistic and nonreductionist tendencies 
could also be helpful in understanding Coakley’s and Grey’s re-interpretation of divine 
kenosis and notions of power.  Instead of just accepting the usual association of power 
with domination and male power, and dependence with weakness and femaleness, both of 
them argue for an understanding of a “power” that is “vulnerable” and gentle yet still 
empowering, and for an understanding of the posture of vulnerability and dependence 
that is empowering.   Only in giving up such simplistic, reductionist interpretations of 
power and vulnerability can one begin to appreciate the interpretations of Coakley and 
Grey who are intimating the very heart of the Christian life: the paradox of the cross and 
resurrection, of as Coakley said, a “strength made perfect in weakness”; articulating ways 
of “redeeming” such values of the Christian life for both women and men.  This cannot 
be done without giving up these dualistic and reductionist understandings of the 
dynamics of power and vulnerability. 
Furthermore, one could deepen other analyses of other characteristics associated 
with male and female such as the question of agency/activity and passivity/receptivity 
and whether these characteristics are the exclusive domain of one or the other. One 
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example that could be subjected to this analysis would be the perception that the giving 
of oneself to another (again another way of equating kenosis with agape) comes more 
naturally to women, and hence they are to be exemplars of such self-giving.  This, for 
example, has been the main argument of John Paul II in his various writings about 
women, particularly in Mulieris Dignitatem where he writes about the special nature of 
woman.  In light of the analysis above, one could ask whether there is such a “special 
nature” of woman.  Of course, John Paul II is careful to clarify that self-giving is the call 
of everyone, and yet his writings reflect that women are more “naturally” able to answer 
and live out this call in their lives.  However, does such a view then reify and trap women 
into such self-giving actions that lead more to their suffering and loss of self?  Does such 
a view diminish the view of women by not taking into consideration other aspects of her 
person that are not tied to her biological make-up or to how she is perceived to 
complement the male?  Furthermore, does the notion of this “special nature” of women 
obscure the universality of this call, that all of humanity is called to live this out, and if all 
are called, then to an extent, everyone has this capacity within them? Does this pedestal 
of her special nature lock her into a prison of a romanticized image of woman that 
women cannot live up to?  
The point here is not to nullify the differences of people, but also not to limit them 
and define them based on only one aspect of who they are.  It is about the practice of 
appreciating otherness, by not limiting others to one’s preconceived notions nor by 
boxing them into just one particular characteristic.  Boxing women as “passive 
receivers”, as “nurturers” and men as “active” or “problem solvers” can be damaging to 
  241 
both parties.  Such “mastery” of the other through preconceived categories is what 
prevents one from a deeper knowledge of that other, not recognizing that there is more 
there to continually know.  Emptiness then can enrich the understanding of kenosis as a 
letting go of such preconceived limited notions of the other, for emptiness undercuts the 
tendency to reify others under one simple characteristic or label which allows one to 
surrender to the mystery of each person that transcends all such reifications.  
Mary Grey argues that this is the same way with the understanding of God in 
Christian dogmas.  She uses the Buddhist story about using a raft to get to the other shore 
then letting it go.  This story is an example of using emptiness as a tool but letting it go, 
lest it become an object of attachment. In the same way, she says that in understanding 
kenosis as this kind of process of emptying and letting go, then the “kenotic, self-
emptying God-in-process questions all constructions and dogmas about God as 
contextual, time-bound and partial…..recognizing that that is what dogmas actually are, 
inadequate human constructions, brings us back to the mystics who could only see what 
God is not, through the ancient via negativa.”540  This is similar to Coakley’s point of the 
need for “unmastery” in our language and understanding of God who is Mystery.  In the 
same way that such “unmastery” is necessary in the deepening relationship with God, so 
too is such “unmastery” necessary in order to truly attend to the other in their difference.  
The doctrine of emptiness can be helpful to point out the dualistic and reifying tendencies 
that prevent such “unmastery” and the mechanisms in the human person that insist on 
“mastery” and “control” of the other that leads to suffering.  Hence, emptiness as the 
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“negation of views” can be a reminder of the importance of apophasis within Christian 
theology, not only in our articulations about God but also in our articulations of gendered 
humanity.   
Doctrine of Buddha nature and Kenosis as plerosis: The fullness of being human 
(in the image of God) and being in community (as the Body of Christ).  As shown in the 
discussions of emptiness, this view was not only used to negate other views (as the 
Madhyamika school did) but eventually developed emptiness into positive statements 
about reality such as nonduality (as against the dualistic tendencies that cause suffering) 
and Buddha nature.  These developments can also enhance the understanding of kenosis 
as giving up the false sense of a sinful limited self to kenosis as seeing the fullness of 
humanity as the image of God, breaking such dualistic tendencies by realizing 
“sameness” with others, neither as superior nor inferior to the other, all creatures of God.  
As we saw in the development of a Buddhist understanding of human nature, the doctrine 
of Buddha nature pointed to how persons are not just defiled and full of suffering but at 
their very core (covered by these defilements) is the nature of the Buddhas with deep 
capacity for loving kindness and compassion as well as discernment, creative 
responsiveness, courage, patience, stability, energy, etc.  This is deeply resonant with the 
Christian notion of creation and how persons are made in the image of God.  A reminder 
of this depth-dimension of the person as image of God can then balance seeing persons in 
their difference while holding to some fundamental commonality/nature that we all share.  
The doctrine of Buddha nature then harkens us back to our own understanding of being 
made in the image of God, and of finding God in all persons; of seeing persons 
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through/with the loving (not possessive nor dominating) eyes of God – in a sense seeing 
our “categorical selves” from the view of the “Absolute.”  
It is with such a vision, for example, that the many negative images of woman can 
be given up, as part of the “false sense of self” that must be rejected in order for a new 
sense of self to emerge.  Instead, such negative images can be replaced by the positive 
image of one as made in the image of God, deserving dignity and equality with others.  
This then can become a criterion for judging one’s own relationship with others, and 
whether one’s dignity or another’s is being respected in our way of interacting with each 
other.541  Furthermore, other aspects that were seen as negative and equated with women, 
such as the body or emotions can now be retrieved and re-valued as part of that which is 
precious to the human being.  This was demonstrated in the discussions regarding 
Vajrayana Buddhism and the teachings on nondualism and valuing the body and the 
emotions as containing wisdom.  As Rita Gross explained, such nondualism leads to the 
view of seeing everything in a sacred manner, and can therefore be brought into one’s 
practice, and become the foundation for a new way of seeing oneself and another and the 
world.   Perceiving reality in this sacred manner is what is known in Buddhism as pure 
perception.  John Makransky writes that  
…to perceive purely is to recognize both the primordial purity of phenomena and the 
Buddha nature within all sentient beings. In meditation practice, as we learn to relinquish 
our ego-centered and dualistic frames of reference into the wisdom of natural awareness, 
we sense the essential purity and perfection of phenomena within the infinite, open, and 
unchanging nature of mind…542 
 
                                                
541 This will be discussed further in the section on Kenosis and the Ethical life 
542 John Makransky, Awakening through Love: Unveiling your deepest goodness (Boston: Wisdom 
Publication, 2007) 133. 
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Nondualism in Vajrayana Buddhism points us back to the Catholic understanding 
of sacramental vision, of seeing the depth-dimension, the sacredness of all things which 
becomes the basis for our appreciation of all reality.543  In this case, the kenosis of women 
calls for the giving up of such “false” negative notions of themselves, their bodies and 
emotions that they have been equated with, to recovering an appreciation for themselves, 
their bodies and emotions within such a sacramental vision. It also becomes the basis for 
ethical action, for oneself and others, grounding oneself and another within a deeper 
reality, the reality of God.  These points will be elaborated further in the next two 
discussions of kenosis and the ethical and spiritual life.   
 This view of human nature (whether as having Buddha nature or being made in 
the image of God) opens into a better understanding of proper human relationships, an 
articulation of a new vision of humanity, and of empowering relationships and 
communities.  The Buddhist doctrine of dependent arising (corollary to ‘emptiness’) 
brings out a way of understanding the relationship of all beings – of holding the tension 
between the self and the other, of our shared nature yet our diversity.  The doctrines of 
“emptiness” and “no-self” show how truly interdependent and interconnected we are.  
Furthermore, the image of Indra’s net, the vision of the bodhisattvas and the 
interpenetration of all things, is helpful in articulating a nondualistic anthropology which 
many feminists search for against dualistic, individualistic views of relationships as the 
relating of separate entities that pre-exist all relationships.  Such an anthropology can 
                                                
543 The sacramental principle reminds Catholics of how all creation is imbued with God’s love and how 
God is revealed through God’s creation.  Hence, all creation has a depth dimension and has inherent 
dignity.  
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offer a view of how to be a self in relation to other that is not oppositional; that does not 
entail the ‘loss of self’ while keeping the otherness of the other intact.   
Mary Grey herself who, in arguing that there is a need to find new ways of 
imagining ourselves, not as individuals “defined over against another, but in-relation-to, 
connected-with”, finds a resource in such Buddhist imagery of Indra’s Net as an example 
of an expression of relationships of connection, of how others are constitutive of oneself 
and vice-versa. This is the alternative image of self and others, a mutual relationship that 
is needed in today’s fragmented society.  Furthermore, she comments on how Joanna 
Macy, another Buddhist feminist, argues that other images such as the boundless heart of 
the bodhisattva are reflective of the doctrine of no-self and how such can “liberate us 
from the rat-race of chasing our own delusions, of being propelled by our own greed. The 
boundless heart image can transform our individualist egos, and refocus us round a larger 
centre.  It can inspire both a new ethics and a new way of knowing.” 544 
 In this case, the Christian is brought back and challenged to find images that 
express a similar sense of mutual empowerment within the Christian tradition, such as 
being made in the image of God.  Another is the example of the Trinity, as a community 
of distinct persons but one God (and what that says about a human community of persons 
where differences are respected). An image offered by Sarah Coakley was that of the 
human community as the Body of Christ.  She described it in a way analogous to the 
Buddhist notion of interdependence as the “mysterious interpenetration of individuals one 
with another” and the discovery of the “mutual members of the ‘body of Christ’” (quoted 
                                                
544 Grey, The Wisdom of Fools, 77. 
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in chapter two).  These images/descriptions bring us closer to the vision of humanity that 
Coakley and Grey argue for, and break us from the “sinful” reality of individualism that 
has led to much suffering since the construct of individualism, of a separate self, as 
articulated in Buddhist “no-self”, is out of touch with reality.  The kenosis that is called 
for then, is a “giving up” of any false sense of self (selfishness or selflessness) in order to 
give oneself into God and the Body of Christ in ways that are empowering for both self 
and other, of finding oneself through empowering relationships with other, and 
expressing such power, vulnerability and suffering through solidarity with that other who 
is experienced as constitutive of oneself.545   
 This image of the interdependence of all things, of being part of a matrix of 
relationships may be a fruitful ground for liberation theologians such as Roberto Goizueta 
who argues that ‘community is the birthplace of the self’ and offers an organic 
anthropology.  It is a reminder that we human beings require the sustenance and nurture 
of a community for our existence and sustenance, and that our self-identities are formed 
in our interactions with others, either in family, school or other relationships.546  Given 
this realization, we are forced to look even harder into community and society in order to 
see the mechanics of sin and salvation there.  In this case, the Buddhist analysis of this 
drive towards the reification of the Self – of the seemingly felt need to grasp and cling to 
pleasure and avoid the unpleasant – the almost desperate drive to collect and possess 
                                                
545 Ethical implications of this will be fleshed out in the next section 
546 Roberto Goizueta has spoken of the importance of the community as “source of self-identity” in 
“Nosotros: Toward a U.S. Hispanic Anthropology” in Listening 27 (Winter 1992): 55. Notice how this  
emphasis on sustenance and nurturing can also serve as positive valuing of such “work” that is usually seen 
as “women’s work” and therefore not as important.  In this case, it is not only seen as positive (indeed 
necessary for all life) but is also argued as the task of the whole community, of women and men, working 
together to preserve life. 
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things and others – may serve to complement the strong Christian analysis of structural 
sin and social sin.  The Buddhist analysis calls attention once again to the personal 
dimension of sin and a new description of the drive for accumulation, possession, and 
domination which could enrich social analysis. This we already saw in Mary Grey’s use 
of the doctrine of no-self against the “rat race” in society that fuels greed. It also calls us 
back to the balance of personal and social sin and the question of the formation of selves 
and the construction of society that then molds/shapes individuals and such ‘character’ 
that can become oppressive, leading to their suffering and the suffering of others. 
Theological anthropology then needs to take into account not only individual women and 
men, but also our roles within the community of persons, including the presence of sin in 
our interactions and in the construction, reification and absolutization of our identities.  
Hence, though the call for relationships and community is important, finding “right” 
relationships, that is to say, empowering relationships where one does not lose oneself is 
still a challenge.  In the next section, we will look at how one can find the balance of self 
and other within the call in the Christian life of service to others. 
Kenosis and the Ethical Life 
From understanding kenosis as giving up false ways and modes of being in order 
to gain a new positive understanding of our self and a new vision of humanity, the 
challenge then becomes how we are to live out such a vision of mutuality and 
interdependence in relationships.  As discussed, in the Christian tradition, this call is 
usually understood as the call to agape, to self-sacrificial love for the other, a kenosis (a 
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self-emptying) of oneself for the other, following the example of Jesus.  As Michael 
Himes has pointed out,  
If we imagine the world and the neighbor sacramentally, then we must reverence the 
world and the neighbor. If we imagine our lives eucharistically, then we must live as self-
gift.  To re-envision the universe sacramentally requires us to act differently within it and 
toward it, and to live agapically requires that we discern what the true good of the other is 
which we seek to bring out 547 
 
Mary Grey also reinforces such insight arguing that once one has a new image or 
a new vision of humanity, no longer as separated individuals but as connected selves, 
then a new understanding of care/agape emerges.  In this case, kenosis means letting go 
of what we previously thought of others as well as letting go of the urge to “dominate, to 
be ‘master’ over all one surveys, to superimpose order.”  Furthermore, it brings forth a 
new “ethic of care, understood more as ‘patient-attention to’ than identified with the 
stereotypical mother-role…”548 
However, as shown, an uncritical acceptance of this can lead to relationships for 
women where they lose themselves in the others, and to the extreme end up in 
relationships of abuse, due to a distorted understanding of “self-sacrificial love.”  For this 
reason, Coakley redefined divine kenosis as a giving up of certain “worldly” dominating 
power so that women are given the example of power and relationship that does not 
dominate or possess but one that can truly empower and sustain. This serves as a critique 
in their own relationships.  Yet, there is still the critique that such a call is too other-
centered and can still lead to a loss of self for women.  A feminist critique of the quote 
above would probably refer to the lack of mutuality in that quote, and the need to balance 
                                                
547 Michael Himes, Doing the Truth in Love: Conversations about God, Relationships, and Service (New 
York: Paulist Press, 1995) 143. 
548 Grey, The Wisdom of Fools, 78-9. 
  249 
such other-centeredness with a concern for oneself. Buddhist discussions, particularly on 
the interdependence of wisdom and compassion, can shed light and further direction to 
these Christian feminist discussions of the living out of right kenosis, and could 
potentially be one of the greatest and most fruitful contributions of the Buddhist feminist 
discourse to Christian feminist discussions. 
   As mentioned, wisdom and compassion are likened to two wings of a bird: 
without wisdom, compassion “exhausts” the bodhisattva, or it can continue to be self-
serving.  This is “idiot compassion” where our actions are still being driven by “ego” and 
serving our own needs.  We have still not fully realized the emptiness (and therefore 
sameness) of all things from which equanimity emanates.  In contrast is “wise” 
compassion which ensures that our actions are not self-serving and are not limited only to 
particular persons but animated by the willingness to liberate all sentient beings.  This 
discussion of the interdependence of wisdom and compassion can challenge Christian 
feminist discussions on the living out of kenosis; that the love of the others must also 
include oneself (if love is to be truly universal and one truly realizes that one is not 
different from others).  Furthermore, that love is challenged to include love of one’s 
enemies, recognizing them as not different from oneself.  Finally, it will challenge 
Christian feminist theologians to find an analogous category for “wisdom” that can direct 
one’s act of kenosis or agape so that it does not only address the needs of the other but 
also of oneself, and that the action is both effective and appropriate, neither self-seeking 
nor exhaustive.  The next section will elaborate on how the Buddhist doctrine of wisdom 
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and compassion can lead to new directions in Christian feminist ways of living out a 
kenotic life of discipleship.   
Wise compassion and the commandment to “love the neighbor as yourself.”   
First, through the wisdom of emptiness, one realizes that everyone is the same in 
their suffering and their wish for happiness and everyone shares the same Buddha nature.  
Part of this exercise is the practice of equanimity, of seeing oneself as similar to others 
and thereby just as deserving of love and compassion as others. Traditional emphasis as 
we saw was in developing compassion for others, but Buddhist feminists have reversed 
the emphasis towards developing compassion for oneself.  Women must include 
ourselves in this circle of care, and see ourselves as having the same Buddha nature as 
others.  Our compassion for others must also be translated into compassion for ourselves 
(or else, it is not an exercise in equanimity for one is differentiating themselves from 
others – in this case as less deserving of compassion).  In the same way, Christian women 
could be encouraged to include themselves in reflections upon being made in the image 
of God, and just as deserving of love, compassion and dignity as others.  Hence, the quote 
above by Himes could be critically understood as reverence, not just for the world and the 
neighbor but also for oneself, to see oneself as a gift, even to oneself, and to discern the 
true good not only of the other, but also of oneself. In this case then, to “live agapically” 
must include loving oneself and interpretations of such require the critical appropriation 
of the Greatest Commandment: to love the neighbor as yourself.  Here, Christian 
feminists could emphasize the need to love oneself before one can truly learn to love 
another, just as Buddhist feminists emphasized the importance of including oneself in the 
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circle of care and compassion, and how a certain amount of self-care is necessary before 
one can respond in the appropriately compassionate way.   
Another approach to the beginning of wisdom and compassion for all focuses not 
on the sameness of all in terms of Buddha nature, but the sameness in the human 
condition of suffering and wanting to be free from suffering.  Furthermore, as the 
Buddhist feminists highlight, compassion for others is always built on compassion for 
oneself by reflecting upon one’s own situation of suffering and pain.  This is a key point 
in the Buddhist tradition. As Christina Feldman states, “you come to know that your 
willingness to be present with pain is the midwife to compassion. Turning toward sorrow 
in your own life opens your eyes to the immense suffering in the world.”549  In other 
words, by looking at one’s own sorrow, one sees how this personal story is also a 
universal story.  Starting from one’s own suffering, one realizes that all human beings 
share in the common bond of suffering and not wanting to suffer.   The more we accept 
and understand our suffering, we become more compassionate to others who we realize 
are suffering as we do.  As mentioned above, turning toward sorrow in your own life 
opens your eyes to the immense suffering of the world.  Such realization then leads to 
compassion for that world.  This is how paying attention to our own suffering leads to 
compassion, not just for ourselves but for others.  This is seen, for example, when 
Feldman speaks about how in moments of rage, fear or resentment, one can try to be 
present to oneself in that moment.  In so doing, one can then find the steadfastness and 
courage to be present for another person entangled in the same pain.  This is also the 
                                                
549 Christina Feldman, Compassion: Listening to the Cries of the World (Berkeley: Rodmell Press, 2005) 
23-24. 
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Dalai Lama’s point when he says that “unless we have some experience of suffering, our 
compassion for others will not amount to very much….therefore the wish to free 
ourselves from suffering precedes any sense of compassion for others.”550   
For Christian women, this approach goes beyond the recognition of loving oneself 
as well as neighbor since we are all made in God’s image and deserve equal dignity and 
love.  Rather, this approach begins with the common experience of suffering.  However, 
instead of starting with the suffering of others (which the teaching on love and agape 
often emphasize), it begins by focusing on one’s own suffering first.  Such a stance then, 
of a universal compassion grounded in the wisdom of our shared suffering, can remind 
Christian women that the call to agape must begin with an analysis of their own situation 
of pain, an acknowledgement of their own suffering in order for true com-passion to 
come about.  This can thicken the Christian understanding of kenosis, no longer as a self-
limitation, a “self-emptying” for the other, but almost a “self-emptying” into our own 
suffering and there link with the suffering of others that leads to the self-emptying for the 
other who is seen as our own suffering self.  Such kenosis then is the entrance into the 
suffering of the other as a continuing expression of the full realization of ourself who has 
discovered interdependence with the other and can see our own suffering in another.  
Compassion and kenosis for the other is fueled by compassion for ourself and the 
realization that our longing to free the other from suffering stems from our own longing 
to free our own self from suffering, and that such pain and suffering must be fought on 
both levels.  Such a stance then brings one back to the great commandment and a greater 
                                                
550 Dalai Lama, “Awakening the Mind, Lightening the Heart” in A Lifetime of Wisdom: Essential Writings 
by and about the Dalai Lama, ed. Clint Willis (New York: Marlowe, 2002) 64. 
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insight about what it means to “love the neighbor as oneself”, to a love of the suffering 
self that leads to the love of the suffering neighbor now experienced as oneself.  The 
experience of having compassion and love for one’s own pain and suffering is the bridge 
to true compassion and love for another.     
Wise compassion:  The Christian commandment to “love the enemy” 
One particular challenge of the Buddhist notion of emptiness as sameness and the 
cultivation of equanimity is not just learning to love the neighbor or other as oneself, but 
learning how to love the “enemy” as oneself.  This may be a particular sticking point for 
women, particularly those who may have been in abusive relationships and cannot think 
of the abuser as similar to them, even more to learn to “love” that abuser.  As Alice Keefe 
explains,  
If, however, pratitya-samutpada means that other people are not fundamentally separate 
from our own selves, then we need to experience not only the suffering of others as our 
own suffering, but also and most painfully to see the violence of others as our own 
violence. Pratitya-samutpada teaches us that the perpetrators of violence are not as they 
are because of any intrinsic nature, rather they are as they are because of the causes and 
conditions that have made up their lives.551 
 
This particular point heightens the challenge of the Christian commandment to 
“love the enemy,” in this case, challenging one to see the enemy as oneself, and to see 
that enemy as still also a creature of God.  How does one talk of a “love of the enemy” 
and experience their violence as one’s own?  For women in particular, how do they love 
the other who has abused them or dominated them?  The teaching of recognizing the 
enemy as oneself harkens back to the realization of Buddha nature and extending it to 
show that even perceived “enemies” have seeds of enlightenment and want peace and 
                                                
551 Keefe, 64-5. 
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happiness but have ignorance or make mistakes. Again, this is part of teaching the 
universality of compassion by realizing that all have Buddha nature, though out of 
ignorance, we may act in ways that harm ourselves or others.  For, “[w]ise compassion 
reverences the inner worth of every single person. But it also sees into the layers of their 
suffering, including the suffering they create for themselves and others through ego-
centered thought and action.”552  In this way, learning to recognize the enemy as oneself 
tests the universality of our compassion and our realization of wisdom while at the same 
time guarding against dualistic tendencies that pits “us” vs. “enemy” which can easily 
lead to many negative emotions such as anger and hatred that lead to our suffering as well 
as the suffering of others.  As Śāntideva has said: 
Some do evil things because of ignorance, 
Some respond with anger, being ignorant. 
Which of them is faultless in his acts? 
To whom shall error be attributed?553  
 
Notice here how he asks whether either one of them is faultless.  In either case, 
the “enemy” as well as the one who reacts with anger to that enemy are equally ignorant, 
acting in ways that are harmful to self and other which leads to more suffering for both.  
In this way, the one who reacts in anger is truly no different from the “enemy.”  Both, in 
their ignorance, have pitted “self” vs. “other” and ultimately inflicted suffering onto each 
other.  Such a teaching can then further deepen our reflections, not only on the Christian 
command to love the neighbor as oneself but also to love the enemy.  As Paul Knitter 
discovered in his own experience with Buddhism, he writes how Buddhists have 
“prodded me to look more deeply and honestly into the nature and demands of Jesus’ 
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‘greatest commandment.’ For them, compassion excludes not only hatred. It also rules 
out anger, and the almost unavoidable result when anger gets out of its corral: violence. 
And once you’re violent, you’ve cut off your interconnectedness and profoundly 
jeopardized your ability to love.”554 Furthermore, he says that “Buddha has faced me with 
the same question I should have earlier heard from Jesus: how can we love our enemies 
and at the same time wage war against them?”555  
What does this mean for women and their fight against violence and abuse?  First, 
it is a quick reminder once again of how no one is “innocent.” We may have harmed and 
done violence to others as well (though not necessary to the extent that harm or abuse has 
been done to oneself).  Furthermore, it is a challenge not to react out of hatred and anger 
and thus be more caught up in the whole cycle of hatred and anger.  Rather, it is a real 
challenge of the commandment of love; that is, not to hate or be angry at the one who has 
caused so much harm and violence recognizing that this abuser is still a child of God, 
though sinful and misguided.   Could such a stance help the one who is engulfed in so 
much anger and hatred that threatens to destroy her?  Could she begin to develop 
“compassion” and love for such a person, thereby releasing her from her own anger and 
violence and begin to heal?  In this way, she moves away from contributing to the cycle 
of hatred and suffering in the world, while at the same time, releasing herself from 
emotions that can annihilate her own self.   
However, this love of the enemy does not mean a passive acceptance of their 
violence and abuse, for as Makransky says, “[w]ise compassion confirms the intrinsic 
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dignity of persons even when it confronts the harmful ways that they think and act.”556  
Furthermore, as Knitter says, “loving our ‘enemies’ to the point of refusing to do violence 
to them does not exclude identifying them, opposing them, and doing so resolutely.”557  
However, this is done out of the understanding of the complex issues of suffering and 
violence and how all of us are part of such a cycle (hence the necessity of developing 
insight).  It is the willingness to enter into their chaos and the chaos of violence that has 
resulted in the suffering of that abuser but also of oneself as the abused.  It is a 
willingness to enter into the complexities of life and to develop a deeper understanding 
and vision of oneself and the other.  Isn’t this in one sense what the Incarnation means, 
what the kenosis into humanity is about, entering the chaos of the world (and maybe in 
Buddhist terms, also understanding the causes and conditions of that chaos)?  This 
willingness to enter such chaos and to understand the circumstances of suffering of the 
abuser is not meant to excuse or “explain away” the violence.  Rather, it is engaged in 
order to come to a better response to such violence and suffering that ends them, instead 
of perpetrating them even further.  This response remains a call for justice for the abused 
and a confrontation with the abusers for what they have done, and the harmful ways they 
think and act.  However, it is not done out of anger or hatred, but out of love and 
compassion.  It is done with the full comprehension of the cycle of violence and suffering 
we are all part of and which must be confronted while also recognizing the dignity and 
worth of every person, including the perpetrator.  Does this not come closer to Jesus’ own 
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confrontation of his enemies, of the way God sees and confronts God’s’ people?  Could 
this not be a more liberating path, than holding on to anger, hatred and blame?         
Wise compassion and Christian’s “prudent” kenosis 
 The love of “friend”, “stranger” and “enemy” as oneself in the Buddhist tradition 
is grounded in the mutual dependence of all things. Furthermore, wisdom reminds us of 
the sameness of all things complements and guides compassion so that it is truly 
universal.  Wisdom can also be used to remind women that they too share in Buddha 
nature and that compassion for others must start as compassion for oneself. Furthermore, 
wisdom ensures that compassion is truly universal and is able to assess the situation with 
clarity and insight in order to act in the most effective and appropriate manner.  In the 
Christian tradition, the love of neighbor and enemy as oneself is grounded in the belief of 
being created in God’s image and being part of the Body of Christ.  As mentioned, this 
must emphasize woman as God’s image and part of Christ’s body, equally deserving of 
love and compassion for others. However, there remains the challenge of finding an 
appropriate analogous companion to compassion in the Christian tradition to help 
navigate one’s ethical decisions regarding compassion and love for others and oneself, in 
the way that wisdom does for Buddhism, so that one’s love is effective and appropriate 
for oneself as well as for the other. As David Chappell points out,  
Christian insistence on love, forgiveness, and reconciliation has not always been 
productive of inner or outer peace. Buddhism responds to this problem by insisting that a 
more primary step is the work of developing internal calmness and clarity. Love has to be 
balanced and guided by understanding the fluctuations of human emotions and the 
limitations of human conceptuality.558 
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 One possible response to this question comes from James Keenan, a moral 
theologian, who proposes a new list of virtues that can thicken the understanding of 
agape and the call of relationships, and how various calls are navigated by prudence.  He 
proposes a list of cardinal virtues which include justice, fidelity, self-care and prudence. 
The understanding of the cardinal virtues are important since they “perfect the 
fundamental anthropological dimensions of being human that are needed for integrated 
virtuous behavior.”559  Here then we see the hinge between the mutual and relational 
anthropology described above and how this is to be lived out and realized in one’s life.  
Keenan’s proposal of these new cardinal virtues shows the challenge of truly realizing 
our relationality, not just to others but to oneself, and his list reflects the need to balance 
and respect these relationalities, with prudence being one’s main arbiter.  He explains the 
four cardinal virtues, saying:  
In this context, I propose my own list of the cardinal virtues. It includes justice, fidelity, 
self-care, and prudence.  As persons, we are relational in three ways: generally, 
specifically, and uniquely.
 
And each of these relational ways of being demands a cardinal 
virtue. As a relational being in general, we are called to justice.  
 
As a relational being 
specifically, we are called to fidelity.
 
As a relational being uniquely, we are called to self-
care. These three virtues are cardinal. Unlike Thomas's structure, none is ethically prior 
to the other; they have equally urgent claims and they should be pursued as ends in 
themselves. Thus we are not called to be faithful and self-caring in order to be just, nor 
are we called to be self-caring and just in order to be faithful. None is auxiliary to the 
others. Each is a distinctive virtue, none being a subset or subcategory of the others. They 
are cardinal. The fourth cardinal virtue is prudence, which determines what constitutes 
the just, faithful, and self-caring way of life for an individual.  
 
 Influenced by the Buddhist feminist discussions on compassion being guided by 
wisdom, Keenan’s proposal regarding prudence as that which determines what 
constitutes the “just, faithful, and self-caring way of life for an individual,” becomes a 
guide for how women are to live out the call to kenosis and agape in ways that respond to 
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the command to “love the neighbor as oneself,” seeing with clarity, both our needs and 
the needs of others and finding the most effective way to respond to both.  It is a call that 
requires much discernment from us so that we can be true not only to our own suffering 
and pain but also to that of the other.  This list of Keenan’s cardinal virtues also shows 
the sometimes competing claims of such relationships and how it is the virtue of 
prudence that navigates through claims so that the call to love the other can truly be 
balanced with the love of self.  This call to love does not lead to a loss of self but an 
empowerment of both self and other, in our personal life and relationships and as well as 
in society and in the world.  Furthermore, such discerned action becomes the way that 
one actualizes their formation as a relational self, navigating through the demands of their 
various relationships, including a relationship with their own selves.  In this case, 
compassion for others and the call for justice can be balanced with a love and compassion 
for oneself as well.  
Such prudence is guided by a vision of oneself and other, of forming one’s 
character as grounded in the image of God and being part of the body of Christ.  Such a 
vision, such character formation, is cultivated within the spiritual life of the individual 
assisted by the communal life of the Church.  It is for this reason that moral theologians 
such as James Keenan argue for the strong relationship between moral theology and 
spirituality, and for the moral formation of the believer through the life of the Church.560  
                                                
560 See James F. Keenan, S.J. “Spirituality and Morality: What’s the Difference” in Method and Catholic 
Moral Theology: the ongoing reconstruction, ed. Todd Salzman (Omaha: Creighton University Press, 
1999) 87-102.  There he argues for the contribution of ascetical theology and how it “amplifies our 
understanding of the moral life.”  See also James Keating’s “The Good Life: An Invitation to Holiness” 
Church (Summer 1995): 15-20.  There Keating argues for the need for the formation of one’s character 
through worship vs. merely getting a “yes” or “no” answer to our moral dilemma.   
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It may be for this reason that both Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey, in their reinterpretation 
of kenosis emphasized the spiritual life so much, understanding such links with the moral 
life.  Now, we turn to how Buddhist feminist discussions on the realization of emptiness 
in spiritual practice can be helpful in Christian feminist discussions of kenosis and the 
spiritual life, and how such spiritual practices cultivate the Christian vision which is the 
ground for just and ethical action in the world today.  
Kenosis and the Spiritual Life 
 
On the self and the spiritual life.  As we have seen, both Coakley and Grey 
focused their reinterpretation of kenosis in the spiritual life as an empowering experience 
for women, a place to “give up” the wrong and damaging notions of “self” and women as 
“weak”, “dependent” or passive, and to begin discovering new models of being, of 
mutual relationships that are more empowering, particularly for women.  Both argue that 
such visions of a strong sense of self and empowering relationships can only be found 
through spiritual practices, particularly practices of silence and contemplation found in 
the Christian tradition.  As we saw, these Christian feminists argue that in spiritual 
practice, far from “losing ourselves,” kenosis opens us up to a greater empowerment.  It 
becomes the place where fragments of our broken selves can be gathered and made whole 
again, and where the “false and sinful” selves that leave them in bondage to dependent 
relationships or relationships that diminish them or others can be given up.   
The Buddhist feminist discussions regarding the process of meditation can be 
very enlightening to the Christian feminist argument that spiritual practice is the place 
where one can begin to feel empowered. As Klein argued, such ritual practices allow for 
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the transformation of subjectivity and the understanding of the self.  They have shown 
how practices of focused attention help to strengthen women and give them a state of 
stability, an independence of mind that can help them to be more critical of themselves 
and their relationships and eventually help them reach a level of self-knowledge and 
ultimately self-acceptance with much gentleness and without judgment or condemnation.  
Such descriptions challenge Christian feminist theologians to articulate more deeply and 
in a more detailed manner how Christian spiritual practices can lead to self-love and self-
knowledge.  For example, such discussions could be helpful to further Mary Grey’s own 
articulation of a feminist spirituality and how the discovery of self and God happens in 
the space of stillness and silence where focused attention is cultivated.  
Moreover, the specificity of Buddhist meditation practices of mindfulness, 
visualization, etc. also challenges Christian feminist theologians to point to more specific 
practices within the Christian tradition that can be helpful and how such practices can be 
adapted to the particular contexts and objections of women regarding spiritual practices. 
For example, Mary Grey in writing about focused attention does not write about the 
specific practices that can cultivate such stillness and silence (though alluding to the fact 
that this can be found in the Christian tradition). More broadly, both Coakley and Grey 
mentioned the Christian mystical tradition, and the examples of John of the Cross or 
Teresa of Avila, but there was no detailed discussion of the practices themselves and how 
they could be adapted and entered into by women today.561 This may be part of the 
particular strength of Buddhism in general, providing “how-to” guides in order to enter 
                                                
561 The attempt at the recovery of Mary in a latter section is fueled by this need to articulate specific 
practices that can be helpful for Christian, particularly Catholic women. 
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into meditation and cultivating such stillness and silence and focused attention.  Though 
part of the Christian tradition, I believe that we have yet to really develop and make 
available such practices of silence and stillness in light of the specific contexts of women.  
As Paul Knitter himself has observed, “the mystical provisions in the Christian pantry of 
spirituality have not been readily available to the ‘ordinary faithful’ on this side of the 
pulpit…Over the past thirty years or so, this mystical or contemplative aridity has been 
recognized and addressed.”562  On the other hand, a particular strength of Buddhism is the 
effective transmission of meditation practices that are made available to those who are 
interested.  The challenge then would be to identify Christian approaches to deepening 
“wisdom” within spiritual practice (that is, of developing the vision of self, God and 
other, which grounds prudence and one’s moral action mentioned in the previous section) 
and learn how to effectively transmit them to others. 
Furthermore, as Knitter himself notes, one of the particular contributions of 
Buddhism to his own Christian spiritual life is the importance of silence. He writes that 
“exploration of Buddhist practice has enabled me to understand and make use of the 
Sacrament of Silence in my Christian practice. I can honestly say that without these 
Buddhist practices, without this sacrament of Silence, I don’t think I’d be able to pray as 
a Christian.”563  Similarly, I believe that Klein and Gross’ detailed articulation of the 
process of meditation can further the argument of how silence is the necessary ground for 
speech and action and is the necessary posture for self-knowledge and self-acceptance.  
In the end, as Klein argues, it is the place where a more stable, empowered self can be 
                                                
562 Knitter, 137-8. 
563 Ibid., 154. 
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experienced in a way that can be maintained outside the practice. Such articulations about 
the role of silence within Buddhist meditation strengthens Coakley’s own  arguments of 
the role of silence within Christian contemplation; how silence does not have to lead to a 
silencing or that it is not merely a passive moment, but becomes the ground out of which 
appropriate and effective words and action can spring forth. 
One of the interesting aspects in Buddhist meditation, especially in the Nyingma 
and Kargu Dzogchen traditions of Gross and Klein, is the notion of emptiness as space, 
as the vast expanse that far exceeds the limited view of existence and reality that we think 
we know.  This notion then of “space”, not as merely “empty” but as full and teeming 
with possibilities, can further deepen Coakley’s discussion of kenosis as the act of space-
making in the discovery and empowerment of oneself.  It becomes then the space of 
giving up all the limited views of women (as fragile, weak, passive, etc.) to the 
exploration of other possibilities for women (images of strength, power) and 
relationships. Again Klein and Gross’ articulation of what happens in this space within 
Buddhist meditation could aid Christian feminist articulations of what happens in this 
space within Christian meditation.  For example, Klein says that it is in this space where 
one looks at the way things are versus how they ought to be (beginning to see reality with 
clarity vs. the obscurations brought about by ignorance).  Hence, articulating this 
movement within Christian self-understanding, we could understand that space as one 
where we turn the critical lens on the sinful ways both in oneself and in society, and 
envision a new way of how things ought to be, of seeing ourselves through the eyes of 
God instead of our usual sinful ways.  It is the place to discover the “more” in ourselves, 
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more than the limited experiences and expectations that have been imposed upon us, 
more than the burden of the “ideal” woman that has limited our imagination about 
ourselves.  In the formation of character that is necessary for moral action in the world 
(as mentioned above), one asks the questions: “who am I?” “who ought I become?” and 
“how do I get there?”  It is in this space that these questions can be explored and 
answered.  It is a kenosis of giving up preconceived notions of self and other so that one 
can explore alternative views of oneself and another.  It opens up the understanding of 
kenosis as plerosis, a reminder of the possibility of a greater reality for women and for 
relationships that may not usually be experienced given the presence of sin in our 
relationships and in society.  As we saw, it is then in this space that the longing for 
balance in thinking of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ characteristics, of exploring new ways 
of being and relationships can all be explored.  It opens one to the possibility of being 
formed, of one’s own character being changed in ways that affect one’s ethical action in 
the world, or as Klein said, in ways that are sustained outside of the practice, and into 
one’s daily life.  This is why, as mentioned above, moral theologians argue for this 
connection between spirituality and the moral life. 
 One interesting difference in the spiritual practices is the vision that sustains the 
practice.  While in the Buddhist tradition, there is the image for example of Indra’s net, 
and the mutual interdependence of all things, and a sense that there is no center that holds 
all of it together, in the Christian tradition, one of the key emphases in spiritual practice is 
finding one’s center in God, the ground of all existence who sustains us and all 
relationships.  In this exploration of finding self and other, the main goal lies in finding 
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God at the center of self and other, as the one who sustains and empowers us.564   This 
was one of Coakley’s key emphases in her re-interpretation of kenosis as “surrender” or 
“vulnerability” to a gentle God. It is from the loving gaze of this God, who knows us 
better than we know ourselves, that the process of healing, of longing for wholeness, of 
finding relationships that empower and do not diminish our sense of worth and dignity, 
begins. 
 This experience is an in breaking of grace, of God’s activity coming to empower 
and sustain human activity.  As Coakley described, it is the experience of being “prayed 
in”; that it is no longer the person doing the prayer, but one is caught in the divine 
dialogue, the divine life of the Trinity. It is this experience of a God whose kenosis is 
interpreted as the “giving up” of worldly powers that serves as the critique to 
dynamics/relationships of domination and abuse, to give up such a dynamic within one’s 
own life and relationship with others.   Furthermore, it is the model of a relationship that 
empowers one, just as one learns to become ‘vulnerable’ and “dependent,” to truly open 
oneself up to the power of relationship that is grounded on mutuality.  It is an experience 
of God that blurs the lines of activity and passivity, of finding God as the one who 
sustains and powers our activity, including prayer.  Finding that “dependence” and 
“vulnerability” are not just “merely passive” acts; such acts can be the gateway to greater 
empowerment, a greater knowledge of God, self and other that can be the ground for 
truly ethical and responsible action in the world.  In the end, in this re-appropriation of 
the importance of kenosis in the spiritual life, women can gain the spiritual maturity we 
                                                
564 This key difference will be discussed later in how the Christian response to Buddhist feminists.  
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need so that we feel empowered in prayer, a result of which is empowered action in the 
world.  It is an experience that breaks the usual notion of prayer as passive and detached 
from the world, but rather renews us, allowing us to find the balance between activity and 
passivity, between self and other.  As Joann Wolski Conn describes it: 
In brief, a feminist theology of spiritual development notices that the classical spiritual 
tradition defines maturity as intimate relationship with the Holy Mystery and with all 
persons and the cosmos, an intimacy made possible by increasing independence from 
attachments that block deeper relationship. The desire to affirm women’s experience as 
much as men’s leads feminist theologians to notice how both autonomy (traditional 
denied or restricted for women) and attachment (culturally reinforced in women) are 
essential for Christian maturity.565  
 
From this dynamic of spiritual practice, one begins to see how women can gain 
some balance in the usual dualistic tendencies of “male-female”, “passive-active”, “self-
other”, ‘self-God” and be able to live in the paradox of a “strength made perfect in 
weakness”, in a relationship with the other and with God that is not in competition with 
our own relationship with ourselves but actually enhances our own self-identity.  
Coakley’s re-interpretation of Christ’s incarnation is particularly helpful here.  In that 
account, Gregory of Nyssa saw the transformation, the flourishing of the human in the 
kenosis of the divine so that the human reaches its perfection (not its dissolution).  The 
language of “destruction” or “dissolution” is tempered by the “transformation” and the 
“flourishing” of the human that happens in the encounter between the human and the 
divine.  It further reflects the process of the paschal mystery of the death that leads to 
resurrection.   
                                                
565 Joann Wolski Conn, “Toward Spiritual Maturity” in Freeing Theology: The Essentials of Theology in 
Feminist Perspective, ed. Catherine Mowry LaCugna (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 19939) 254. 
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Furthermore, the Buddhist feminist discussions of how meditation can bring about 
the experience of a strong, powerful yet relational self can also bring one back to the 
depth of the Christian mystical tradition where some have argued that a powerful 
relational anthropology was developed that also focused on a strong sense of self.  For 
example, Caroline Walker Bynum has argued that Bernard of Clairvaux, among other 
monks, “stress[ed] the discovery of self- and of self-love – as the first step in a long 
process of returning to love and likeness of God, a love and likeness in which the 
individual is not dissolved into God but rather becomes God’s partner and friend.”566  
Moreover, analogous to the Buddhist feminist’s discussion on the positive valuation of 
emotions in Vajrayana Buddhism, in the Christian medieval tradition, passions were 
presented positively, “not as sources of sinful inclinations, but as the force that when 
properly trained would assist the devout Christian in the way of the Lord. This shift was 
only accomplished when a positive anthropology (imago Dei), a positive goal (union with 
Christ) and a positive way (imitation Dei) provided the framework that the energy of 
humanity had to be understood as at least potentially positive.”567  Here we see spiritual 
practice as the place of the transformation of such desires and passions, and a realization 
that such desires and passions in themselves can serve as the gateway to our practice, in 
the same way that negative emotions can be brought into Buddhist practices.   
Buddhist feminist articulations of the positive valuation of emotions can aid 
Christian feminist theologians to specify how such positive valuation of emotions can be 
                                                
566 Caroline Bynum Walker, “Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?” in Jesus as Mother: 
Studies in the Spirituality of the High Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), quoted 
in Keenan, “Spirituality and Morality: What’s the Difference,” 91. 
567 Keenan, “Spirituality and Morality: What’s the Difference,” 95. 
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helpful for Christian women and articulate this within a Christian framework.  For 
example, Gross described how “transforming” anger led to clarity, to a “critical 
intelligence” that helped her to perceive situations of injustice and to let go of the 
“negative” energy of anger and the murkiness such emotions bring.  Such discussions 
about anger are helpful for Christian feminist theologians and our anger towards the 
situation of women, particularly in the Church. First, it can allow us to “work creatively 
with the energy contained in anger”568 without being consumed by such anger in our 
work toward social change.  Second, discussions about how “negative” emotions such as 
anger contain clarity and wisdom are helpful reminders to Christian feminist theologians 
of the wisdom contained in one’s desires and passions, to not move away from such 
desire and passions per se and to realize that God is found at the core of one’s desires and 
passions.  We are asked instead to move away from “disordered” desires and ask, as 
Mary Grey did, “What do women truly want?” “What does the heart truly desire?” That 
is why desires and passions are the gateway to spiritual practice, why they can be 
transformed.  This was the path of Augustine who saw his restlessness as the constant call 
to purify and transform his passions and desires so they could be re-directed once more to 
God. In the specific case of Christian women, the negative connotations of passions and 
emotions and its association with women can be placed in a more positive light within 
spiritual practices and can be used as the fuel for one’s practice. 
 On relational anthropology and the spiritual life.  Spiritual practice not only leads 
to a renewed sense of self but to a new sense of relationships. Coakley contends that we 
                                                
568 Keefe, 67. 
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do not just meet the gentle God who empowers us in prayer, but we also begin to meet 
Christ and envision the body of Christ. In so doing, we re-shape our understanding of our 
relationship with others as well.  This is why, as many Christian mystics have argued, an 
interior personal spiritual practice leads to concern for the world and a greater sense of 
one’s connection with others in the world.  In the Buddhist tradition, we saw that this was 
expressed in the doctrine of dependent origination understood as the corollary to 
emptiness.  This was the vision one realized once one saw that there was no independent, 
autonomous self.  There were specific meditations that were done to begin to realize such 
a vision of interdependence to lessen our attachment to ourselves, and develop 
compassion for others which can result in action in the world.  The question then for 
Christians would be to identify what practices, what visualizations, what images –in other 
words what resources - may be helpful for Christians/Catholics to recover their own 
sense of community, and bring such images to mind in their own individual and 
communal practices. It further asks how we can revitalize such practices and images, give 
them more power and effectiveness to combat the image of the broken, individualistic 
world we live in.  Such highlights Mary Grey’s contention of the present moment of the 
“dark night of the church” and the need to revitalize our images and practices.  
For example, Śāntideva’s reflection on the body as hands and limbs that are many 
and different yet still all one, can harken back to a Christian reflection on the Body of 
Christ, where there are different members but all part of one body, and if one part is 
suffering then all are suffering (1 Cor. 12).  As John Sheveland compares: “[r]esembling 
Paul’s use of body imagery, Śāntideva communicates a profound non-difference between 
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persons – in their state of suffering and desire for happiness – that should give rise to 
compassion, a moral solidarity that acts on their behalf to remove suffering and its 
causes.”569  Such images then “bear the potential to increase readers’ domain of 
affectivity, to recondition their imagination toward a solidaristic affiliation and love of 
neighbor. All the more so when sounded together.”570 In this case, comparisons of images 
of the body can lead Christian reflection back to how such visions within the spiritual life 
grounds moral activity in the world by reminding us of our interrelation with all else.  
Moreover, it also brings us back to the notion of the Church itself as the Body of Christ, 
to the presence of Christ in the world today, and help one another live up to our image as 
imago Dei particularly in this suffering world. It reminds us why the congregation gathers 
together on Sundays and other holy days to celebrate as a community, and remember not 
only what Christ has done for us, but what we are called to do in the world, not just as 
individuals but as a community.  The challenge is how to incorporate such images into 
our individual and communal practices in ways that can help us realize our 
interconnection with each other and the world.  A further question to explore would be 
“who” are part of this body?  Just as in Buddhist meditation practices, the goal is for the 
universality of compassion, in Christian practices, we could ask “who” is part of this 
body, part of the Church?  How are we challenged as a community to extend membership 
of that church in ways that are more universal?  Where are our boundaries of “friends”, 
“strangers” and “enemies” that have limited the universality of our love of neighbor 
including the “religious other” who is seen as “stranger” or even “enemy”?    
                                                
569 John Sheveland, “Solidarity through Polyphony” in The New Comparative Theology, 185. 
570 Ibid., 186. 
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Furthermore, the image of Indra’s net and the interpenetration of all things as well 
as devotional practices done in communion with the buddhas and bodhisattvas, can bring 
us back to a reflection on the communion of saints, of our interrelatedness to the saints of 
the “past” as we call on them in our liturgies. We look to the dynamic of how we are 
empowered by them and their example and how this in turn leads us to empower and 
inspire and support others. Such a vision can revive to the notion of how a community of 
believers can provide support to an individual.  Moreover, this vision of the communion 
of saints, far from just reminding us of our similarity and our shared goal of holiness, also 
shows us how there are different paths to that goal, as seen by the variety of saints that 
we have.  It shows how the vision of mutual interdependence and communion does not 
have to mean assimilation but can encourage and respect difference and diversity, for 
“the Christian communion of saints demonstrates the enormous variety of ways that the 
holy is incarnated; it demonstrates, as Flanagan beautifully puts it, ‘the deep truth that 
persons find their good in many different ways.’”571  One could say the same about a 
reflection of being the Body of Christ – all members with different talents and gifts, 
recognizing and rejoicing in such differences and different paths to holiness.  These 
reflections on the body of Christ and the communion of saints, can begin to give women 
an alternative model of relationships that are not about diminishment and assimilation, 
but about support and empowerment as well as finding one’s own distinctive way.572  
                                                
571 Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” 713. 
572 One example of the work that has been done on this topic is Elizabeth Johnson’s Friends of God and 
Prophets: a Feminist Theological Reading of the Communion of Saints (New York: Continuum, 1998). 
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 However, as one meditates on this image of the Body of Christ and the 
communion of saints, many Christian feminists have pointed out that there are not as 
many models of women as saints, nor women in positions of leaderships (particularly 
where other Pauline texts such as Ephesians 5 or 1 Cor. 11speak of seeing the male as the 
leader just as Christ is the “head of the Church”) so that they have to be supplemented by 
other images to be more supportive of positive images of women, and not subsume 
women again in the category of “men/humanity” where they disappear.  As Mary Aquin 
O’Neill has argued: 
 In a church that places as much emphasis on the body as Catholicism does, in a church 
that defends what is called the “sacramental principle,” the absence of the ‘woman’ has 
grave consequences. If the body itself has the value of a sacramental sign, if the human 
body is a text to be read, there is much to be anticipated as theologians let in the female 
and look for the inbreaking.573  
 
 In the end, as I look at the Buddhist feminist discussions on meditation and 
specific practices of mindfulness, visualization, etc., I am challenged to think of specific 
practices or specific images for visualizations that can particularly aid in the project of 
Coakley and Grey to articulate a new understanding of kenosis as a spiritual practice, and 
how this leads to a renewed sense of self and relationships.  From the Vajrayāna practices 
that focused on nondualism and the importance of male and female imagery as well as 
masculine and feminine principles and the Ritual of the Great Bliss Queen (in particular 
the focus on her story and her agency as well as the visualization of the female body), I 
am inspired to think of analogous examples within the Christian tradition, of a model or 
models that could inspire such balance while respecting the particularities of being a 
woman.  In this case, I am led back to the person of Mary in spiritual practice and the 
                                                
573 Mary Aquin O’Neill, “The Mystery of being Human together” in Freeing Theology, 157. 
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kenosis of Mary as an example of the kenosis called for in the Christian life, as a model 
for women and men in the life of discipleship, as the female face of God (as Elizabeth 
Johnson suggests) and also of Mary (together with Jesus) as the model of humanity (as 
Mary Aquin O’Neill suggests).   
Reflecting on Mary’s story.574  Just as the image of the Great Bliss Queen relies 
not only upon its rituals but also on her story, Christian spiritual practices could also 
focus on the story of Mary as the example of the kind of kenosis that is called for.  
Donald Mitchell, expanding on the Buddhist-Christian conversation on emptiness and 
kenosis in the spiritual life, puts forward Mary as an example of the new understanding of 
kenosis inspired by dialogue with Buddhism.  He writes,  
Mary is not a model for a kind of distorted kenosis where one allows oneself to be 
dominated by others. To be empty of self, in the authentic sense, means to be empowered 
by God in freedom and openness in one’s choice to give compassionate to others, and 
also to be humble enough to accept the compassionate care from others when necessary. 
So Mary is a model of a kenotic love that seeks to aid and liberate all who are in need.575 
 
Notice here how his description of Mary’s kenosis matches much of the discussion 
above: a kenosis that leads to empowerment of oneself by God and to compassionate 
action in the world.  In offering such a model of kenosis, Mitchell turned to the writings 
of Chiara Lubich who founded the Focolare movement,576 who identified events in 
Mary’s life that could apply to the life of laypersons.   She lists the annunciation, the 
visitation of Elizabeth, the birth of Jesus, until Jesus’ public ministry and his crucifixion 
                                                
574 I understand the complicated history of Marian devotions and doctrines for women.  As O’Neill says, 
“the Marian tradition, no less than other traditions, has been affected by the androcentric bias of theology.”  
O’Neill, “The Mystery of being Human together,” 152.  Hence, this section will be devoted to a 
reconstruction of a new understanding of Mary and her kenosis in light of the feminist critiques and 
categories that I have been working with in the past chapter, and influenced by Gross and Klein’s retrieval 
of the story and ritual of the Great Bliss Queen in ways that are empowering for women. 
575 Mitchell, 197.   
576 For Mitchell’s discussion on Lubich, the Focolare movement, and Mary, see pp. 193-205. 
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where she is given to John.  All these various events, Mitchell argues, correspond to the 
“growth of the kenosis of love that contributes to the unity for which Paul was pleading 
in his letter to the Philippians.”577  Furthermore, taking a cue from Gross’ reflections on 
the Great Bliss Queen, one could also look at these events in her life and see how her 
relationships or how her interaction with others enriched her own as well as others’ 
spiritual life.  In this list of events, one could turn to the wedding feast of Cana as one 
particular event where we see her agency, where she moves from “contemplation to 
action.”  Mary takes initiative in the face of a human need (the lack of wine at the 
wedding) and brings attention to such a need to her son. This is not to be interpreted as a 
“woman” asking a “man” to fix things, rather for Mitchell, this corresponds to one’s 
spiritual growth where “one’s more hidden contemplative life with God at a certain point 
must emerge into a public active life with God for the sake, not only of oneself but of all 
humankind.”578  This then, can serve as an example of the argument that a rich spiritual 
life does not have to lead to an escape from the world, but an even more acute attention to 
the needs of the world, and the demand to act given such needs.  Furthermore, Buddhist 
emphasis on the importance of wisdom, of having insight and clarity so that one’s action 
is effective and appropriate, can also show how Mary’s action began with contemplation 
and therefore how action in the world must start with a keen observation or analysis 
before one acts (of seeing how things are vs. how things ought to be, as mentioned above) 
and how this can be brought into one’s spiritual life.  
                                                
577 Mitchell, 195.   
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At the same time, this event highlights how action in the world cannot be done by 
an individual, but precisely must be done with others so that the burden is not carried 
only by oneself.  Moreover, by inviting others to a response - to also see the need and to 
respond appropriately – allows the other an opportunity to deepen their own practice and 
response to the world, giving them an opportunity to practice compassion for others.  
Furthermore, it heightens one’s sense of interdependence and a sense of community – 
both with the suffering other, as well as the others who also respond to such suffering.     
Another event that could be reflected upon is the scene at the foot of the cross 
where Jesus gives his mother to John and vice-versa.  Mitchell interprets this as part of 
the process of emptying where she loses her son in order to become the mother of 
humanity.  “She must be empty of everything to be love for this person who stands beside 
her. But, it is precisely through this painful loss that Mary becomes the mother of all 
humankind, represented by John.”579  This interpretation may seem one-sided and further 
once again the notion that it is primarily women who must give themselves to others.580  
However, taking Gross’ insight about the Great Bliss Queen and the role of others in the 
spiritual path, this event could highlight that it was not just John who was “given over” to 
Mary, for her to take care of him, but Mary was “given over to John” and the community 
so that he/they could also take care of her, not in a relationship of dependency, but in 
order to gather strength from each other in the face of the death of Jesus and become 
                                                
579 Mitchell, 201. 
580 My critique of Mitchell is that though he tries to address the feminist critique by saying that Mary’s 
kenosis is not a distorted kenosis, he does not really develop how this is not so.  Furthermore, he does not 
say enough about the more “active” aspects of Mary’s kenosis and his discussion still focuses more on 
Mary’s kenosis for others which does not adequately address the feminist critique that such model.  Hence, 
my own attempt in this section to broaden his reflections with my own, gained from the dialogue between 
the Buddhist and Christian feminist discussions of the previous chapters.  
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more committed disciples. Neither one could deal with Jesus’ death and continue his 
ministry alone.  It must be done, again in community.  Such a gesture then could point 
back to the need for mutually empowering relationships and relate back to Mitchell’s 
own contention that Mary’s kenosis also includes being able to take compassionate care 
from others, and finding strength through relationships.  Hence, it is then with both Mary 
and John’s activity, that the work of Christ and the growth of the early Christian 
community continues.  It requires the activity and receptivity of both Mary and John to 
begin this new relationship and continue their discipleship to Christ.  Such activity and 
receptivity from both of them can lead to a more balanced and integrated sense of 
community, of the union of humanity that requires self-giving and emptying from all 
followers and to find empowerment and strength in the community and through others in 
their continuing commitment to self, others, and God.  This is why for Mitchell,  
Mary’s life presents the Christian with a model for a positive way of spiritual kenosis that 
can empty out the negative kenosis of our ordinary way of being….Mary gives us a 
Christian model for the existential realization of a lived kenosis whereby one can 
discover this original and true way of being and contribute to a new and more united 
world.581 
 
Moreover, such a relationship between John and Mary being “given over” to each other, 
can also lead to what O’Neill describes as the anthropology that Genesis reveals to us in 
which: 
…the unity of humanity is the unity of a communion of persons and the model of the 
person is not the autonomous and isolated individual but the covenanted one who is free 
because bound to others and to God. It demands an anthropology of mutuality in which 
the male/female difference becomes paradigmatic of human limitation and possibility and 
in which being like God can be achieved only by the gift of self to others and the 
reception of the gift of self from others. In such an anthropology, difference is not to be 
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liquidated but delighted in, and personal development is the fruit of relationships as much 
as the reward for efforts of will.582 
 
 In this description of the “communion of persons”, we see the anthropology that 
we are meant to live out: one of mutuality, respect for differences, and personal 
development.  In addition to this, her statement that the “male/female difference becomes 
paradigmatic of human limitation and possibility” is an argument against the sufficiency 
of other models of anthropology such as androgyny that try to take all “masculine” and 
“feminine” traits into oneself. The very fact of our being embodied as male or female 
presents limitations while relationships and the experience of community allow us to 
transcend such limitations and open other possibilities to us.  Hence, such traits can only 
be experienced within community, in the mutual and dynamic give and take of 
relationships for “no human life…can embrace both sides of the human experience at the 
same time. One cannot be both male and female, nurturer and nurtured, actor and 
audience, the one to undergo suffering and the one to feel the suffering of the other all at 
the same time.”583  
 In light of this, O’Neill herself argues for the model of humanity to be BOTH the 
figures of Mary as well as Jesus, for “[o]nly a hermeneutic of the two figures, male and 
female, and of the traditions that have interpreted them, can allow for the discovery of the 
common and reciprocal story of salvation.”584 Such a view then pushes the implications 
of truly understanding the self within a community, how the community is part of one’s 
self-identity or “community is the birthplace of self”, how all aspects of humanity cannot 
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be fully contained within oneself, and how the self cannot just be isolated but must be 
nurtured and sustained by a community.  The fullness of humanity is found in 
community.585   
 At the same time, O’Neill also argues that focus on BOTH figures of Mary and 
Jesus can also serve as a corrective to Christology for: 
Without Mary, theologians are forced to develop an androgynous Christology or a 
docetic one. By androgynous, I mean a Christology in which Jesus is imagined as 
complete in himself, embracing the possibilities of female as well as male being. By 
docetic, I mean that his body is not considered to be a real human body and that it in no 
way affects his being.586 
 
This focus on Mary then is necessary to move out of androgynous understandings 
both of Christology as well as anthropology.  Furthermore, it can lead to deepened 
reflection of the “female” side of anthropology that is often missing in many discussions 
of what it means to be human or to be a follower of Christ, who is male.  One particular 
objection to Christology is the question of whether a “male savior can save women”.   As 
argued by other Christian feminist theologians, one can look at Jesus as the one who 
overturned such patriarchal relationships, and brought together a community of equals 
where women played a greater role.  Yet, this may not fully answer questions of 
embodiment, how these issues come to the fore when the maleness of Jesus is 
highlighted, and how such maleness is used to exclude women from certain functions 
within the Church.      
 Looking back at the ritual of the Great Bliss Queen and the focus not just on her 
story but also on the female body within the ritual, it would be interesting to delve into 
                                                
585 In the next section, I will look at how this model challenges Rita Gross’ contention of an androgynous 
model of persons. 
586 O’Neill, 155. 
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the figure of Mary and how we are to understand the female body with regard to 
salvation, especially since women’s bodies have been seen as inferior, as a source of 
temptation, etc. Rather, if we are to take seriously the story of Genesis where male and 
female were created, how do we begin to see women’s bodies as saved and as vehicles of 
revelation and salvation, the way that men’s bodies (as symbolized by the man Jesus) are 
usually understood.  This is another argument then for the insistence of taking both the 
figures of Jesus AND Mary in discussions regarding anthropology, particularly in 
speaking about the body and the issues regarding divine embodiment.   
 First, remembering the importance of the body, in particular the female body as a 
symbol in the ritual of the Great Bliss Queen, I am led back to thinking about the body 
and its centrality in Christian anthropology, particularly in the belief in the resurrection of 
the body and soul.  Our hope in such a resurrection is based primarily on Christ’s 
resurrection from the dead.  However, in the Catholic Marian tradition too, we speak of 
the assumption of Mary including her body.  These Catholic Marian teachings such as the 
Immaculate Conception and the Assumption are understood to be symbolic statements 
that refer to all believers, and to the church so that “the doctrine of the assumption is not 
an occurrence exclusive to Mary ‘since, as a matter of fact, it happens to all the 
saints.’”587  In this case, female believers are then once again subsumed into the 
“common humanity” which is usually (implicitly or not) seen as male or just an 
                                                
587 Elizabeth Johnson, “The Symbolic Character of Theological Statements about Mary” Journal of 
Ecumenical Studies 23/2(Spring 1985): 333.  There, Johnson notes how it is interesting that interpretations 
of Mary either “take away her being a woman” by equating her with all humanity, or by highlighting her 
being a woman but equating her “womanness” with “feminine traits” of “passivity,” “compassion, etc.,” 
qualities that are not always empowering for many women (or at least not balanced or not fully reflective of  
the experiences of women and their agency). 
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androgynous body.  Is there a way then that the focus on the assumption can also 
highlight the fact of the assumption of a female body; that corresponding to the 
resurrection of the male body of Christ is the assumption of the female body of Mary?  
Would such a correlation once again highlight the universality of salvation, of the hope of 
the resurrection of both women and men, female and male bodies, and giving value to 
women’s bodies as well?  Would this strengthen O’Neill’s contention of a humanity 
revealed in Genesis of being created both male and female as well as saved and 
resurrected as male and female? 
 These reflections on the positive images of the female body can lead to deeper 
reflections on the female body, not just as symbol of humanity but possibly as the symbol 
of divinity itself (just as we saw how the female body of the Great Bliss Queen was used 
to symbolize and reflect qualities of emptiness and compassion). In the Great Bliss Queen 
for example, the womb and other female organs were seen as emblematic of wisdom and 
the state of Buddhahood itself.  In the same way, one fruitful avenue within Catholic 
theology might be to look at the correlation between the understanding of the compassion 
of God and the “womb” or “uterus” For example, John Paul II, in the encyclical Dives in 
Misericordia, compares the compassion of God to the love of a mother for her child in 
the womb.  In fact, in the footnote regarding mercy in the Old Testament, John Paul II 
notes how the Hebrew word for “compassion” was rahamim which, “in its very root, 
denotes the love of a mother.”588  Here then we find the image of the God, usually 
portrayed as “abba” Father showing the motherly love, or “womb-love.” As such, Danny 
                                                
588 John Paul II, Dives in Misericordia, footnote 52. 
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Huang, a Filipino Jesuit concludes, “if compassion is the heart of abba, this father-God 
Jesus experiences and proclaims, then this father is not patriarchal, because this father is 
very much like a mother.”589 Hence, such positive reflections on women’s bodies can 
become an opening into reflections on the divine nature that break away from the usual 
patriarchal images of God as male. Furthermore, one can also begin to turn to the 
Christian medieval tradition where mystics such as Bernard of Clairvaux imagine Jesus 
as Mother, having breasts which sustain and nurture his followers. Could the retrieval of 
such images be helpful to balance the usually male imagery of God and give a more 
positive image for women who can then begin to see themselves as imago Dei, not just in 
their characteristics but also through their bodies?  However, not wanting to lock women 
into their “biology” (as wombs or just mothers), I wonder if the image of the Father with 
a womb (a pregnant man perhaps?) or Jesus with breasts can present enough of a “shock” 
value, again the “absurdity” or “impossibility” of just one person, one gender assuming 
all the characteristics of humanity, as argued by O’Neill above.  It can also shake us from 
our limited notions about “male” and “female”, our limited expressions of our 
understanding and experience of God, and remind us of the symbolic nature of all 
images.  This can be likened to the Buddhist reflections against attachment to views and 
how emptiness itself must be let go of.  Images such as a “pregnant man” or an “infertile 
mother” are used against attachments to view or a literal acceptance of such images in 
reality.  In this case, one can positively value the female and the female body without 
necessarily reifying “woman” and associating and reducing her only to her body while at 
                                                
589 Danny Huang, S.J. “‘God is our Father; even more God is our mother’: The year of God the Father and 
‘respect for women’s rights’” (speech, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, August 6, 1999). 
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the same time saying something about God without reifying God and forgetting that God 
is ultimately Mystery.  Here, the doctrine of emptiness, of using the raft and letting it go, 
might once again be a useful reminder so that women are not reduced only to their 
bodies, without saying that gendered bodies do not matter.590 
Beyond this, we once again focus on the specific example of Mary and what 
reflections about her can show us, not just about humanity but also about the divine.  
Elizabeth Johnson contends that “the Marian tradition has a great deal to offer to a more 
inclusive theology of God; that once this offer is received, the Marian tradition itself will 
be fundamentally redirected and refreshed, and that consequently one obstacle to the 
Church becoming a community of equal disciples will be diminished.”591 
 Just like the image of “womb-love” or compassion was seen to balance the male 
image of God, so too Johnson argues that the qualities of Mary, particularly in the 
development of a compassion-oriented Mariology, should be “transferred back to the 
source [God], so that the reality of the divine is thought ontologically to be 
compassionate, intimate, and caring, and is imaged to be such in female as well as male 
representations.”592  Furthermore, she also looks for inspiration in depictions or cults of 
Mary in other countries like Latin America and shows how devotion to Mary “signals 
Mary’s identification with the oppressed in the name of God. Consequently her cult 
expressly validates the dignity of each downtrodden person and galvanizes energy for 
                                                
590 In this case, the need to image God as both male and female (though never reducible to either) could be 
aided by Tibetan Buddhist deity yoga where the male-female figure in union functions as a central symbol 
of Buddhahood.  In an analogous way, one could claim that the Christian image of God would be 
completely lopsided without the female form.  
591 Elizabeth Johnson, “Mary and the Female Face of God” Theological Studies 50 (1989): 502. 
592 Ibid., 514. 
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resistance against dominating powers.”593  Here then is an image of Mary, not usually as 
the “passive” or silent woman, but as one who is active in fighting for liberation from 
oppression.  One could say, she is the one who “hears the cry of the poor.”  Hence, for 
Virgilio Elizondo, the devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe, “involved resistance by 
conquered people not only to the European invaders but to the male God in whose name 
they dominated.”594 
 In these articulations then of the “female face of God” as inspired by Mary, 
Johnson cautions that they may still be interpreted as stereotypically feminine which 
define women in preconceived categories that complement the male.  However, she also 
contends that such characteristics of “mothering, compassion, and presence, so particular 
to the historical experience of women are being reclaimed, reimagined, and 
revalued…”595 In other words, though these characteristics may be particular to the 
historical experience of women, they are not limited only to women, but again are part of 
the fullness of humanity.  Furthermore, such explorations of aspects of Mary and the 
“female” or “feminine” represents “a missing or underdeveloped piece in our repertoire 
of references to God and, as shaped by women’s experience, should be allowed to 
connote and evoke the whole of the divine mystery in tandem with a plethora of other 
images.”596   
                                                
593 Johnson, “Mary and the Female Face of God,” 514. 
594 Ibid. 
595 Ibid., 525. 
596 Ibid., 526. 
  284 
 Many of these images of Mary are found not only in the teachings about Mary but 
in Marian devotions, in spiritual practices and rituals about Mary.597  What we find then 
is that spiritual practices can bring about the exploration of the fullness of what it means 
to be “woman” and what it means to be human.  In the “giving up” of the limited sense of 
self, of giving up “knowledge” of what one knows of “male” and “female”, of 
“humanity” and “divinity”, the specific focus on the reflections of being female, of being 
woman, can open the doors of the imagination to a vision fuller than these limited 
notions, of a vision that encompasses both male and female in a fuller theological 
anthropology and a more wholistic sense of Christology as well as the doctrine of God.  
They are visions that hopefully reflect and respect the reality and experience of women 
while at the same time not reifying or limiting them.  It is such visions that can affirm 
women and their sense of self, and empower them to find communities that give them 
life, and to give life back to such communities and to society.  Furthermore, such visions 
could also breathe life back into practices which as Grey says have excluded the 
humanity of women, and revalorize or retrieve practices that speak more to women’s 
experiences and empower them as women and as children of God to fight against 
suffering in this world.  One of the main challenges then, as highlighted by the 
conversation with Buddhist feminists and the importance of meditation, is naming such 
Marian practices and devotions (that are reflective of this new understanding of Mary and 
of anthropology), adapting them and making them accessible in ways that can become 
empowering of self and relationships, that bring us closer to realizing the vision of the 
                                                
597 Maybe more accurately, the teachings about Mary reflect popular piety and devotion to her in people’s 
spiritual lives. 
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human community that O’Neill described.  As seen in the discussion above, the teachings 
and the reinterpretation of them in light of the Christian feminist critique is being done, 
but the question of how this is then translated into individual and communal practice still 
remains.   
III. A Christian response to the Buddhist feminist discussions on emptiness and the 
search for a relational self 
 
 In the previous section, the focus has been on the main comparative theological 
task of learning from Buddhism in order to gather fresh insights into the Christian 
feminist issues regarding kenosis and the role of the spiritual life in the understanding and 
living out of “right” relationships.  This section focuses on the differences between the 
Christian feminist and the Buddhist feminist discussion and the challenges and questions 
that the Christian discussions may pose to the Buddhist feminist discussions on emptiness 
and the spiritual path.  Such may be difficult but is still part of the comparative process.  
As Clooney says,  
Strong arguments in favor of one’s own tradition often go along with critiques of others’ 
theological positions, and theologies are often confessional and apologetic at the same 
time, testifying and criticizing, explaining and arguing, persuading and disproving. But 
even criticism need not be a problem if it is offered respectfully and professionally.598 
 
 The Christian feminist discussions regarding self and right relationships are never 
divorced from the Christian emphasis on community and ecclesiology, as well as the 
insistence that spiritual practice is about finding right relationship with God.  For this 
reason, there was Coakley’s insistence on understanding the self as being part of the 
Body of Christ as well as Grey’s focus not only on individual kenosis but on the kenosis 
of the church, seeing the community’s impact on the individual person.  One aspect of the 
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previous section demonstrated how the Buddhist understanding of emptiness as 
dependent origination could enrich this Christian vision of community.  This section will 
focus on how the Christian understanding of community, communal worship and 
responsibility to the earthly community challenges the Buddhist feminist discussions on 
the suffering and liberation of women.  It will also trace possible new implications of 
understanding emptiness as the interdependence of all things, and how suffering 
(including the suffering of women) comes about due to causes and conditions, not only 
by individual choices but collective delusion.  Such discussions may add a further 
dimension that can empower the Buddhist feminists’ search not only for a strong 
relational self, but also how to find it within the Buddhist community, the sangha.  Other 
topics will include how to live out compassion for others in ways that lead to the 
liberation of women from their specific suffering that allows them to truly be free and 
enlightened and work for the liberation of everyone else.  The discussion in this section is 
informed not only by my own Catholic lens and the discussions in the previous chapters, 
but also by some Western Buddhists who have articulated what Christianity has offered 
for their own understanding of Buddhism.  I trace the possible implications of their 
thoughts for Buddhist feminist discussions regarding self, emptiness and the power of the 
sangha and spiritual practice. 
Social dimension of the doctrine of “no-self”/causes of suffering  
 
In Rita Gross and Anne Klein’s discussion of the suffering of women, they took 
the traditional understanding of “no-self” and emptiness and used it as a feminist tool to 
critique the dynamics of gender and gender roles in society and how this has led to the 
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suffering of women.  They discussed the tendency to reify what gender means as “male” 
or “female” that has locked women and men into certain roles based on social 
construction which is an illusion.    However, Christian feminist analysis (also influenced 
by liberation theology) moves beyond an individual to a social analysis of sin and 
suffering.  Mary Grey touched on this when she talked about how individual disordered 
desires lead to the fragmentation and separation in society today.  What liberation 
theology has added, and what is emphasized about social sin or the communal nature of 
sin, is that such fragmentation and separation in society then affect individuals in their 
formation and in their capacity to choose the good.  This has been one of the main 
streams in the Christian understanding of sin in its social dimension; that the state of sin 
and one’s own capacity for freedom is diminished by the choices of others that in turn 
influences our own choices.  Hence the temptation to sin is greater in light of the “sin of 
the world.”   
Considering this Christian social analysis of sin, Buddhist analysis of suffering 
and its origin in individuals could then be extended to a more social analysis of suffering 
and its impact on the individual’s suffering.  One could look at the vision of 
interdependence in Indra’s net and look at the “negative” side of such interdependence.  
Instead of a vision of bodhisattvas and their enlightenment, we see instead unenlightened 
beings reflecting their unenlightenment upon others building a tower of delusion and 
suffering.  This would be the doctrine of samsara, of being caught in the web of 
suffering.  In this case, it takes on another dimension by looking at how one is not just 
caught in a web with others, but how each one keeps the other caught in this web. 
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Individual personal delusion contributes to the universal delusion that influences 
another’s capacity to decide and fuels the other’s own delusion and disordered desires.  In 
particular, for Buddhist feminist analysis, one could add that a woman’s false, negative 
image of herself and her role in society could also be seen as part of the false reflection of 
that image upon her by others and by society.  This is part of the difficulty of moving out 
of such reification of “self” and “other”, of “male” and “female”; because a false image 
of “woman” and “man” is constantly reflected by society, keeping everyone trapped in 
the gender net of delusion and suffering.  In other words, whereas Christianity can learn 
from Buddhism new ways of understanding the mechanism of desire, acquisition, and 
temptation that leads us to personal sin that affects society, Buddhism can look at how the 
choices of others seen as social conditioning or collective delusion affects one’s delusion 
and suffering.  In particular, one can look at the specific ways that women suffer under 
such gendered collective delusions, not just as individuals but in many social issues that 
affect women in the world today (sex trafficking, domestic abuse, labor/slavery, etc.).  
This could complexify and enrich the understanding, not just of individual suffering but 
the collective social suffering that is also part of our suffering as individuals and how 
individual delusion and suffering result in these social ills.599  Furthermore, this could 
also strengthen the analysis that without some sort of liberation from such social 
suffering, individual enlightenment or liberation may be harder to achieve.  The causes 
and conditions for enlightenment may not be as optimal, or may not be there at all, given 
                                                
599 Such analysis on how individual delusion results in social ills have been done by some Buddhist writers 
such as David Loy in The Great Awakening: a Buddhist Social Theory (Boston: Wisdom Publication, 
20030, as well as other engaged Buddhists such as Sulak Sivaraksa (a Thai socially engaged Buddhist 
writer) as well as Thich Nhat Hanh. 
  289 
such suffering and such conditions for women and men. Hence, to work for the liberation 
of all beings includes not just working toward their personal enlightenment but freeing 
them from the social conditions that hamper or prevent the possibility of conditions of 
such enlightenment from happening. 
Communal dimension of enlightenment/awakening/liberation 
If it is accepted that part of the “negative side” of interdependence is mutual 
blindness or a shared delusion, then the task of enlightenment can never just be a personal 
task but also the task of the community.  In this case, it goes beyond the usual 
understanding of the bodhisattva as one who sees individual liberation as inseparable 
from the individual liberation of all beings.  Rather, this moves toward asking about the 
role of the community, of the sangha or of spiritual friends (kalyanamitra) in one’s 
individual liberation so that instead of reflecting deluded images, such friends and 
communities become part of one’s individual path to enlightenment.   This case was 
made by Mary Grey, on the Catholic side, when she argued against the ideal individual 
hero model which disempowers communities from taking responsibility for their own 
action in the world.  She also discussed the role of worship and the worshipping 
community as the place where the individual “recovers” heart, and helps one remember 
who they truly are.   
John Makransky has discussed how Christian ecclesiology was helpful in his own 
understanding of the communal understanding of the path to awakening. He noted how 
the Buddhist path is usually framed as an isolated or solitary path especially as it came to 
the West.  However, his understanding of the Christian teachings regarding the body of 
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Christ and the communal nature of creation and salvation, led him back to the Buddhist 
tradition where he noticed how “buddhahood, embodies itself not just as individual 
attainment (rang don, dharmakaya) but as a power to coalesce communities of awakening 
(zhen don, rupakaya) and to incorporate bodhisattvas into bodies of buddhahood …”600 
Understanding then this intrinsically communal nature of the path to awakening 
could aid in Rita Gross’ suggestion of the revalorization of the sangha, seen as the poor 
third among the three Jewels of refuge. The sangha then could be redefined as the 
communal place where one “recovers heart” or in this case where one is reminded of who 
they are in their basic goodness and Buddha nature.  It no longer needs to be seen as a 
gathering of people on individual paths, but rather a gathering of people empowering 
each other on their collective path to enlightenment.  It is within the community that 
understands the communal path of enlightenment that individuals can awaken each other 
out of their communal and individual delusions.  As Gross argues, the sangha is the third 
refuge because “no one becomes enlightened, or even develops basic sanity, without the 
matrix of adequate communal and relational existence.”601  The responsibility then that is 
the consequence of such a communal path could become the foundation for the 
transformation of the sangha to one imbued by feminist values such as friendship and 
nurturance, as Gross suggested.  Moreover, it could also emphasize other ritual aspects 
that are communal in nature and further build this new sangha.  Thinking beyond 
individual spiritual practices, shared practices that can strengthen bonds among women 
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and empower them will also be helpful in their own individual processes.  In this way, 
apart from meditation practices, there could also be the revalorization of other ritual 
practices such as feasts or offerings and how such rituals can foster community and a 
greater shared practice with one’s spiritual companions (kalyanamitra).  Such 
revalorization then can revitalize the community and its practices in ways that truly 
embody the interdependent nature of all things, particularly the interdependent nature of 
awakening.  It underscores as well the importance of friendships and relationships, which 
as Gross and Klein have noted have sometimes been missed or underemphasized, 
especially as Buddhism entered into the culture of individualism in the West.   
It can also support Gross’ emphasis regarding the path of the Great Bliss Queen as 
one where interpersonal relationships and spiritual practice are intertwined. There she 
spoke of the transformation of one’s relationships due to spiritual practice but also how 
one’s practice can be enriched by one’s relationships.  In this case, one sees the 
communal nature of the path and that one cannot get there alone, but only by travelling 
the path with others. In so doing, the notion of “refuge in the sangha” could be further 
deepened as trust and faith in the community that enables one to begin to trust and have 
faith in one’s own self, especially if one is starting the practices and perceiving oneself as 
“weak” or “spiritually inferior.”  By giving oneself over to the community, taking refuge 
while one does not yet feel strong enough, they experience encouragement from the 
community that empowers their own practice and allows them to slowly build their own 
trust and faith in themselves.  
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One particular point of difference between the Christian and Buddhist feminist 
discussions regarding anthropology is the model of humanity.  Whereas Rita Gross 
argued for an androgynous model of humanity, Mary Aquin O’Neill has challenged the 
adequacy of such a model towards a model of humanity that involves community (instead 
of just one person balancing all “masculine” and “feminine” traits within them).  As 
discussed, Rita Gross did not see androgyny as the disappearance or nondistinction 
between “male and female” but the affirmation of the particularities of being “male” and 
“female” and to find that balance of “masculine” and “feminine” characteristics in each 
person.  However, as O’Neill argues, the balance of such characteristics can only be fully 
found in community or in relationships for no human life can encompass the fullness of 
human experience.  This for her is the anthropology in Genesis and why she offers the 
image of Jesus AND Mary together as the model for humanity, without respectively 
assigning “masculine” or “feminine” characteristics to them.  Could such an argument 
then enrich Gross’ articulation of androgynous humanity and the goal of realizing 
“masculine” and “feminine” characteristics within oneself to the need to find the 
wholeness of human experience in relationships and in community?  Would such an 
understanding come closer to the implications of dependent origination and seeing how 
others are constitutive of oneself and how no one can be an autonomous or individuated 
being?  Could this anthropology strengthen Gross’ reading of the story of the Great Bliss 
Queen and the importance of having spiritual consorts and spiritual friends 
(kalyanamitra) on the path?  Her path shows how others are constitutive of oneself but 
does not result in the dissolution of self but in the empowerment of self, and finding the 
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balance within oneself through an experience with the other.  Such then emphasizes 
relationality and interdependence and the realization that there cannot be a “self” without 
others or without community.  Balance can only be found and experienced with and 
through others.   
Social dimension of compassion: call for social action/justice in the world  
Empowered in such communities, Christian feminist discussions on solidarity and 
social justice might be useful for Buddhist feminist discussions regarding the meaning of 
compassion, not just in terms of meaningful and empowering interpersonal relationships, 
but in the social dimension of compassion, of freeing women and men from the social 
suffering that they encounter in the world today.  Karma Lekshe Tsomo believes that 
Christian women can learn much from Buddhism in terms of meditation while Buddhist 
women can learn more in terms of service to society.  Rita Gross herself has talked about 
finding a “prophetic voice” within Buddhism.   In particular she writes,  
Feminism, especially the Christian and post-Christian feminist thought with which I am 
most familiar can, with great cogency, be seen as in direct continuity with Biblical 
prophecy, in its true meaning of social criticism, protest against misuse of power, vision 
for a social order more nearly expressing justice and equity, and, most importantly, 
willingness actively to seek that more just and equitable order through whatever means 
are appropriate and necessary.602 
 
In this way, the Christian stance on justice, particularly liberation and feminist theology’s 
insistence on praxis can also serve to call Buddhist traditions into more social analysis 
and activity. 
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As John Cobb has argued, “to say that Buddhism is not an ethical religion or that 
lacks a social ethic can be extremely misleading.”603 However, one of the usual criticisms 
of Buddhism (including Kyoto school dialogues) by Christian theologians is how 
historicity may not be emphasized as much, or that the relative truth in Buddhism may be 
underdeveloped due to the greater emphasis on the ultimate truth of emptiness.  This 
results in the fact that, as Cobb says, a critical evaluation of social and political programs, 
or a judgment of social structures and their historical roles are not usually encouraged.604  
Some of this work is now being done, for example by Engaged Buddhists as well as 
feminists such as Rita Gross who, as we saw, argued for changes in Buddhist institutions 
and in society. But could such analysis and engagement in the world also be enriched 
through dialogue with Christian liberationist and feminist engagement with the world that 
focuses on particular social and historical realities that lead to suffering?  For example, 
John Makransky has described how the Christian concern with the God of Justice 
prompts him to “seek increased clarity on the meaning of unconditional compassion 
associated with the bodhisattva path of awakening” as well as “explore how communal 
dimensions of awakening in Buddhist praxis ‘knit’ Buddhist individuals and communities 
into inter-connected, integrated responses of service and action that respond to concrete 
needs and problems of societies and the natural world.”605  
This emphasis on seeking clarity regarding the meaning of unconditioned 
compassion has been the work of many Christian liberation and feminist theologians 
                                                
603 John Cobb, Beyond Dialogue,132. 
604 Ibid., 133. 
605 John Makransky, “Thoughts on Why, How and What Buddhists Can Learn from Christian 
Theologians”. 
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asking what “love”, “mercy” and “salvation” mean in the world full of suffering, in 
particular the suffering of the poor and suffering of women.  Such reflections could also 
challenge Buddhist feminist reflection on their own articulation of what “unconditioned 
compassion” means in the face of the physical and social suffering of women.  As seen in 
Chapter 2, their reflections have focused on the realization of wisdom and seeing how 
everyone shares the same nature and spiritual capacity.  Hence women should not be seen 
as different and inferior from men.  However, maybe emphasis could be given, not just to 
the personal differences among men and women but also to the social differences that 
have led to the suffering of women, and how such specific socio-historical contexts that 
have led to the suffering of women must be addressed, even challenged and changed, in 
order for such “sameness” to be truly realized. In this case, the realization of the ultimate 
view of emptiness and the “sameness” of all things does not lead to just an acceptance of 
the way things are or an escape from the realities of the world.  Rather, it is from such a 
view that one confronts and addresses the differences and how these have led to the 
specific suffering of people.  As John Makransky has expressed, “…buddhist 
compassion, as an unconditioned expression of wisdom, upholds something in persons by 
simultaneously confronting something in them. To uphold persons in their deepest 
potential of freedom and goodness is to confront us in all the ways that we hide from that 
potential – the individual and social inhibitions and structures that prevent us from 
responding fully to others with reverence and care.”606  Furthermore, though the 
realization of “sameness” may be one’s ultimate view, this does not negate the need to 
                                                
606 Makransky, “Thoughts on Why, How and What Buddhists can learn from Christian Theologians” 
Buddhist-Christian Studies 2011.  
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address the person in their specificity, so that one’s compassionate action toward a 
“victim” or a “victimizer” (though recognizing their Buddha nature) will take different 
forms, and require diverse ways of confronting their specific suffering and delusions.  In 
this case then, one is able to hold on to the ultimate view of the emptiness of all things 
and the importance of the relative view by analyzing the specific individual and social 
delusional ways that led to suffering, confronting them so that the truth of the ultimate 
view can be realized. 
Looking at this understanding of unconditional compassion as encompassing 
socio-historical realities leads back to the understanding of upāya (skillful means) as an 
expression of compassion (discussed in Chapter 1).  The doctrine of skillful means was 
about adapting the teaching of the Dharma to the specific needs of the students to 
facilitate their awakening.  One of the stories that depict this doctrine is that of Kisa 
Gotami who experiences the death of her child and cannot deal with the child’s death.  
The Buddha tells her to gather seeds from households who have not experienced such a 
death.  In doing so, she realizes the universality of the experience of death and loss and 
eventually comes to see that she is the same as others in their suffering and wanting to be 
free from suffering.  This leads to her own awakening and she ends up following the 
Buddha.  This is part of the expression of unconditional compassion.  However, as Klein 
argued, the doctrine of upaya, though focused on specific situations, does not delve into 
the details of a person’s life.  This is why she thinks feminism can contribute greatly to 
Buddhist practice.  But what the dialogue with Christian feminists could bring is not just 
the personal aspect but also one’s socio-historical context as part of the “specific needs” 
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of the student.607 Could the doctrine of upaya be expanded to look, not only on the 
specific personal circumstance but maybe also the ethical/social structures that prevents 
such spiritual awakening, in order to truly address the particular needs of the student and 
facilitate spiritual awakening?  In this way, unconditional compassion and spiritual 
liberation can be seen to also require specific action in the world that frees people from 
the physical suffering in this world which one recognizes as tied to spiritual liberation.608   
In this case, one could look at Kisa Gotami and wonder how or why her child died 
and maybe how it could be prevented from happening again? At the same time, one could 
still speak of the universality of the experience for women who experience the untimely 
death of their children (due to many social ills such as poverty, lack of health care, etc.).  
The sharing of such a painful episode could become a stepping stone for women like Kisa 
Gotami to band together, recognize the universality of their suffering and make sure that 
it does not happen to them or to others again.  This is not to say that unconditional 
compassion becomes limited to social change, but that social change is an aspect, another 
expression of unconditional compassion. Spiritual awakening then can only occur when 
both causes and conditions of one’s personal and individual as well as one’s social reality 
are all present.  
In the same way, the story of the Great Bliss Queen as seen in Chapter Three 
focused on her positive and negative interactions with others (particularly men) which 
                                                
607 This insight has been facilitated by the work of Leah Weiss Ekstrom on Buddhist pedagogy and the need 
to focus on the particular context and experience of women. 
608 See for example, John Makransky’s article “No Real Protection without Authentic Love and 
Compassion” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 12 (2005): 25-36.  There he used the story in the Cakkavatti-
Sihananda sutta to show the relationship between the fundamental causes of suffering and social suffering 
such as poverty.   
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brought about spiritual progress for her and for those others.  Could reflections on this 
story be enriched by going beyond “spiritualizing” her story to an examination of what 
happened to her at the hands of these men, and what socio-cultural limitations she had to 
break through?  In this case, issues of abuse and violence toward women could also be 
raised, confronted, and “universalized” to show the specific suffering of women that 
continues to happen today.  Spiritual “progress” cannot just happen without dealing with 
the social issues that hamper its progress.  Would such reflections then be more 
“realistic” and break the story of the Great Bliss Queen as an “ideal” for women to follow 
(glorifying her suffering in the process)?  It could now be a story that mirrors the 
suffering of women today, a story of suffering that must be fought in order that true 
liberation and enlightenment may come about.  This kind of reflection on her story could 
also help to respect women’s stories and reflect on their own suffering in light of the 
Great Bliss Queen.  In this way, one doesn’t just lose themselves in their identification 
with the Great Bliss Queen but actually use her story as the gateway to explore our own 
specific experience of suffering as women.  Such reflections could then help ease Anne 
Klein’s worry that in the ritual, women could lose their own personal stories thereby 
losing their own self in identifying with the Great Bliss Queen.   
On Kenosis as surrender to God and Buddhist refuge 
The Christian feminist discussions around kenosis, anthropology and action in the 
world inevitably revert to our relationship with God and how such empowers 
transformation in oneself and in the world. For this reason, the spiritual understanding of 
kenosis was emphasized in Coakley and Grey’s discussions.  In the same way, liberation 
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theology sees itself as grounded in spirituality.  Establishing a relationship with God 
through prayer or an active spiritual life empowers one’s actions in the world.  In the 
Buddhist discussions on emptiness and its realization through meditation and Buddhist 
practices, the focus has been on the transformation of the self; how a strong sense of self 
that is mutually dependent on others is realized through practice.  Furthermore, this 
transformation and empowerment of the self is usually seen as tapping into the previously 
unrealized potential of one’s own nature (Buddha nature).  This for example is what one 
sees in the discussions about the Great Bliss Queen and how one is ultimately tapping 
into a power that is one’s own, that one is truly discovering oneself in the ritual of the 
Great Bliss Queen.   This is one key point of difference between Christian and Buddhist 
practice that many Buddhists notice, that Christian spiritual practice focuses on the 
“other-power” of God whereas Buddhist practices focus more on “self-power” and the 
realization of one’s own potential.  For example, in a comparison of certain Buddhist and 
Christian practices, Robert Aitken concludes that,  
Most importantly, the presence of God sets the tone for Christian prayer, from the 
formulas of children and the assurances of Brother Lawrence to the plain but profound 
utterances of the Desert Fathers and the ‘blasphemy’ of Meister Eckhart [….] God must 
guide us to the elimination of his concept, that all things might be seen in their equality. 
For Yuan-Wu, however, the commentator on The Blue Cliff Record¸it is with individual 
human realization that the many beings are seen in their glorious light, and the Buddhas, 
sages, and masters, not to mention God or “God,” have no role whatever, and are, in fact, 
excluded…609 
 
Focus on God and “other power” is problematic from a Buddhist perspective 
since it may continue to reinforce dualistic thinking when there is a self and a God 
understood as outside oneself.  This kind of dualistic thinking could lead to suffering.  
                                                
609 Robert Aitken, “Formal Practice: Buddhist or Christian” in Christians Talk about Buddhist Meditation, 
Buddhists Talk about Christian Prayer, Rita Gross and Terry Muck, eds. (New York: Continuum, 2003) 
83. 
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However, this question of God and “other-power,” the question of the source of one’s 
empowerment and transformation leads to the question of what empowers Buddhist 
practices. Is it simply “self-power” and the realization that one has the nature of the 
buddhas and therefore has the qualities necessary to attain enlightenment?  This begs the 
question of the role of Buddhist refuge, of being part of the “community” of buddhas and 
bodhisattvas and the role they play in one’s own transformation, and in Buddhist 
women’s search for transformation and empowerment that is not a purely individual 
act.610   
For example, I argued that refuge in the sangha as one’s community of spiritual 
friends could strengthen the practice of women who start with feelings of inadequacy and 
spiritual inferiority.  Extending such reflections, refuge in the community of the buddhas 
and bodhisattvas, resting on the “strength of others who have gone before us” (similar to 
the reflections of the communion of saints in the Christian tradition), refuge in the 
buddhas and bodhisattvas who have accomplished what we currently feel unable to 
attain, the practitioner is enabled, inspired and empowered by the buddhas and 
bodhisattvas to begin and persevere in the path.  This for example can be seen in the Way 
of the Bodhisattva when in the beginning of the path, the practitioner “confesses” but also 
take refuge in the buddhas and bodhisattvas appealing to them.  It states:  
Nowhere help or refuge will be found. 
And sunk beneath the weight of sorry, 
Naked, helpless, unprotected –  
                                                
610 The focus on “self-power” and the realization of one’s own potential can be seen in the Buddhist 
feminist discussions regarding spiritual practice including the ritual of the Great Bliss Queen.  Of course, 
this is not a blanket statement for all of Buddhism.  For example, Amida Buddhism focuses on “other-
power” as seen particularly in the Nembutsu or the calling on the name of Amida for one’s liberation. 
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What, when this befalls me, shall I do?611  
 
Thus from this day forth I go for refuge 
To buddhas, guardians of wandering beings, 
Who labor for the good of all that lives,  
Those mighty ones who scatter every fear.612  
 
Gripped by dread, beside myself with terror, 
To Samantabhadra I will give myself; 
And to Mañjushrī, the melodious and gentle, 
I will give myself entirely.613  
 
These lines are usually understood as part of the motivation to enter the 
Bodhisattva path, fearing one’s death and the loss of the opportunity for enlightenment, 
one seeks refuge.  However, as mentioned, before immediately “spiritualizing” such 
texts, would it bring forth another dimension to think of the ways that women are “naked, 
helpless and unprotected” and what refuge could mean in that sense?  Furthermore, it 
highlights the entrance to the path where one comes in “weak” and needing to “give 
oneself over” to the community in order to draw strength from them.  In such re-thinking 
of the notion of refuge, the point is to shift the emphasis from one’s own power to the 
kind of “communal well” of love, compassion, etc. that is “created” by the web of 
interdependence.  It is not just tapping into and realizing one’s own power as one realizes 
that one has the nature of the Buddha. It is also tapping into the “common consciousness” 
of the buddhahood of all things, tapping the dharmakaya, and drawing on the love and 
compassion that does not belong to anyone in particular but to everyone in this 
interdependent web of relations.  Within such refuge, “letting go” or “giving oneself 
entirely” into the web of relations, we can rest and relax.  We do not have to take the full 
                                                
611 Shantideva, 2:46. 
612 Ibid., 2:47. 
613 Ibid., 2:49. 
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burden of loving others or liberating others which can be exhausting especially if it feels 
like we are only doing this, using our own power, drawing on our repository of love and 
compassion which will always have limits.  Rather, refuge in the buddhas and 
bodhisattvas can mean tapping into that endless spring or fountain of love and 
compassion that all beings are constantly radiating.  Practice (and work in the world) is 
never simply to be understood as being powered solely by our own efforts and capacities.  
Rather we are tapping into the love and compassion of buddhas and bodhisattvas, in fact 
of all beings.614  Refuge becomes a reminder, not just of our individual capacities but of 
something that is coming from beyond ourselves and ultimately empowers our love of 
self and unconditional love for others.  Such love and compassion is limitless because it 
is the love that comes from the mutual dependence of all things.  It is also a reminder of 
how/why we are able to be liberated despite feeling weak or too trapped in samsara.  
This is what we take refuge in and what empowers practice.  Could this be another way 
for women to give themselves to the care of an empowering community, even to the care 
of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, when they feel that their work and effort are not 
enough?  As the Christian feminist theologians have insisted about God empowering the 
human in spiritual practice, so too Buddhist feminist theologians can think of refuge as 
                                                
614For example, John Makransky’s meditations start with visualizing benefactors as a way to eventually tap 
into the communal source of love and compassion, reminding the practitioner not just of what one has but 
of what is coming from beyond oneself.  See his book Awakening through Love. In particular,  he writes: 
“…spiritual benefactors who first learned to receive the enduring wish of love from others before them and 
then radiated that wish to us all. Buddhas, bodhisattvas, holy beings, spiritual teachers – many have blessed 
us with that radiant wish even before we had heard of them. From them, we can learn to recognize this, 
acknowledge it, receive it, participate in it, and pass it on.” Awakening through Love, 30.  
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that which empowers their practice and enriches the understanding of “empowerment” in 
the web of interdependence.615   
For John Makranksy, dialogue with the Christian notion of salvation (and debates 
between human effort vs. grace), emphasized this “other-powered” aspect on the issue of 
the agent of compassion and transformation.  He says,  
From this perspective, it would not be correct to say that the transformative power of the 
practice comes just from re-conditioning the subjectivity of the practitioner, as if the ego-
centered personality were the primary agent of the practice. The ultimate agent of tong-
len, gradually discovered from within its practice, is innate Buddhahood (dharmakaya), 
which works in and through the practitioner from beyond her ego-centered mind, to do 
what is not possible for that mind.616 
 
 Such insight into the dynamics of Buddhist practice can be helpful for Buddhist 
women who are coming in with feelings of inadequacy or inferiority.  Furthermore, it 
once again highlights the communal aspect of spiritual liberation and unconditional 
compassion implied in the doctrine of dependent origination.  It also helps to articulate an 
empowering way for women who do not have to rely just on themselves (doesn’t this fuel 
one’s delusion about self as independent and autonomous?) but also on the greater 
community of the sangha, and the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, not just for their 
“individual” transformation/empowerment but for the transformation of society as well.  
It also shows how one’s agency works with the power of others (not fully reliant on just 
one or the other) in order to reach liberation and freedom from suffering. This articulation 
                                                
615 One important shift in the articulation of Buddhist refuge that may be particularly important for 
Buddhist women today is the retrieval and emphasis of spiritually mature women within this field of 
refuge.  Though the field of refuge has always included realized women in the past, present, and future, in 
the past, within patriarchal cultures that raised up men mostly as exemplars, spiritually women were not 
public figures.  In the present though this is changing and in the future it is likely that many women will be 
publicly known as realized sangha. For example, some Buddhist feminist teachers already include and 
emphasize female spiritual benefactors in their field of refuge.    
616 John Makransky, “Thoughts on Why, How and What Buddhists can learn from Christian Theologians”. 
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regarding “agency” goes back to the heart of issues regarding “dependence” and how 
there is a right kind of “dependence” on others which does not result in a loss of self or 
agency, but empowers such agency.  In that case, we cannot just let go of the language of 
“surrender” or “dependence” because if we take the doctrine of emptiness and dependent 
origination seriously, then some kind of “dependence” is necessary for the empowerment 
and transformation of the self.  Transformation cannot be done in isolation, but needs 
right relationships to make it possible.  In the Buddhist case, it requires refuge 
(understood as faith, trust and dependence) in the Buddha, the dharma and the sangha for 
empowerment.  In this space of refuge, we are able to do what “is not possible for the 
mind” to do independently of others and without tapping into that ultimate wisdom and 
compassion of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas that is one’s own power but also 
empowered by innate Buddhahood.  This is the power that the practitioner taps into in 
meditation practices.   
  




I.  The contribution of the interruption of the Buddhist feminist voice to Christian 
feminist theology in particular, and to Christian theology in general. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation aimed at a “double-
interruption” by bringing in the voice of the religious other into the discussion of 
Christian theology while also bringing the feminist voice into Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue.  From the beginning, I noted the analogous concern of our Christian and 
Buddhist writers: critiquing the notions of kenosis and emptiness while also showing how 
they could be retrieved in the discussions of a relational self and how this happens in 
practice.  The Buddhist insistence that emptiness (and the strong relational self that 
women search for, as Klein argues) can only be realized through spiritual practices 
supported Coakley and Grey’s move of understanding kenosis within the spiritual life. 
For Coakley, kenosis in contemplation can lead to the empowerment of self, of finding 
“power-in-vulnerability” that leads to a renewed understanding of the paradox of the 
cross and resurrection.  For Grey, kenosis within the spiritual life is what is necessary in 
order to fight the fragmentation that women experience, not only in their own selves, but 
also in our current culture. 
Moreover, in the previous chapter, I articulated the various ways that the 
interruption of the voice of Buddhist feminists enriches and deepens the Christian 
feminist discussions on kenosis and theological anthropology and the role of spiritual 
practices in these discussions.  There, I showed how Klein and Gross’ discussions on no-
self and emptiness broadened the Christian feminist discussion of kenosis to include the 
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notion of “letting go” of preconceived gendered notions of self and God, as well as 
valuing the body and emotions (which women are usually identified with) as one learns 
to let go of dualistic tendencies that lead to suffering. Understanding kenosis in this way 
serves as the foundation for the discovery of a self beyond the usual limited notion of 
women as “weak” or “passive” to a more empowered notion of self. It opens women up 
to new ways of understanding or experiencing themselves by learning to “let go” of old, 
sinful ways of self.  
In Klein and Gross’ articulation of how a strong yet relational self can begin to be 
formed through meditation (which includes the development of states of stability, calm, 
and nonjudgmental awareness which they argued are important for women), Coakley and 
Grey find support for their own articulation of how Christian contemplation and spiritual 
practices can serve to illuminate new ways of understanding the self and the self-in-
relation, and seeing these practices as the place where self-love and self-acceptance are 
cultivated in a way that opens us to a real love and attention to the other.  This sense of 
our relationship with others was described by Coakley as the discovery of our “mutual 
interpenetration” with each other as part of the Body of Christ.  As Mary Grey has 
argued, this search for new images and descriptions of our relationality can be supported 
by the images and descriptions of interdependence articulated in Buddhism, such as that 
of Indra’s net.  Images of interdependence such as these can lead, as all four feminists 
argue, to a real love and compassion for others. 
One of the major contributions of our Buddhist feminist authors to the Christian 
discussions has been their reinterpretation of wisdom and compassion.  In particular, they 
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emphasized how women should not start with compassion, but as Gross repeatedly stated, 
women must start with cultivating self-love and nonharming before one exercises 
compassion for the other.  Furthermore, they also emphasized how compassion for the 
other must begin with compassion for oneself, particularly by becoming attentive to the 
various layers of our own suffering and through that, to cultivate compassion for the 
suffering of others.  Ultimately, one must cultivate wisdom together with compassion to 
make sure that one’s compassion is effective, not covertly self-seeking, but also does not 
harm or exclude oneself.  As I demonstrated, this challenges Christian feminist discussion 
on kenosis and agape to emphasize the love of self, and to articulate the Christian virtues 
and vision necessary to support a love for the other that includes a love for oneself.  In 
those discussions, I offered the possibility of thinking about the virtue of prudence as an 
analogue to wisdom as that which can direct our actions in our various ways of relating to 
self and others.      
One of the main differences that emerged in these discussions was how Christian 
spiritual practice is centered on God and how Christians understand the whole practice to 
be empowered by God.  This, as mentioned, was problematic for many Buddhists who 
interpret this as a dualistic tendency that leads to further suffering.  However I 
highlighted how this particular aspect within the Christian feminist discussions could 
serve to deepen Buddhist reflections on what truly empowers their practice.  In so doing, 
I hope to have demonstrated the kind of interreligious learning that Boeve, Clooney and 
Roberts all argued for in the introduction.  It is a dialogue that does not reduce religions 
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to mere similarities but highlights differences in a way where true learning can occur, 
including learning more about our own tradition in a deeper way.     
In the end, the Buddhist feminist discussions on practices and the need for female 
imagery and models in these practices, led me back to Mary - to her story and to Marian 
devotions – as a rich resource that serves as an example of the kind of kenosis that 
Coakley and Grey argue for.   
II. The contribution of the interruption of feminist voices to Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue on kenosis and śūnyatā 
 
 In Chapter One, I reviewed the critiques leveled against the Masao Abe dialogues, 
in particular that of E.D Cabanne and Gregory Ornatowski. Both of these authors saw the 
need to recontextualize the Buddhist-Christian dialogue regarding kenosis and emptiness 
within the spiritual life/practices of both traditions, not limiting it to intellectual concerns 
but ultimately to the soteriological concern of both traditions to which these doctrines are 
tied.  In the previous chapters and as summarized in the section above, I have shown how 
both our Buddhist and Christian feminist writers were focused on recontextualizing 
kenosis and emptiness within the spiritual life.  More specifically, in response to 
Ornatowski’s suggestion to take into account other meanings of emptiness, the survey of 
Rita Gross and Anne Klein brought us back to the various meanings and uses of 
emptiness within Indo-Tibetan practices, such as its epistemological use against clinging 
to views.  This was helpful in reminding our Christian feminists writers of the 
“unknowing” and “unmastery” of our notions of self and God. It also allowed us to 
explore the notion of emptiness as interdependence and how this was a rich resource for 
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women in both traditions of re-articulating the kind of relational self that they are 
searching for.   
Furthermore, all four authors insisted on a kind of priority of spiritual praxis 
before ethical/political action.  For example, I demonstrated how Coakley argues for a 
new understanding of kenosis as the act of surrender or vulnerability and dependence 
within contemplation as the ground for greater engagement and commitment to others 
and the world, as well as re-contextualizing theology within contemplation.  I also 
described Klein’s argument for the importance of meditation, of mindfulness or 
visualization practices, in women’s search for an empowered self and empowering 
relationships. There too was Gross’ autobiographical narrative of how her meditation 
helped her to see the clarity in anger that allowed for more effective action without the 
negative emotion.  She emphasized the necessity of clarity and insight to ensure that 
one’s action is effective and appropriate, demonstrating how wisdom is necessary for 
compassion.  In the end, Gross summarizes the necessity of spiritual practice in the face 
of suffering and violence today, which echoes the sentiment of the other authors we have 
discussed.  She writes,  
What good is spiritual discipline in times when oppression and injustice are rampant and 
when vast numbers of people who claim they are religious favor aggression and violence 
as the way to cope with their pain … But what other than genuine spiritual discipline will 
give us the patience to continue in the face of such discouraging circumstances? What 
else will give us the patience to remain non-aggressive in the face of so much 
provocation? What else will enable us to continue to respond with kindness toward those 
who are aggressive and hateful to us, who would destroy or oppress us if they could? 
What else can sustain us in the face of pervasive sadness for ourselves and our world? 
What else can enable us to see so clearly the sacredness of our world and to treasure 
properly the incredible fragility of our lives? ….In many ways, we live in difficult, 
dangerous times. But one thing we can experience to a far greater extent than any 
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generation prior to our own is the ability to appreciate each other’s spiritual disciplines 
and their transformative potential.617 
 
 Despite the kind of “primacy” given to spiritual practice, these Buddhist and 
Christian writers also argue that spiritual practices must lead to ethical/political praxis in 
the world.  This, for example, was one of the key lessons learned in the reinterpretation of 
the relationship of wisdom and compassion, that to focus only on the cultivation of 
wisdom, without the practice of universal compassion (now understood to include 
liberation from social suffering and injustice after the dialogue with Christianity) is 
insufficient or is bondage.  Coakley argued this as well, stating that the practice of 
contemplation far from being an escape from the world leads to deeper engagement in the 
world, partly by forming us into people who are able to be more attentive, able to listen 
better to the cries of others and therefore better able to respond to particular needs of 
others.  The same point was also clearly demonstrated by Grey in her discussion of how 
Thomas Merton and Etty Hillesum’s spiritual lives brought them more deeply into the 
suffering of the world and need to fight against such suffering.    
In the end, the discussion of these Buddhist and Christian women on the 
importance of practice (in both senses described above) and how the teaching on kenosis 
and emptiness should not just be discussed and understood but practiced, contributes to 
the new direction in Buddhist-Christian dialogue that many of its participants argue for, a 
dialogue that addresses the social ills and reality of the people today, and ties the 
teachings more concretely to practice (both spiritual and ethical) showing their 
                                                
617  Rita Gross, “Conclusion” in Christians Talk about Buddhist Meditation, Buddhists Talk about Christian 
Prayer, eds. Rita Gross and Terry C. Muck (New York: Continuum, 2003) 156-7. 
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interdependence with each other in order to be relevant today.  As David Chappell, from 
the Buddhist side argues,  
Today, however, most Buddhist dialogue efforts imply that the present needs are not 
primarily intellectual but moral: how to act as partners to overcome social injustice and 
economic exploitation in both East and West by cultivating spiritual and communal 
values that will restore a global kinship and responsibility for each other and our Mother 
Earth. Contemporary Buddhists who advocate interreligious dialogue see this as a task 
not just for their minds and mouths, but also for their hearts and hands.618 
 
Paul Ingram, from the Christian side, echoes the same sentiment when he writes 
that: 
 
…“theological reflection, centering prayer, and interreligious dialogue without works is 
dead’ for the same reasons that ‘faith without works is dead.”  For me, a central point of 
the practice of faith is the liberation of human beings and all creatures in nature from 
forces of oppression and injustice and the mutual creative transformation of persons in 
community with nature […] Consequently, any religious practice needs to include focus 
on practical issues that are not religion-specific or culture-specific, meaning issues that 
confront all human beings regardless of what religious or secular label persons wear.619 
 
 Hence, the comparative work in Chapter Four opens up Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue in this new direction, broadening the discussions beyond doctrines and teachings 
into explorations of spiritual practice and effective action in the world today.  It also 
models the kind of solidarity needed in a fragmented world and the “interruption” that 
Boeve argues is necessary in this religiously plural context.620 
                                                
618 David Chappell, “Buddhist Interreligious Dialogue: To build a Global Community” in The Sound of 
Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogues in Honor of Frederick J. Streng, eds. Sallie King and Paul 
Ingram (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1999) 25. 
619 Paul Ingram, “On the Practice of Faith: A Lutheran’s Interior Dialogue with Buddhism” in Christians 
Talk about Buddhist Meditation, Buddhists Talk about Christian Prayer, Rita Gross and Terry Muck, eds. 
(New York: Continuum, 2003) 35. 
620 Furthermore, this attention to suffering, to ethical action and the work is liberation is necessary, not just 
in interreligious dialogue but in the work of comparative theology as well.  As Tracy Tiemeier has argued, 
“if comparative theologians do not more carefully interrelate culture, religions, and liberation, they run the 
(even if unintended) risk of being at best irrelevant and at worst a tool of the new imperialism.  Grounding 
comparative theology in cultural and socio-political considerations will not ‘dilute’ the intellectual rigor of 
the discipline; rather, it will deepen it.”  Tiemeier, “Comparative Theology as a Theology of Liberation” in 
The New Comparative Theology, 149.  
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 In broadening Buddhist-Christian dialogue into the realm of spiritual and ethical 
praxis, this work shifts the focus from Masao Abe’s concern of addressing irreligion to 
the challenge of addressing suffering (particularly, though not exclusively, the suffering 
of women).  I would argue (as Mary Grey has) that part of the reason for irreligion today 
is because religions do not address the specific suffering in the world and hence has 
become superfluous in many peoples’ lives   Furthermore, many people no longer find 
life-giving aspects of such religions in a world that has dealt so much suffering and death 
in the past century.  For this reason, Jon Sobrino, a liberation theologian, has argued that 
the only credible mark of the Church today is to become a church of mercy, and to take 
people down from their crosses and fight against injustice and suffering.621  In the same 
way, Mary Grey, as we saw, argued for the necessity to combat the fragmentation and 
alienation that is experienced in the world today and how Christianity must address such 
issues, in order to remain relevant and credible in the world today.  Of course, dialogue 
with Buddhism has shown how we cannot just concern ourselves with the obvious 
physical injustice and suffering that we see in the world today but also with the subtler 
levels of suffering that lead to actions that inflict suffering on people.  Hence, the 
relevance of religions today is contingent upon how they address the continued suffering 
and injustice in the world today, and how articulations of salvation or liberation must 
include such consideration.  This entails, as our Buddhist and Christian feminists argue, 
looking at religions themselves to see whether/how they may have contributed to such 
suffering. For this reason, my discussion of our various authors always began with their 
                                                
621 See Jon Sobrino, The Samaritan Church and the Principle of Mercy” in The Principle of Mercy: Taking 
the Crucified People from the Cross (New York: Orbis Books, 1994) 15-26. 
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awareness of how kenosis and emptiness are contentious doctrines for women.  For 
example, I focused on how Coakley was aware of how kenosis and practices of 
contemplation have been used to promote women’s dependence and passivity, and how 
Rita Gross observed that the wrong understanding of emptiness (of thinking that things 
on the relative level are irrelevant) has led to continued gender inequality in Buddhist 
institutions.    
However, it is also clear in the writings of these Christian and Buddhist authors 
that though patriarchal interpretations of Christian and Buddhist teachings and practices 
have contributed to the suffering of women (and other marginalized groups), Christian 
and Buddhist teachings and practices can also continue to be a resource for women, to 
become part of the “antidote” against the suffering in the world. This was their main 
project.  In particular, their attempt to retrieve and re-imagine the doctrines of kenosis and 
emptiness brought them back to their broader contexts of the spiritual practices within 
their traditions and the concern for salvation (in the Christian tradition) and 
liberation/enlightenment (in the Buddhist tradition).  In both cases, they highlighted the 
need for such discussions to move beyond intellectual/doctrinal interpretations into the 
level of practice and highlight the necessity to broaden the dialogue around kenosis and 
śūnyatā to focus on practice (both spiritual and ethical) in order to address issues of 
suffering. This shift to addressing suffering responds to Catherine Keller’s concern that 
Buddhist-Christian dialogues, by not taking into account these religions’ patriarchalism, 
may deepen the suffering of women.  Furthermore, the dialogue between our Buddhist 
and Christian feminists re-directed the previous conversation to include the specific 
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suffering of women, and in so doing, also articulated new ways of re-thinking their 
Buddhist and Christian doctrines and practices in ways that broadens the dialogue and 
opens new avenues of continued exploration. 
One particular avenue that should be explored in further Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue as well as in feminist comparative work is the inclusion of the voices, 
interpretations and concerns of women from other parts of the world such as Asia. As 
Tracy Tiemeier argues, comparative work needs to “move beyond the cultural monolith 
of white America by making sure that how and where we theologize is also reconsidered 
in light of new currents in Asian theology.”622 Her admonition highlights one of the limits 
of this work – that though it has considered the voice of the marginalized other (both 
women as well as the religious other), it is still a work that focuses on “white” 
European/North Americans and their particular Western feminist concern of searching for 
a self.  What particular concerns do Asian Christians and Buddhists have?  What images 
and practices do they find life-giving? It is necessary to develop a dialogue with the 
voices of Buddhist and Christian Asian women who could contribute in ways that teach 
us to become even more attuned to the voices of the other in the differences and in their 
particular experiences and concern.  The addition of these voices could critique the 
current project and help us to broaden our horizon of understanding.  Including these 
voices could then broaden our solidarity to a more global level while at the same time 
learning to become more sensitive to the particularities of our socio-historical-economic 
and cultural locations.  
                                                
622 Frank Clooney, “Response” in The New Comparative Theology, 197. 
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III.  The contribution to a renewed Christian theology 
In articulating the contribution of the Buddhist feminist voices for Christian 
feminist theology, it also became clear to me how this project also contributes to 
Christian theology in general.  In particular, the focus on praxis (both spiritual and 
ethical) in these dialogues supports current conversations within Christian theology 
regarding the relationship of spirituality, theology, and morality.   
Philip Sheldrake, in his book Spirituality and Theology, has traced the split 
between the two from the Middle Ages all the way to the Enlightenment period.  He 
concludes though that “Western theology and spirituality are in the process of 
overcoming an ancient and radical divorce that began in the late middle Ages and was 
reinforced by the Enlightenment. The last twenty years have seen the beginnings of a 
serious conversation between spirituality and theology. This is vital to both.”623  
Specifically, he points to liberation and feminist theology as important movements that 
have influenced the reintegration of spirituality and theology.  This kind of relationship 
between spirituality, theology and morality is what we see argued for by both of our 
Christian feminist writers, Sarah Coakley and Mary Grey.  For example, Coakley points 
to the necessity of a contemplative theologie totale.  She argued for the importance of 
starting with contemplation in order to come to a deeper understanding and articulation of 
Christian doctrines as well as the cultivation of the proper humility (the “unknowing”) 
that is required so that we are always open to that “knowledge-beyond-knowledge”, the 
Mystery of God.  It is also such a practice that cultivates a true attentiveness to the 
                                                
623 Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology: Christian Living and the Doctrine of God (New York: 
Orbis Books, 1998) 95. 
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marginalized other which becomes the foundation of one’s action for them that is more 
than just mere “good political intentions.” Mary Grey too, as we saw, argued for the 
development of a feminist spirituality that could address the current state of 
fragmentation in the world, through a re-ordering of our desire back to God and to the 
other.  These kinds of feminist work then contribute to the work being done today by 
contemporary theologians that reintegrate spirituality, theology and morality.   
A major contribution of this project is the dialogue with Buddhist feminists that 
reinforces this wholistic understanding of theology. In the Buddhist feminist discussions, 
I emphasized how intimately connected the teaching of emptiness was with the practice 
of meditation (that is, how emptiness is realized/experienced in meditation and how 
meditation practices led to new articulations regarding emptiness), as well as how 
wisdom and compassion were interdependent.  This reminded us of how Christian 
practices of agape or kenosis must be done with the wisdom or vision of interdependence 
(and love of self, other and God) that can only be cultivated through spiritual practices.  
Furthermore, the dialogue with Buddhist feminists (who used emptiness as a tool against 
clinging to views) showed how the doctrinal understanding and articulations of God must 
always be challenged and enriched by a spiritual discipline of “unknowing” that moves 
us out of a sense of superiority of “knowing” God and other that blocks true knowledge 
and wisdom. On the other hand, the Christian stance on justice, and particularly liberation 
theology’s insistence on praxis, also serves to call Buddhist traditions into more social 
analysis and activity, and as I argued, a deeper looking at the “negative side” of 
interdependence.  As we saw, Karma Lekshe Tsomo has said that she thinks Christian 
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women can learn much from Buddhism in terms of meditation while Buddhist women 
can learn more in terms of service to society.  Rita Gross herself has talked about finding 
a “prophetic voice” within Buddhism.  Here, we see the ways that Buddhists and 
Christians can help each other to critique their traditions and renew them in order to face 
the situation in the world today.  This encounter between these Christian and Buddhist 
feminist writers is a good example of how theology must be related to spirituality and 
ethics.  It also begins to explore the impact of other religions for Christian theology and 
spirituality.  This was one of Sheldrake’s concerns when he observes the current context 
of the global encounter of world faiths and writes that: 
…Raimundo Pannikar, argues that whereas Christian theology traditionally operated 
within what he calls a “dialectical dialogue” (that is, by argument against ‘the other’) it 
now needs to accept a “dialogic dialogue” that is open to the values of ‘the other.’ The 
disturbing impact of this new context for Christian theology and spirituality has hardly 
begun to be explored.624   
 
All this points us back to understanding theology as engaging the whole person – 
head (doctrine), heart (worship), and hands (moral), or as Miguel Diaz would argue, a 
theology is not just faith seeking understanding, but also faith seeking justice and as well 
as adoration.625  This emphasizes the importance of the reintegration of spirituality and 
theology which we saw was argued by our Christian feminist authors and supported by 
                                                
624 Sheldrake, 60. My point above of how the Buddhist feminist insistence of nonclinging to views 
challenges Christian feminists to a spiritual “unknowing” that leads to doctrinal humility is also relevant to 
the development of this “dialogic dialogue” that Sheldrake seeks.  As Catherine Cornille has argued, one of 
the conditions important for interreligious dialogue is humility, and yet within Christianity itself, “it 
[humility] has more often been regarded as an attitude to be adopted toward rather than about the truth of 
Christian doctrine.”  Catherine Cornille, The Im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue (New York: 
Crossroad Publishing Company, 2008) 28.  She also contends that dialogue with Buddhism could enrich 
the Christian understanding of humility since Buddhist discussions of humility include humility about all 
doctrinal formulations.  Cornille, 54. 
625 Miguel Diaz, On Being Human: US Hispanic and Rahnerian Perspectives (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 
2001) 18. These three approaches are taken from Gerald O’Collins, Retrieving Fundamental Theology: The 
Three Styles of Contemporary Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1993). 
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the Buddhist feminist writers discussing their own concerns about the links between 
practice and teachings.  In the end, the dialogue among these feminists emphasizes not 
just this wholistic aspect of theology, but that such a wholistic theology demands 
PRACTICE! PRACTICE! PRACTICE!626 This is the key message that both our 
Christian and Buddhist feminist authors emphasized.  Furthermore, Sheldrake himself 
argues that “[t]heology as a whole, not merely spirituality, is practical and needs to be 
practised.”627  Moreover, both disciplines (of theology and spirituality) imply some kind 
of transformation in one’s search for truth for “there is never an authentic disclosure of 
truth which is not also transformative.”628  This is exactly what we found our writers 
arguing for in the end: practices that lead to the transformation of the self, of society, and 
of their institutions, both Buddhist and Christian (in their teachings and practices) in ways 
that can become more life-affirming for all.  Such transformations of the self were 
probably best expressed by Coakley, as previously quoted, in what she hopes are the 
fruits of practice for women:  “personal empowerment, prophetic resistance, courage in 
the face of oppression, and the destruction of false idolatry.” On the other hand, both 
Mary Grey and Rita Gross argued for the transformation of their communities, of the 
                                                
626 The Buddhist-Christian feminist dialogue that I have undertaken has emphasized the importance of 
practice understood as both ethical as well as spiritual practices. Hence, a faith that does “justice” and 
“adoration” as mentioned.  This same dual notion of practice is observed by Paul Knitter in his own 
encounter with Buddhism.  He says that there is “‘practice’ in its Buddhist sense – the daily exercises that 
one follows in order to stay in good spiritual shape,” and there is “‘practice’ more in its Christian meaning 
–the activities one performs in order to live out one’s spirituality in the world, local and global. 
Generalizing grossly, what Buddhists mean by practice is more interior and personal, while what Christians 
mean is more external and social.” Knitter, Without Buddha I could not be a Christian, 167.  As Knitter 
notes, these are gross generalizations, and as I have demonstrated, both our Christian and Buddhist feminist 
authors are concerned with both kinds of practice, arguing for the necessity and interdependence of both, in 
order to deepen one’s spiritual life and empower one’s commitment to the suffering world. 
627 Sheldrake, 22. 
628 ibid., 23. 
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Church and the sangha, to become places where the transformation of the self and society 
can begin.     
In the end, my hope is that this work on the comparison of Buddhist feminist 
discussions on emptiness and the Christian feminist discussions on kenosis is 
performative of the power of kenosis and the kind of mutual learning and transformation 
that can happen in the dialogue with another tradition.  Moreover, it provides the 
“interruption” that I described in the introduction, the kind of interruption necessary for 
growth and a deeper understanding and discovery of self, other and God, particularly in 
our interreligious encounters and in our articulations about our understanding of 
theological anthropology and the relationship between self and o/Other within Christian 
theology.   Ultimately, my interruption sheds new light on unexplored areas within 
Christian theology and Buddhist-Christian dialogue.  I hope that such interruption 
provides light and hope in this suffering world, partly fragmented by religious and 
cultural differences, showing ways that religions can learn with and from each other (and 
how these religions can learn from the voices of) in ways that are fruitful to both but also 
address the greater need in the world, the alleviation of suffering in all its forms.   
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